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← 650 F.2d 860 - Crick v. Smith

Crick v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

650 F.2d 860 · 1981

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
December 2002
most recently cited

20 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Johnson v. Zerbst · Wainwright v. Sykes · Fay v. Noia · Kent v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “deliberate bypass” rule and requiring deference to states' contemporaneous objection requirements, in the absence of a showing of "cause” and "prejudice”, are the following: (1) A contemporaneous objection requirement allows the record of the constitutional claim to be made when the recollections of the witnesses are freshest, rather than years later in a federal habeas [ ] corpus proceeding. (2) It allows the judge who observed the demeanor of the relevant witnesses to make the factual determinations necessary for deciding the federal constitutional question. (3) Contemporaneous objections give the trial court an opportunity to cure the claimed error, thereby making a major contribution to the finality of criminal litigation. (4) Compliance with a contemporaneous objection rule may cause the prosecution to reassess its request for the admission of evidence when confronted with claims which would indicate the possibility of reversal by the state appellate courts or upon federal habeas corpus review. (5) The rule in Fay v. Noia could encourage “sandbagging”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Whether it can be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile judge in Kentucky, in 1973-74, having omitted the statutory findings of “best interest” in the transfer order would not, on being apprised of the omission, have changed his decision and reasserted juvenile court jurisdiction over the defendant under the circumstances which existed in this case.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “exactly what remains of the deliberate by-pass rule ... after Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, appears deliberately to have been left uncertain ....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.