Roth v. Guzman’s Empirical Analysis
650 F.3d 603 · 2011
Citation profile
11 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably McDonough v. Anoka County (2015), Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (2013)
11 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 18 U.S.C. § 2722 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 18 U.S.C. § 2725 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Ashcroft v. Iqbal · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton · Mitchell v. Forsyth
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft.... (3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only— (A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business or its agents ...; and (B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud.... (4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding. ... (5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical reports.... (6) For use by any insurer ... in connection with claims investigation activities.... (7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles. (8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection. (9) For use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify information____ (10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities. (II) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains. (12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information per”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he starting point is the ordinary meaning of the statute. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 , 105 S.Ct. 638 , 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) (“In construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed ‘accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ ”) (citation omitted). If the language of the statute is clear, the plain meaning of the text must be enforced. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 , 109 S.Ct. 1026 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 , 117 S.Ct. 843 , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). When a plain reading “leads to ambiguous or unreasonable results, a court may look to legislative history to interpret a statute.” Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir.2002). [Section] 2721(b)(3) provides that state officials may disclose personal information “[f]or use in the normal course of business ... to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business,” and to correct inaccurate personal information for the purposes of “preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against the individual.” Plaintiffs interpret the references to “the individual” in § 2”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.