¶1concurring.
¶2I reluctantly concur. Ramirez v. State, 590 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), a panel opinion, held that a defendant waived his rights under the Speedy Trial Act (Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P.), by pleading guilty. I was a member of that panel, and regrettably did not dissent. When the matter was considered by the court en banc in Luna v. State, 602 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and in Flores v. State, 606 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the same decision was reached. I joined the dissenting opinions in those cases because I concluded Ramirezwas wrongly decided and the majority in Lunaand Floreswas misinterpreting § 3 of Article 32A.02, supra. I still believe that way, and for that reason I concur in today’s opinion.
¶3However wrong the decisions in Ramirez, Luna and Floresmay have been, an interpretation of Article 32A.02, § 3, V.A.C.C.P., was established by this court which for almost three years has been consistently followed by this court, other appellate courts and the trial courts of this state. The Legislature has met and adjourned without action to change that interpretation. We will now undoubtedly be swamped with post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings concerning the change in our interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act. Law that has been learned by the Bench and Bar will now have to be unlearned, and without question will not be unlearned fast enough to prevent many appeals and numerous new legal questions. The doctrine of stare decisis still has some meaning. There should be some finality in the decision-making process of this court.
¶4While I am glad to see the court finally interpret § 3 of the Speedy Trial Act properly, I reluctantly concur in today’s opinion for the reasons stated.