¶2At the outset of this opinion, we note that this case arises from a certification of the law by the Court of Appeals on application therefor by the Commonwealth. Discretionary review was granted by the court, which we have chosen to honor despite the fact that the acquitted movant herein has no standing to seek review by this court. There is simply no issue in which this movant has any interest, nor does our law extend to any acquitted person the right of certification of questions of law.
¶3§ 115 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that “... the commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than for the purpose of securing a certification of law ...” The Constitution is silent concerning which appellate court has jurisdiction to accomplish this end. The only rule relating to certification of questions of law is CR 76.37, which empowers the Supreme Court of Kentucky to answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the highest appellate courts of other states.
¶4Customarily, certifications of questions of law are issued by the highest court of the state. The basis for this is obvious, as intermediate courts are bound by applicable precedents of the highest court and without power to overrule them. See SCR 1.030(8)(a). To apply first to the Court of Appeals and then to this court constitutes an exercise in duplication and a waste of time and effort.
¶5Aware that the Commonwealth should have certified the questions here represented to this court, ab initio; realizing that this movant has no standing before us; and hoping that this problem will not appear again, we affirm the Court of Appeals and adopt and adapt its opinion, to-wit:
¶6“The [Commonwealth] requests this Court to certify the law with respect to three separate rulings made by the trial court. Such involve: (1) the admission into evidence of the prior criminal record of the victim to show his propensity for violence and aggression; (2) the admission into evidence of the prior criminal record of an individual possibly present at the time of the shooting, but who did not testify or appear at the trial; and (3) the submission to the jury of instructions allowing the defense of self-protection to charges of second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide.
¶7“In April of 1981, Lewis Earl Thompson, Jr., was indicted by the Jefferson County Grand Jury and charged with murder. KRS 507.020. As amended, the indictment charged him with “intentionally and wantonly causing the death of Danny Carman by shooting him with a pistol.” The shooting occurred early in the morning of November 20, 1980, outside the Left Field Lounge as [Thompson] attempted to break up a fight between several individuals, one of whom was the victim. After [Thompson] intervened, he struggled with the victim, and shot him at point-blank range. At the time of trial, [he] pleaded self-defense. Subsequent to a trial by a jury, [Thompson] was acquitted on all charges.
¶8“Initially, the [Commonwealth] argues that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in admitting into evidence prior criminal convictions of the victim. Such evidence was admitted to show the victim’s character for violence and aggression. In an in-chambers hearing held on the [Commonwealth’s] motion in limine that no reference be made to the victim’s prior criminal convictions, the trial court stated that such evidence was relevant and admissible in that it went to the question of who was the aggressor.
¶9“Notwithstanding the trial court’s logic, it is the settled law in this jurisdiction that evidence of prior specific acts are inadmissible to show a victim’s character for violence or aggression. In Parrish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 560 (1979), the Court stated as follows:
*80“Parrish testified that he was aware of the deceased’s reputation for being a person of violent character. He then attempted to testify as to specific incidents of violence. The trial court declined to admit this testimony and Parrish argues error.
“The rule in this jurisdiction is that once the defendant has adduced some evidence that he acted in self-defense, ‘Proof of the violent and dangerous character of deceased can only be made by evidence of his general reputation in the community for such character, and not by evidence of specific acts or general bad conduct, or of isolated facts, which are not connected with the homicide.’ Robertson’s New Criminal Law and Procedure, Second Edition, § 489, p. 657. See also Amos v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 836 (1974), and McGill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 470 (1963).
¶10Neither the law in this jurisdiction, nor the Federal Rules of Evidence, allow a defendant to prove character by evidence of prior specific acts. FRE 404(a)(3), (b). Such can only be proved by evidence of the individual’s reputation in the community, not by personal opinion, nor by specific acts of conduct. See Lawson’s, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.15(2), p. 16 (1976). As such, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence prior criminal convictions of the victim.
¶11“Secondly, the [Commonwealth] argues that the trial court erred in introducing evidence of prior criminal convictions of an individual who did not testify but was alleged to have been present at the scene of the shooting. It argues that such evidence was not only inadmissible, but irrelevant. We agree. It is a fundamental rule of evidence that evidence must be relevant to be admissible. O’Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., Ky., 413 S.W.2d 891 (1967). In that the individual was neither indicted, nor a witness at the trial, evidence of his prior criminal convictions was irrelevant. Furthermore, such evidence was inadmissible. See Abney v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 588 S.W.2d 714 (1979). On the contrary, such evidence may have been highly prejudicial to the Commonwealth.
¶12“Finally, the [Commonwealth] argues that the trial court erred in including in its instructions for second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide the defense of self-protection. It argues that a self-protection instruction does not apply to wanton or reckless homicide in light of KRS 503.030 and 503.020. Specifically, it urges this Court to reconsider its decision in Kohlheim v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 618 S.W.2d 591 (1981), in light of the 1974 commentary to KRS 503.120. This, we decline to do. As such, we hold that the trial court, under the facts presented to it, acted correctly.”
¶13All concur except VIRGINIA COLLINS BURBANK and ASA M. ROUSE, Special Justices, who dissent and file herewith separate dissenting opinions.
¶14dissenting.
¶15Since I reach a different conclusion, I must report my reason. The law is well-settled in Kentucky that evidence bearing on the character of the victim is admissible in limited circumstances, Lucas v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 281, 132 S.W. 416 (1910); Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 159 (1972). It is permitted in cases of self-defense to justify the action of the accused by proving the violent reputation known to the accused prior to the commission of the act for which he is charged. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, Section 2.10(c); Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 (1959); Wooten v. Commonwealth, Ky., 478 S.W.2d 701 (1972), Amos v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 836 (1974).
¶16It appears to me, however, that there are numerous cases in which the victim may be the aggressor, but his violent character and reputation therefor may not be known to the accused. In such instances, the jury is entitled to all material facts from which it *81can draw logical conclusions. The language of an early Kentucky case, Duke v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 138, 229 S.W. 122 (1921), suggests to this writer that evidence of a prior criminal conviction of the victim would have been admitted to show who was the aggressor, but for the incompetent manner in which it was offered. Justice Hurt, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
“The ruling of the Court in excluding testimony offered by him of which the accused complains is that he offered to prove by the clerk of the court that prior to the killing of Wells (the victim) ... was indicted, convicted and committed to the penitentiary for the crime of accessory before the fact to the crime of shooting and wounding the accused... [T]he clerk had [no] personal knowledge of the shooting and wounding of the accused or the connection of the deceased with it, and the offered evidence was doubtless excluded, and properly so, upon the well-settled principle that the best evidence of a fact must be offered, and anything less than the best evidence within the power of a party to produce is not competent, and the only way to prove the existence and contents of records which are in existence is the production of same. The bill of exceptions then recites that the appellant offered as evidence an indictment accusing the deceased of counseling and advising and paying Elgin David to willfully and maliciously shoot and wound the accused, but upon objection the reading of the indictment as evidence was excluded by the court. The indictment is copied into the bill of exceptions and it shows that the deceased was indicted for such a crime, and the name of the accused, as well as the names of five or six other persons, were indorsed upon it as witnesses. The record which must necessarily have been made as to the disposition of the indictment was not offered, nor is it embraced in the bill of exceptions. Hence the one question before us is the admissibility of the indictment as evidence alone. It is very clear that an indictment, which is a mere accusation, would not be competent evidence to prove anything alleged in it or anything beyond its own existence.”
¶17The rule of relevancy protects against misuse of such evidence and limits its use to prior convictions of crimes that are violent. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, Section 200. Moreover, a proper admonition to the jury will reduce the hazard of prejudice resulting from its introduction.
¶18I recognize that a prior criminal conviction represents a type of specific act or ats, but I do not find their exclusion under Kentucky cases binding or persuasive. Ray v. Commonwealth, 184 Ky., 800, 212 S.W. 908 (1919), Friley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 483 (1953), and, Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 (1959) all involved excluded testimony of a single or isolated act of violence. The opinions contain no rationale for their holdings. We are left to speculate if the basis of the exclusion is the singleness of the proffered proof, the risk of creating prejudice in the minds of the jury by a summary of the incident or some other basis. I would distinguish such cases, follow the federal rule, United States of America v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C.Cir., 1972)
¶19. The Burkscase has been considered indirectly by the Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, in a case in which the prosecutor failed to divulge to the accused the victim’s prior criminal record. The Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, noted that in ruling upon the motion for a new trial, the trial judge evaluated the significance of the victim’s prior criminal record in the full context of the trial, remained convinced of the accused guilt and, thus, did not deprive the accused of due process of law.