Hubbard v. Jeffes’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The absence of Miranda warnings does not vitiate consent to a seizure of personal property, because the Miranda protections are addressed to constitutional rights that are distinct from Fourth Amendment rights. Solicitude for individual privacy is the central thrust of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Privacy rights must be balanced, however, against the interest of the community `in encouraging consent [to a search], for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence of the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongfully charged with a criminal offense.' Schneckloth [v. Bustamonte,] supra, 412 U.S. [218] at 243, 93 S.Ct. [2041] at 2056 [, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 .] Inasmuch as the integrity of the fact-finding process may be enhanced by admitting evidence recovered from a search or seizure, the Supreme Court has not required a stringent standard for measuring voluntariness in the Fourth Amendment context. As the Court noted in Schneckloth, in refusing to impose the `knowing and intelligent waiver' standard, `almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.' 412 U.S. at 237 , 93 S.Ct. at 2052 . The Miranda rights implicate the reliability of the truth determining process, because they apply in an inhe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 211 N.J. Super. 321 - State v. Chappee

2. “a habeas petitioner, in order to overcome state court factual determinations, must demonstrate 'by convincing evidence' that the state proceeding was inadequate or the determinations clearly erroneous”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Meyers v. Gillis