United States v. Kitchell’s Empirical Analysis
653 F.3d 1206 · 2011
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 7 district · 8 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 3742 · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Illinois v. Gates · United States v. Place · Illinois v. Caballes · United States v. Hunnicutt
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[R]easonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous standard.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[t]o determine whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain beyond the scope of the traffic stop, we must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Although the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion, reasonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous standard. While reasonable suspicion cannot be based upon a mere hunch, it also need not rise to the level required for probable cause.... Indeed, a factor may raise objectively reasonable suspicions even if it is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In addition to being justified at its inception, a lawful traffic stop must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ]. That is, “[t]he investigative detention usually must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” [United States u] Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d [1345,] 1349 [ (10th Cir.1998) ](internal quotation marks omitted). In accordance with these principles, we have held that a law enforcement officer conducting a traffic stop “may generally request a driver’s license, registration, and other required papers, run requisite computer checks, and issue citations or warnings as appropriate.” United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.2004). In addition, “an officer may ask questions, whether or not related to the purpose of a traffic stop, if they do not excessively prolong the stop.” United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 , 1146 n. 1 (10th Cir.2010). However, “[o]nce an officer returns the driver’s license and registration, the traffic stop has ended and questioning must cease; at that point, the driver must be free to leave.” United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir.2009). Thus, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if i”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.