Securities & Exchange Commission v. Gabelli’s Empirical Analysis
653 F.3d 49 · 2011
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 4 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 77Q (§ 17 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 80B · 28 U.S.C. § 2462
Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Holmberg v. Armbrecht · Trw Inc v. Adelaide Andrews · Bailey Assignee v. Glover et al. · Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Market timing” refers, inter alia, to buying and selling mutual fund shares in a manner designed to exploit short-term pricing inefficiencies. A mutual fund sells and redeems its shares based on the fund’s net asset value (“NAV”) for that day, which is usually calculated at the close of the U.S. markets at 4:00 P.M. Eastern Time. Prior to 4:00 P.M., market timers either buy or redeem a fund’s shares if they believe that the fund’s last NAV is “stale,” i.e., that it lags behind the current value of a fund’s portfolio of securities as priced earlier in the day. The market timers can then reverse the transaction at the start of the next day and make a quick profit with relatively little risk. Mutual funds ... that invest in overseas securities are especially vulnerable to a kind of market timing known as “time zone arbitrage,” whereby market timers take advantage of the fact that the foreign markets on which such funds’ portfolios of securities trade have already closed (thereby setting the closing prices for the underlying securities) before the close of U.S. markets. Market timers profit from purchasing or redeeming fund shares based on events occurring after foreign market closing prices are established, but before the events have been reflected in the fund’s NAV. In order to turn a quick profit, market timers then reverse their positions by either redeeming or purchasing the fund’s shares the next day when the events are reflected in the NAV.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The fraudulent concealment doctrine ... is an equitable tolling doctrine, not an accrual doctrine. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, even when a claim has already accrued, a plaintiff may benefit from equitable tolling in the event that the defendant took specific steps to conceal her activities from the plaintiff. Thus, whereas the discovery rule does not ordinarily apply to non-fraud claims (as it is generally expected that a plaintiff will be able to discover the conduct underlying non-fraud claims), the fraudulent concealment doctrine may be used to toll the limitations period for non-fraud claims where the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant took affirmative steps beyond the allegedly wrongful activity itself to conceal her activity from the plaintiff.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[MJarket timing can harm long-term investors in the fund by raising transaction costs for a fund, disrupting the fund’s stated portfolio management strategy, requiring a fund to maintain an elevated cash position to satisfy redemption requests, resulting in lost opportunity costs and forced liquidations ... unwanted taxable capital gains for fund shareholders and a reduction of the fund’s long term performance.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.