State v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(d) Excluded Periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial: (1) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to motions to dismiss or suppress, examinations and hearings on competency, the period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, interlocutory appeals, and the trial of other charges. No pre-trial motion shall be held under advisement for more than 30 days and any time longer than 30 days shall not be considered as an excluded period. (2) The period of delay resulting from an adjournment or continuance granted at the timely request or with the consent of the defendant and his counsel. The court shall grant such a continuance only if it is satisfied that the postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal offenses. A defendant without counsel shall not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by the court of his right to a speedy trial under this rule and of the effect of his consent. (3) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the timely request of the prosecution, if: (a) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at the ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Nitz · State v. Williams

2. “(c) When Time Commences to Run. The time for trial shall begin running, without demand by the defendant, as follows: (1) From the date the defendant is arrested, initially arraigned, or from the date the charge (complaint, indictment, or information) is served upon the defendant, whichever is first. If the defendant is in custody or incarcerated on other charges at the time the alleged offense occurs, the time for trial shall begin running 10 days after the case is referred in writing by correctional officials to the prosecuting attorney, or 15 days from the time action is instituted in the correctional facility to impose administrative segregation, whichever is earlier. The arrest, arraignment, or service upon the defendant of a complaint, indictment, or information, relating to subsequent charges arising out of the same conduct, .or the refiling of the original charge, shall not extend the time, unless the evidence on which the new charge is based was not available to the prosecution at the time of the original commencement date of the 120 day period and a showing of due diligence in securing the defendant for the original charges is made by the prosecution; or (2) If the defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, from the date of mistrial, order granting a new trial, or remand. 21”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Williams

3. “A defendant can waive his right to a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 45, but a waiver should generally be only with the defendant’s informed consent. See Criminal Rule 45(d)(2). We do not have to decide in this appeal whether the prosecution could have used Williams’ waiver of speedy trial to charge him with tampering with evidence before his trial on the murder charge. However, it seems clear that in executing his waivers of his right to speedy trial Williams certainly did not intend to allow the state to try him on the murder charge and then, based upon the same evidence presented at the murder trial, later try him on a theory of tampering with evidence based upon the same conduct. We find that Williams’ waivers of speedy trial were ineffective as to a second trial based upon the tampering with evidence charge where the tampering with evidence charges were filed after his murder trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Nitz