Alvarez v. People

¶1The defendant, Pedro Patlan Alvarez, was convicted of second-degree assault1 after trial to a jury. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in People v. Alvarez, 624 P.2d 358 (Colo.App.1980), and we granted certiorari. The defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds. First, Alvarez argues that he was prejudiced by a juror’s use of a dictionary to aid her in understanding terms contained in the jury instructions. Second, the defendant claims his due process rights were violated when the trial court received evidence that he had been identified by a witness as one of the assailants during an inadvertent “one-on-one showup” at the police station shortly after the crime. Finally, the defendant asserts that the trial court violated due process requirements in allowing two witnesses to testify that they recognized a photograph of the defendant, taken at the police station on the night of the incident, as the man they had seen assaulting the victim. Although we find that admission of the disputed identification evidence produced no constitutional defects, we agree that the juror’s resort to a dictionary to determine the meaning of words found in a key instruction was reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶2I.

¶3This prosecution stems from an assault that occurred outside the Silver Moon Bar in Fort Lupton on June 21, 1977.2 That evening at about 8:00 p.m., Irma Gonzales and Salvador Velasquez were sitting in the bar drinking beer when an acquaintance of theirs, Ernesto Martinez, Jr., entered the bar and requested that Velasquez accompany him outside. Gonzales stayed inside the bar while the two walked out. Moments later, the barmaid called Gonzales’ attention to a fight that was taking place outside. Gonzales went out and saw Velasquez on the ground being kicked by three men. An acquaintance of Gonzales’, Joe Diaz, was standing by, neither participating nor attempting to stop the fight. Gonzales identified Martinez as one of the assailants and described the other two as a man in a white shirt, and a man in a black hat and coveralls, with a full beard and long hair. This description of the three men was consistent with less detailed information given by Juanita Lopez, a woman who lived across the street from the bar and viewed the incident from her yard and the adjoining street. After the assault, the three men and Joe Diaz got into Martinez’ pickup truck and drove away.

¶4Velasquez sustained a badly broken jaw and other injuries as a result of the beating. He was unable to describe the persons who attacked him and was unsure of their number.

¶5The defendant, Alvarez, testified that he was at the scene of the beating but that he attempted to stop it. Alvarez gave the following account of the events of the day. On the afternoon of June 21,1977, he drove from his home to Fort Luptón, where he and Joe Diaz met Ernesto Martinez, Jr., across the street from the Silver Moon Bar.3*1129Alvarez parked his pickup truck and the three men then rode together in Martinez’ truck to a number of sugar beet farms in the area looking for work. Alvarez described Martinez as a “crew leader,” a person hired to help in securing farm work.

¶6That evening, Alvarez’ testimony continued, the three men drove back into town, where Martinez stopped to visit his father. The three had been drinking beer throughout the course of the afternoon. Martinez went inside his father’s house while the defendant and Diaz stayed in the truck. When Martinez returned, he appeared upset, stating to the others that someone had been bothering his father that afternoon. Martinez drove his pickup to the Silver Moon Bar and went inside while Alvarez and Diaz stayed in the truck. The defendant testified that he did not get out of the truck until he saw a crowd congregating around a fight outside the bar. Martinez and a man in a white shirt, whom the defendant did not know, were beating Velasquez. The defendant described the man in the white shirt as tall, with long hair and a small beard. Alvarez testified that he and Diaz approached the fight scene, and Alvarez tried to grab Martinez from behind in an effort to restrain him.4 Martinez shoved the defendant to the ground, and by the time Alvarez stood up, the other three men were entering Martinez’ truck. The defendant got into the truck with them, momentarily forgetting that he had parked his own truck nearby earlier that day. A short distance away from the bar, Alvarez got out of Martinez’ truck, walked back to the bar, got into his own truck and proceeded toward home.

¶7Alvarez was apprehended before he reached home by a police officer who noted that the appearance of the defendant and his truck matched Gonzales’ description of a bearded man wearing a black hat and driving a pickup truck with a described license number.5 The defendant was taken to the police station, where Gonzales was waiting to be interviewed by police. Alvarez was brought into the station handcuffed, in the custody of two officers, when Gonzales saw him. She did not say anything when she first saw Alvarez, but then, after being asked by the police whether she had seen him before, stated that he was one of the men who had beaten Velasquez.

¶8Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress evidence of the inadvertent one-on-one showup at the police station, and also requested that a lineup identification procedure be conducted to determine if the state’s two identification witnesses, Gonzales and Lopez, would be able to identify the defendant. A lineup was conducted at a pretrial suppression hearing on November 30, 1977, at which time Gonzales selected a man other than the defendant and Lopez did not pick any of the persons in the lineup. The defendant was among the men in the lineup but had shaved his beard between the date of the incident and the lineup. Defense counsel suggested that Alvarez would grow his beard before trial for the purpose of a second lineup procedure in order to meet the anticipated argument by the prosecution that the first lineup was unreliable because the defendant had appeared without a beard. The court then ruled that Gonzales’ identification testimony would not be limited or suppressed in any way and that, if Lopez still should be unable to identify the defendant in the second lineup, Lopez’ testimony would be limited to her description of the assailants as she remembered them.

¶9On the first day of trial, less than a month after the pretrial suppression hearing, another lineup was conducted after jury selection but prior to the opening statements. The defendant’s beard had *1130grown, and he later testified it looked the same as in a picture taken at the time of his arrest and received in evidence. Gonzales again did not identify the defendant, but picked the same man she had chosen out of the first lineup. Lopez was unable to identify any of the lineup participants as the black-hatted assailant. After the lineup, defense counsel renewed his motion to suppress all identification evidence. The prosecutor stipulated that he would not ask either Lopez or Gonzales to identify the defendant at trial as one of the participants in the assault by pointing him out in the courtroom. The court ruled that Gonzales and Lopez could describe the assailants as they remembered them and Gonzales could testify about the one-on-one showup. At trial, during the defendant’s case, Gonzales and Lopez testified about the results of the two pretrial lineups.

¶10When the arresting police officer was cross-examined during the trial, defense counsel introduced into-evidence a photograph of the defendant taken at the police station on the night of his arrest.6 Later, over defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor had already shown the picture to Gonzales and Lopez together in violation of a sequestration order, the prosecutor recalled these two witnesses and questioned them about the photograph. Gonzales positively identified the man pictured as the person she had seen assault Velasquez, and Lopez testified that he looked very much like that man.

¶11At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on the law and included the standard instruction that the prosecution was required to prove each element of the offense “beyond a reasonable doubt.”7 The jury retired to begin its deliberations at 2:10 p.m., and at day’s end, almost four hours later, still had not reached a verdict. The jurors then returned to their homes for the night under instructions that they should not discuss the case with their families or friends. One of the jurors was troubled as to whether her doubts were “reasonable,” “imaginary,” or “vague,” terms used in the reasonable doubt instruction, and she consulted her dictionary at home for the definitions of these words. The next day, she discussed these definitions with one other juror, and the two of them decided that their doubts were “vague” and not “reasonable.” The two jurors then voted to find the defendant guilty, and Alvarez was convicted.

¶12II.

¶13Alvarez argues that the juror’s consultation of her dictionary during deliberations and her relation of dictionary definitions to another juror constitute such serious misconduct that prejudice to the defendant sufficient to require reversal-can be implied from proof of the misconduct alone without an affirmative showing of prejudice. Alternatively, Alvarez contends that he has shown prejudice sufficient for rever*1131sal because the affidavit of one juror establishes that she decided that her doubts were not reasonable in reliance on the dictionary definitions, showing a direct causal relationship between use of improper material and the defendant’s conviction. We agree that the record in this case establishes that the juror’s use of a dictionary substantially prejudiced the defendant, so his conviction must be reversed. This makes it unnecessary to consider the merit of the defendant’s proposition that even without a showing of prejudice a juror’s use of a dictionary requires reversal.

¶14There can be no question but that a jur- or’s consultation of a dictionary to assist in understanding legal terminology in the court’s instructions is improper. Jurors are required to follow only the law as it is given in the court’s instructions to the jury, whether or not they personally agree or disagree with such instructions. Colorado Jury Instructions (Criminal) 1:3.8 The words “reasonable,” “doubt,” “imaginary,” and “vague” may not have significance as legal concepts when used separately in everyday parlance; however, the term “reasonable doubt” describes one of the most fundamental legal concepts in the prosecution of criminal offenders. The jurors are bound, therefore, to accept the court’s definition of this legal concept, and to obtain clarifications of any ambiguities in terminology from the trial judge, not from extraneous sources. See Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Ry. Co., 341 So.2d 671, 677 (Ala.1977) (unauthorized consultation of dictionary for definitions of legal terms violates juror’s “sworn duty to apply the law as charged by the court to the facts of the ease... ”). See generally, Annot., 54 A.L. R.2d 738 (1957).

¶15The remaining question is whether this improper juror conduct requires reversal. In considering whether other types of jury misconduct mandate reversal of a conviction, we have consistently held that a defendant must establish that he was prejudiced by the misconduct in order to overturn his conviction. People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910 (1974); People v. Peery, 180 Colo. 161, 503 P.2d 350 (1972); Milano v. People, 159 Colo. 419, 412 P.2d 225 (1966); Segura v. People, 159 Colo. 371, 412 P.2d 227 (1966). The defendant urges, however, that prejudice should be conclusively presumed when a juror consults a dictionary for aid in understanding words used in the court’s instructions. We need not reach that question in this case, for the record amply establishes that the defendant was prejudiced in fact by juror misconduct.

¶16Two jurors submitted affidavits9 wherein they expressed serious doubts about the defendant’s guilt. The first juror believed that Gonzales had told the truth, but thought it was possible that, in all the excitement, she could have been mistaken that the defendant was kicking Velasquez rather than attempting to stop Martinez. This juror was so troubled by her doubts that she consulted her dictionary for help. She looked up the words “vague,” “imaginary,” “doubt,” and “reasonable,” each of which appears in the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt.10 The juror admits that the dictionary definition of “vague” helped her make up her mind that her doubt was not reasonable. A second juror stated that on the first day of deliberations she initially voted not guilty, but, becoming persuaded that her doubts were vague, changed her vote to guilty at the end of the day. The next morning, she reconsidered her vote change in light of the dictionary definitions *1132that the first juror discussed with her. She ultimately decided her doubt was a “vague” one and accordingly stayed with her vote of guilty. The second juror admits that she continues to have doubts about Alvarez’ guilt.

¶17The central fact is that the juror who looked up the words was aided by the dictionary definitions in deciding that her doubt was not reasonable. This decision was essential to the defendant’s conviction. We hold that this adequately established prejudice resulting from juror misconduct and requires reversal.11

¶18III.

¶19Because the juror misconduct constitutes sufficient grounds for reversal, we are not required to decide whether the defendant’s two other assignments of error also require that his conviction be overturned. However, we elect to address these issues since the trial court will of necessity be confronted with them again on retrial.

¶20The defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion to suppress Gonzales’ testimony regarding the one-on-one showup at the police station shortly after the incident. He also asserts that the admission of the in-court identification of a police mug shot by Gonzales and Lopez denied him due process because the identification was tainted by the impermissible suggestion of the district attorney when he showed the photograph to the witnesses prior to their testimony. Because identity is not an issue in this case under the facts as they were developed at the trial, we conclude that the identification procedures do not implicate the defendant’s due process rights.

¶21It is well established that a defendant’s right to due process of law is violated by admitting into evidence the results of an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure unless the totality of the circumstances establishes that the procedure did not result in a substantial likelihood of an irreparable misidentification despite its suggestiveness. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). The factors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification are:

the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.

¶22Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d at 154; accord, People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232, 238 (Colo.1980). In applying the totality of the circumstances test, these factors must be weighed together against the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Manson v. Brathwaite, supra.

¶23The cases represented by Manson v. Brathwaite and People v. Smith involve contexts where identification is an essential element of the prosecution’s case and is not admitted by the defendant. Under the proof as developed in the case now before us, however, the defendant admits that he was present at the scene of the assault. Moreover, he agrees that he was the bearded person wearing a black hat and coveralls. The uncontroverted evidence was that only one person fit that description. The crucial difference between the defendant’s testimony and that of prosecution witnesses Gonzales and Lopez was the nature of his participation in the fray. Gonzales and Lopez testified that he was kicking the victim. The defendant maintained that, to the contrary, he was attempting to restrain Martinez from further assaulting Velasquez. Thus, the issue was not whether the defendant was the person seen by Gonzales and Lopez; instead, the question is the nature of his activities.

¶24*1133The -due process value protected by the exclusionary requirement of Manson v. Brathwaite, supra,is fairness. Id.Under the totality of circumstances present here, no principle of fairness was violated by allowing the jury to consider identification evidence that merely corroborated the defendant’s own admission that he was the person observed at the scene of the crime. We therefore hold that, upon consideration of the record in its entirety, due process of law was not violated by admitting Gonzales’ testimony of the police station show-up and by admitting the in-court photographic identification by Gonzales and Lopez.

¶25On retrial it will be the prosecution’s burden to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo.1981). This burden includes establishing that the defendant was present and participated in the assault. If the record at the new trial contains proof of the defendant’s admission that he was the man in the black hat, beard and coveralls involved in the incident when the challenged identification evidence is presented, no due process issue will be implicated and the admissibility of that evidence should be determined by usual evidentiary principles. As this seems to be the likely evidentiary posture on retrial, we believe no useful purpose would be served by evaluating the identification evidence under due process principles in this opinion.

¶26We reverse the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and return the case to that court with directions that it be remanded to the district court for a new trial.