People v. Ferguson’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
13 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently February 2014
13 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 40 Colo. App. 490 - People v. Medina · Johnston v. CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF GREENWOOD VIL. · Johnston v. City Council of Greenwood Village · People v. Jones · People v. Lichtenstein
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(6)(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution; (e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial; (f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant; (g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant if: (II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Jones v. People · People v. Beyette“The resolution of this issue lies in the fact that the defendant, not the state, presented the motion to dismiss which led to the appeal.... The prosecution must be allowed to respond to [the defendant’s motion to dismiss certain charges] by testing the trial court’s ruling on appeal. The delay was not occasioned by the prosecutor’s action, but by the defendant’s own motion. We therefore hold that the period of time necessary to go through the appel-. late process, where the appeal stems from a dismissal upon the defendant’s motion, tolls the statutory speedy trial period. The provision governing this situation is section IS — 1—405(6)(f>: “(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial ..., the following periods of time shall be excluded: [[Image here]] “(f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant.” See also, Crim. P. 48(b)(6)(VI).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.