Puleo v. Knealing’s Empirical Analysis
1995
Citation profile
5 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 629 So. 2d 1036 - Schmidt v. Fortner · 608 So. 2d 1 - Timmons v. Combs · 625 So. 2d 1283 - Nordyne v. Florida Mobile Home Supply · Wright v. Caruana · 608 So. 2d 857 - Wilson Ins. Services v. W. Am. Ins.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“By specifically referencing section 768.79 in section 44.102(6), the legislature left no doubt that it intended for all the provisions of section 768.79 to apply, following a court-ordered mediation resulting, as here, in impasse. A court-ordered mediation which results in an impasse, simply modifies the time limits imposed by section 768.79 by allowing either party the opportunity to serve a new offer at any time prior to trial. The provisions of section 768,79 and section 44.102(6)(b) are, in fact, consistent with one another in that it appears the legislature has simply allowed an enlargement of time within which to serve an offer of judgment in those instances where a court mediation has taken place.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(6)(a) When an action is referred to mediation by court order, the time periods for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.061, or to an offer or demand for judgment pursuant to s. 768.79, respectively, shall be tolled until: 1. An impasse has been declared by the mediator; or 2. The mediator has reported to the court that no agreement was reached. (b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer of settlement or an offer or demand for judgment may be made at any time after an impasse has been declared by the mediator, or the mediator has reported that no agreement was reached. An offer is deemed rejected as of commencement of trial.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“DO THE TIME REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 44.102, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTRUSION OF THE LEGISLATURE ON THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN TIMMONS V. COMBS, 608 SO.2D 1 (FLA.1992)?”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.