Carlsen v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

337 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 339 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"... [W]hether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt_ [citations omitted.] The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.... We apply this standard by determining whether the evidence supports an inference other than the guilt of the appellant.””

   12 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Little v. State · Chambers v. State

2. “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chambers v. State · Gilmore v. State

3. ““Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. [356,] at 362 [, 92 S.Ct. 1620, at 1624 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 ]. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.... [[Image here]] “It follows that circumstantial evidence should not be tested by an ulti mate ‘standard for review’ different from direct evidence; the standard in both kinds of cases is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ' Accord Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1981)” (Emphasis theirs and emphasis ours)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. State