Denby v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

96 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 96 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It follows that circumstantial evidence should not be tested by an ultimate `standard of review' different from direct evidence; the standard in both kinds of cases is whether `any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Accord Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). "Still, we are unable to devise or discover any reason, compelling or otherwise, for abandoning the utilitarian `exclusion of outstanding reasonable hypothesis' analysis for applying the above `standard for review' in circumstantial evidence cases. By the nature of circumstantial evidence, in order to determine it rationally establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a process of elimination must be used. Illustrative is Taylor v. State, 653 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). We there cited the Jackson `standard for review;' in actually assessing the evidence, no method other than a procedure of eliminating the guilt of others under the evidence could be fashioned to effectively conclude the evidence rationally established Taylor's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Stated in the converse, if the evidence supports an inference other than the guilt of the appellant, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not a rational finding." See also Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on re”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State · Geesa v. State

2. “[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [citations omitted] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chambers v. State · Autran v. State

3. “. Thus, we have declined to accept the standard requested by appellant. In both direct and circumstantial evidence cases the reviewing court will look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment. All cases containing the language that review of the evidence “in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent” are expressly overruled.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Carlos v. State