¶1OPINION
¶2Tamara Coulbern brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss the criminal prosecution against her for several counts of drug dealing. Coulbern argues that the jeopardy assessment (and collection) of the Indiana Controlled Substance Excise Tax [CSET] in the amount of $845.53 by the Indiana Department of Revenue prohibit the criminal prosecution for drug dealing under principles of double jeopardy. We agree.
¶3We need not devote extensive analysis to the present case because its ultimate disposition will depend upon the anticipated decision or decisions of our supreme court in Cliff v. Indiana Department of State Revenue (1994), Ind.Tax, 641 N.E.2d 682; Hall v. Indiana Department of Revenue (1994), Ind. Tax, 641 N.E.2d 694; Bailey v. Indiana Department of Revenue (1994), Ind.Tax, 641 N.E.2d 695; Hayse v. Indiana Department of Revenue (1994), Ind. Tax, 641 N.E.2d 698; Whitt v. State (1995), Ind.App., 645 N.E.2d 677; and Collins v. State (1995), Ind.App., 645 N.E.2d 1089. Our supreme court has granted transfer in all of these cases, however, no written opinion or opinions have yet been issued.
¶4The above cases have all relied on Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch (1994), - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1987, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, in holding (or noting) that Indiana's CSET amounts to punishment that, under principles of double jeopardy, may not be imposed in a subsequent proceeding after a eriminal prosecution. The present case is distinguishable from those before it only in that the CSET was assessed against (and collected from) Coulbern before the inception of the present criminal prosecution. However, as noted by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Kurth Ranch, when there is a constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of the erimi-nal punishment or civil sanction cannot possibly make any difference. - U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1958.
¶5Based on the authority set out above, we hold that the jeopardy assessment and collection of the CSET against Coulbern prohibits the criminal prosecution against her for drug dealing. Therefore, we must reverse and remand with instructions that Coulbern's motion to dismiss be granted.
¶6Reversed.