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← 656 SO2D 104 - Taylor v. State

Taylor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
2
states following
August 2018
most recently cited

17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently August 2018

17 state decisions

90199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Wrenn v. Gould · United States v. Eichman · 460 So. 2d 778 - May v. State · McFee v. State · 481 So. 2d 203 - Fisher v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Indeed, a jury may reasonably conclude that a defendant intended to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, if the quantity or nature of the seized substance evidences an intent to distribute—as opposed to an intent to merely possess for personal use. Where the quantity or nature is such that it merely reflects possession for personal use as an intent to distribute, then only a suspicion of intent is raised.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[P]roof of possession with an intent to distribute or sell should not be based solely upon surmise or suspicion. There must be evidentiary facts [that] will rationally produce in the minds of jurors a certainty, a conviction beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did in actual fact intend to distribute or sell the [drugs], not that he might have such intent. It must be evidence in which a reasonable jury can sink its teeth.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[T]hat a prospective juror who is related within the third degree by blood, adoption, or marriage to a deputy district attorney presently serving on the staff of the elected district attorney responsible for the criminal prosecution is related to an “attorney of record” for purposes of a challenge for cause-”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.