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← 656 So. 2d 241 - Burnside v. State

656 So. 2d 241 - Burnside v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
2
states following
September 2008
most recently cited

11 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Cuyler v. Sullivan · McMann v. Richardson · United States v. McLain · United States v. Fahey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The trial judge’s second error was admitting the hearsay testimony of a friend of Barrett in Ohio with whom Barrett hid after his post-murder flight from Florida. Over objection, Donald Campbell was allowed to testify that Barrett had told him that Barrett had killed four people in Florida because it was necessary to do so in carrying out a contract to kill one. This testimony supported the state’s argument that the four murders were the result of the original conspiracy involving Burnside rather than Barrett’s independent acts that did not further the conspiracy. When Barrett spoke to Campbell after the murders, any conspiracy had ended; the statement was not the admission of a co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See § 90.803(18)(e), Fla.Stat. (1991). Nor was there any record showing or finding that John Barrett was unavailable to testify at Burnside’s trial. See § 90.804(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). There was no other argument presented that would provide a legal basis for the admission of the hearsay statement. (Emphasis supplied)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Conflict of interest cases warrant a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. Although it is a `fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice,' it is `not quite the per se rule of prejudice' that is applicable in denial of counsel cases.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “need not show that [he] would necessarily have been successful if [the alternative strategy] had been used, but that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.