657 So. 2d 562 - State v. Samuels’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Certainly, a timely request that the police notify (or permit an accused to notify) counsel of a forthcoming lineup ought always be honored. Nevertheless, in the absence of a bad faith effort to circumvent defendants' statutory right to counsel following arrest, and given the showing made in this case that the lineup was conducted according to fair and standard police procedure, the exclusion of reliable evidence is too great a price to impose solely because of the absence of counsel at the lineup. It is also logical to refuse to apply a per se rule of exclusion because the presence of counsel at the lineup is primarily intended to prevent unfairness, as noted in Wade , and not to prevent the accused from involuntarily supplying physical evidence against himself. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). The Wade decision not only clearly recognized that the accused has no constitutional right to refuse to participate in a lineup, but also suggested that standard statutory or police administrative regulations assuring fairness could possibly remove the post-indictment lineup as a "critical stage" at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. See State v. Pierre, 261 La. 42 , 259 So.2d 6 (1972). Thus, the statutory right at issue here may be enforced simply by placing the burden on the state, when the statute has been violated, to prove the fairness of the procedure employed. This approach accommodates society's interest in fa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 712 So. 2d 701 - State v. Carter

2. “"An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda , mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecutor's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 709 So. 2d 213 - State v. Gaspard

3. “The Louisiana Supreme Court has discussed at what point the right to counsel attached under the state and federal constitutions in State v. Hattaway, 621 So.2d 796 (La.1993). The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists during pretrial confrontations that could be considered "critical stages". After the right to counsel has attached and counsel has been retained or appointed to represent the defendant in the adverse judicial criminal proceedings, however, the defendant has the right to rely on counsel as the medium between himself and the state. Correlatively, the state has an affirmative duty not to circumvent or debate the protection afforded by the right counsel. Id. at 801 . * * * * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 712 So. 2d 701 - State v. Carter