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← 658 FSUPP 492 - Follette v. Vitanza

Follette v. Vitanza’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

18
cited by 18 later decisions
October 2015
most recently cited

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently October 2015

801987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (§ 130 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1671 · 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 1673 · 15 U.S.C. § 1676 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · Mathews v. Eldridge · Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. · Fuentes v. Shevin · Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,' (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claim or defenses of the representative ■ parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “If there is no implied private cause of action for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1673 , it is also only logical that there can be no section 1983 action for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1673 . The basic reason the courts have concluded that there is no implied private cause of action is that Congress apparently intended the accompanying administrative remedy to be the exclusive remedy for a section 1983 action for violating the garnishment provision would simply be an avoidance of the congressional intent that the administrative remedy be exclusive. Furthermore, a fourteenth amendment violation requires a deprivation of a property (or life or liberty) interest. If there was no private right to enforce section 1983 outside of the administrative remedy, then the plaintiff cannot complain that she was deprived of a substantial federal right created by 15 U.S.C. § 1673 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.