Rosebury v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Dec. 20, 1978 A felony information in Cause Number 289,804 was filed against appellant for aggravated robbery. Appellant waived indictment. Jan. 22, 1979 State announced “ready.” April 11,1979 Appellant pled guilty; was found guilty and sentenced to 25 years in Cause Number 289,804 for the offense of aggravated robbery which was alleged to have occurred on Nov. 16, 1978. Sept. 7, 1979 State announced “ready.” The proceeding was reset for a competency hearing. Sept. 14, 1979 Based on evidence from the competency hearing, appellant was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea; judgment and'sentence were set aside and appellant was granted a Motion for New Trial. 1 Appellant filed a waiver of speedy trial. 2 Oct. 5, 1979 State announced “ready.” Appellant filed a waiver of speedy trial. Oct. 22, 1979 State announced “ready.” Jan. 28, 1980 Appellant was indicted in Cause No. 309,085 for the offense of aggravated robbery which was alleged to have occurred on Nov. 16, 1978. Feb. 11, 1980 State’s motion to dismiss the information in Cause Number 289,-804 was filed and granted. Feb. 18—Aug. 26, 1980 Appellant’s case was reset six times. Aug. 26, 1980 A hearing was held on appellant’s motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, Art. 32A.02, V.A.C. C.P., which was overruled. Aug. 26, 1980 Appellant pled not guilty; waived a jury trial; was found guilty by the court and was sentenced to 15 years.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Paris v. State

2. ““There is a distinction between successive indictments for the same offense and a subsequent indictment for a different offense. As we held in Ward, Paris, and Rosebury, supra, when the latter indictment alleges the same offense, or where the facts show that only a single offense has been committed, the State’s announcement of ready on the earlier indictment, or the defendant’s waiver of speedy trial on the earlier indictment, will be effective. Conversely, when the subsequent indictment alleges a primary offense that is different from the one alleged in the earlier charging instrument, and the facts show that both offenses were in fact committed in one transaction, we hold that the State’s timely announcement of ready on one offense does not constitute an announce ment of ready on the second, different offense arising out of the same transaction.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Luedke v. State

3. “... the facts of this case reveal only a single offense: only a single substance was possessed, a substance originally alleged to be tetrahydrocannabinol and subsequently found to be and correctly alleged to be marihuana. Under the facts there was only one case: a single offense was committed and a single offense was alleged, although erroneously pleaded. Had appellant possessed both substances a different issue would be presented.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. State