People v. Arnold’s Empirical Analysis
1967
Citation profile
25 federal appellate · 284 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 321 later decisions (6 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2011 · most notably Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), California v. Beheler (1983)
25 federal appellate · 284 state decisions — followed in 17 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Escobedo v. Illinois · 62 Cal. 2d 338 - People v. Dorado · People v. Stewart
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 321 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage““Although in this pre-Miranda [Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] case we are not constitutionally compelled to accept Miranda standards, we find the above reasoning entirely persuasive in defining custody as that term is used in Escobedo [supra] and Dorado [supra]. Accordingly, we adopt the definition of the United States Supreme Court of in-custody interrogation: ‘By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ (Italics added.) (384 U.S. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612.) We hold that custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived.” 58 Cal. Rptr. at 121 , 426 P.2d at 521 .”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“"The vice of the custodial interrogation * * * [lies] in the psychological coercion implicit in interrogation in the isolated chamber from which the suspect may reasonably believe he cannot leave. In such circumstances the person detained or arrested finds himself completely and suddenly cut off from freedom of movement. An involuntary immobilization by law enforcement officers dramatizes the fact that the individual stands suspected or accused of crime. Lacking knowledge of his constitutional rights, he may feel that he can extricate himself from the situation only by submitting to interrogation. He may reasonably believe that if he attempts to leave the interrogation chamber the authorities will impose immediate detention. * * * Although in this pre- Miranda case we are not constitutionally compelled to accept Miranda standards, we find the above reasoning entirely persuasive in defining custody as that term is used in Escobedo and Dorado . Accordingly, we adopt the definition of the United States Supreme Court of in-custody interrogation: `By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' * * * We hold that custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.