66 Ill. 2d 290 - People v. Lott’s Empirical Analysis
1977
Citation profile
87 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 91 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably 232 Ill. 2d 113 - People v. Walker (2009), 165 Ill. 2d 305 - People v. Lewis (1995)
87 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 54 Ill. 2d 280 - People v. Pickett · 11 Ill. 2d 360 - The People v. Burson · 32 Ill. 2d 441 - The People v. Irwin · 41 Ill. 2d 364 - The People v. Nelson · 52 Ill. 2d 544 - People v. Black
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““[T]he continuance provisions [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 114 — 4] are to be construed ‘to the end that criminal cases are tried with due diligence consonant with the rights of the defendant and the State to a speedy, fair and impartial trial’ [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 114 — 4(h)]. « « « There is no mechanical test, statutory or otherwise], for determining the point at which the denial of a continuance in order to accelerate the judicial proceedings violates the substantive right of the accused to properly defend. The circumstances of each case must be weighed, particularly the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.””
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The circumstances of this case evidence that the testimony of the State rebuttal witness, Nitz, stating that the defendant had admitted the crime to him and to others, was totally unexpected by the defense counsel. *** * * * In this case, where counsel neither knew of nor was given the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of the incriminating testimony that the defendant admitted the crime to people in the jail, there was even a greater risk of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues in the minds of the jurors. The probative value of the surprise testimony was substantial. The defense objected and was then denied a continuance to search out evidence and witnesses to contradict the testimony in the minds of the jurors. Defense counsel informed the court that he was unprepared as to the testimony, and he sought discovery from the State on the matter and a continuance. The court denied both. Unlike the counsel in Kuczynski, who had been knowledgeable of the fact that the witnesses were testifying and of the circumstances of the evidence at the preliminary hearing, the defense here was totally unaware of the circumstances brought out by the testimony and was unprepared for this development in the case. As such, he could not buttress his request for a continuance by citing concrete information as to the availability of other means of proof he could obtain for rebuttal. We have determined from the trial record that the denial of a continuance, on the grounds of surpri”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.