Volume 66 — Illinois Appellate Court Reports

Trespass on the Case.—Death from alleged negligence. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Grundy County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligence. Error to the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>Bill to Compel the Payment of a Legacy.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County; the Hon. Charles Kelltjh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>Bill for Divorce.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County; the Hon. Charles Kelluh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for commissions. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Laches—As to Matters not Per Se Nuisances.—Where a railroad embankment, not in itself a nuisance, but occasionally an obstruction to water, had been suffered to exist in the same condition for forty years, it was held that the village through which it passed, having acquiesced therein without complaint, had, by its own laches, lost its right to object.</p> <p>2. Nuisances—Jurisdiction in Equity.—A court of equity has no jurisdiction over the subject of a nuisance, except in extraordinary cases, where the case is clear and free from all substantial doubt as to the right of relief, for in doubtful cases the party will be turned over to his legal remedy.</p> <p>3. Same—Jurisdiction at Law in the First Instance.—It must be a wrong and mischievous case of pressing necessity, or the right must have been previously established at law, for the defendant ought not to be deprived of his constitutional right of trial by jury.</p>

<p>Mandamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee County; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

Assumpsit, goods sold and delivered. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas-M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>1. Bills op Lading—Security for Advances.—A party who advances money to another for the purpose of enabling him to buy stock for the market, and upon the shipment of such stock takes the bills of lading as security, becomes vested with a special property in such stock which continues as long as it is in transit and until such advancements are paid.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the City Court of Elgin; the Hon. Russell P. Goodwin, Judge, presiding. .Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

Trespass on the Case.—Obstructing the flow of water, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>1. Husband and Wife— When Wife May Enter into Partnership.—By section. 6, chapter 68, R. S., the wife is allowed to enter into and carry on partnership business only by the consent of her husband, except in cases where he has abandoned or deserted her, or is idiotic or insane.</p> <p>2. Same—Employment of the Husband.—Where a wife in good faith puts her capital into a partnership business, and acts in good faith in carrying on the business, she may employ her husband as her agent. The good faith of the transaction is always in question.</p> <p>3. Same—Strangers as to Their Separate Property.—A husband and wife as to her separate property stand in the same relation as strangers. She may sell it or loan it to him, or constitute him her agent for its management or disposition.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on promissory notes. Error to the Circuit Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Corporations—Assets Trust Funds.—The assets of a corporation are a trust fund and the directors have no right to appropriate them to their own use.</p> <p>2. Laches—Application to Trust Funds.—Courts of equity do not favor the application of the doctrine of laches to trust funds.</p> <p>3. Trust Funds—Liability for Misappropriation.—Where several persons misappropriate funds in their possession they become liable therefor as joint tort feasors, and one or all may be sued for the wrongful acts in which they all participated or shared.</p>

<p>I. Foreclosure—Mortgage Clauses in Policies as Defenses.—In a proceeding to-foreclose a-mortgage upon premises insured by policies containing mortgage clauses .in favor of the mortgagee, the question as to ■whether the mortgagee had complied with the condition of the policies so as to recover the loss, can not be considered as a defense, while the right to recover the loss from the insurance company remains undetermined.</p>

<p>1. Dram Shop Aot—Actions Under.—In actions under section 9 of the dram shop aot, where it is shown that the deceased was intoxicated, it is for the jury to determine from the evidence whether such intoxication was caused in whole or in part by liquor sold to him by the defendant.</p> <p>3. Measure of Proof—Actions Under the Dram Shop Act.—Actions for damages under section 9 of the dram shop act, are civil actions; the plaintiff is only required to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence.</p> <p>3. Instructions—Increasing the Burden of Proof.—An instruction which requires of the plaintiff “ strict proof,” and directs the jury not to give him a verdict except upon a “ clear preponderance of the evidence,” in cases where, if the weight of the evidence is sufficient to turn the scale in his favor he is entitled to recover, is properly refused.</p> <p>4. Damages—Measure of.—In these cases it is impossible to compute the actual damages upon any definite or specific basis. The jury must determine the question as practical men upon the evidence before them as best they can, and unless then finding is clearly excessive, it will not be disturbed.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—Parol Licenses.—A parol license for the construction of a ditch, under the act of 1889, is not within the statute of frauds.</p> <p>2. Injunctions—Drains and Drainage.—Where a drain is constructed by license under the act of 1889 an injunction will lie to prevent the owner of the land from interfering with it without the consent of all parties concerned.</p> <p>3. Damages—By Ditches Constructed by License.—Where damage is done by the water o£ a ditch constructed by agreement of land owners under the act of 1889, and such agreement fails to provide for such a contingency, the owner of the lands damaged is without a remedy.</p>

<p>1. Set-off—Unauthorized Note.—A note signed in the name of the plaintiff by his attorney, but without authority, can not be set off against him in a suit for goods sold, etc.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for fees, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall County; the Hon. Thomas S. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>1. Verdicts—Not Manifestly Against the Weight of the Evidence.— Where the question is one of fact for the jury, if the verdict is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence, it must stand as decisive of the controversy.</p>

<p>Indictment, for wife abandonment. Error to the County Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Robert H. Lovett, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Error to the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Cities and Villages—■Duty to Keep Sewers in Ttepair.—It is the duty of a city, having established a sewer, to keep it in repair, and to see that it does not become a nuisance. And this duty it may be compelled to perform by a bill in equity, for the abatement of the nuisance.</p>

Trespass on the Case.—Damages by changing the grade of a street. Appeal from the City Court of Elgin; the Hon. E. P. Goodwin, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>Bill to Construe a Will.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; the Hon. Hiram Bigelow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

Trespass, for ejecting a person from the train. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>Bill to Remove a Cloud.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Exceptions—Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Want of a Bond.— The action of the court upon a motion to dismiss an appeal from a justice of the peace for want of an appeal bond saves itself in the record. No exception is necessary.</p> <p>2. Appeals—By School Districts Without Bond.—A school district may appeal to the Circuit Court, from a judgment rendered against it by a justice of the peace, without giving an appeal bond.</p> <p>3. Statutes—Repeal General and Particular Acts.—A general enactment does not operate as a repeal of a special law on the same subject even though enacted at the same session of the legislature. So a subsequent statute, which is general, does not abrogate a former statute which is particular.</p> <p>4. Same—Construction of Repugnant Acts.—When two acts are seemingly repugnant they should, if possible, be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former by implication.</p> <p>5. Same—The Act of 1879 Not Repealed by the Act of 1881.—Section 62 of Chapter 79, R. S. (the justice’s act of 1881),. requiring an appeal bond from all parties, does not repeal the act of 1879 (Laws 1879, 232,) giving the right to school districts when suing or defending for the benefit of the public, to appeal without bond.</p>

<p>Bill for Injunction.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henderson County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Mechanics’ Liens—Parties—Limitations.—Creditors represented in a trust deed are not bound by proceedings for a mechanic’s lien upon the premises unless they are made parties, and no creditor will be allowed to enforce the lien given by the mechanic’s lien law unless his suit is instituted to enforce such lien within the time fixed by the statute.</p> <p>2. Equity Practice—Refusal to Refer.— The refusal to refer a case to a master in chancery is no ground for reversal where there is nothing in the record to show that the appellant has been in any way damaged by the refusal.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for services. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. Alfred Sample, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for killing domestic animals. Error to the «Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. Charles B. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.

<p>1. Agency—Implied Powers—Construction of the Contract.—Conditions in a contract of agency for the sale of pianos providing that all new and second-hand instruments taken in exchange or part payment for instruments were to be regarded the same as goods consigned by the principal to his agent and credited at a fair cash value, to be determined by the principal, clearly implies an authority to exchange or-trade pianos as well as to sell them.</p>

<p>1. Usuby—Building and Loan Associations.—Building and Loan Associations may contract for premiums, fines and interest without violating the statutes against usury.</p> <p>2. Fobeign Cobporations—Doing Business in Illinois.—Section 26 of Chapter 32, R. S., Ill., entitled Corporations, impliedly grants to foreign corporations the same privileges that are enjoyed by domestic corporations. A corporation created in one State may, upon the principle of comity, exercise within another State the general powers conferred by its charter and permitted by the laws of its State, provided the doing so does no violence to the laws or public policy of such other State.</p>

<p>1. Abstracts—Of the Record.—An index is not an abstract.</p>

<p>Bill to Set Aside a Judgment.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County; the Hon. Charles Kellum, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

Motion to Strike the Bill of Exceptions from the Files.—Appeal from, the City Court of Aurora; the Hon. R. P. Goodwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court on rehearing at the December term, 1895. Motion sustained.

<p>Mandamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County: the Hon. Hiram Bigelow, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Excessive Damages—Remittitur.—Where the damages allowed by a jury are excessive, a remittitur is proper as to the excess.</p>

<p>1. Indictment—Signature of State’s Attorney.—The absence of the signature of the state’s attorney to an indictment does not render it invalid, and where no motion is made to quash, such an objection comes too late after verdict.</p> <p>2. Change of Venue—Exceptions Must be Taken in the Court Below.—The objection and exception to the action of the court upon a motion for a change of venue, must be made in the court below; it comes too late when made for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p> <p>8. Instructions.—Definition of a Dram Shop.—The refusal of the court to instruct the jury as to the definition of a dram shop, is not a prejudicial error.</p> <p>4. Same—Sale of Intoxicating Liquor.— An instruction which assumes that outside the corporate limits of a city, town or village, a person may lawfully sell intoxicating liquor in quantities of five gallons or upward, regardless of where it is to be drank, is properly refused.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for malicious prosecution with counts in trespass for false imprisonment. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Action for Damages.—Death from alleged negligence. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in- this court at the March term, 1896.

<p>1. Railroad Companies—Dangerous Highway 'Crossings.—A railroad company has no authority to shut the traveling public from the streets, and where a street crossing is so dangerous to travelers that it would be considered a want of ordinary care to attempt to make any further use of it, the company will be liable if injury follows.</p> <p>2. Dahaues— $5,000, When Not Excessive.—Where the deceased was twenty-seven years old, left a wife and three children, owned two teams, and was a teamster hauling for lumber dealers, the statutory limit @5,000) is not excessive.</p>

Assumpsit, upon an account due, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Bill by Stockholders, to compel the restoration of misappropriated funds. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Assumpsit, for work and materials. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tdthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

Assumpsit, for balance due on goods sold, etc. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Henry Y. Freeman, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

<p>1. Ultra Vires—Insurance Companies:—An insurance company created by a special act authorizing it to insure dwelling houses, household furniture, farm buildings and other property, may lawfully- insure a saw mill or the contents of a printing office.</p> <p>2. Same—Estoppel to Assert Mutuality.—Where a person in good faith procures a policy from an insurance company and receives the benefit of the same while the insurance company has the detriment, each is estopped to deny the validity of the contract.</p> <p>3. Same—Corporations can not Assert.—Although a corporation makes a contract in violation of the express terms of its charter, it must account for the benefits received from the same.</p> <p>4. Construction of Statutes—Manifest Intention of the Legislature.—Where the legislature chartered an insurance company to insure dwelling houses, household furniture, farm buildings and other property, its manifest intention must have been to empower the company to insure other property as well as dwelling houses, household furniture and farm buildings.</p> <p>5. Mutual Insurance Companies—Proceedings to Appoint a Receiver—Who are not Bound.—A person who is not a policy holder in a mutual fire insurance company at the time, is not bound by the proceeding for the appointment of a receiver and of the making of an assessment by the court.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for rent. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas G-. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1886.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for rent. Appeal from- the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles Gh Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Foreclosure—Bents Accruing During Period of Bedemption.— When the mortgagor bids off the premises at the foreclosure sale for less than the amount due him and obtains a deficiency decree for the balance, he has the equitable right, upon a proper showing, to have the rents of the premises which accrue, during the period of redemption, applied in satisfaction of such deficiency, and a receiver may be properly appointed for such purpose.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Questions oe Fact—Finding of the Jury.—All questions of fact are settled by the finding of the jury.</p>

<p>1. Leases—Power of Assignee to Collect Rents—Attornment.—An assignment by a lessor of all his title and interest in a lease, with directions that all rents thereunder be paid to the assignee, authorizes the assignee to sue for the rent to accrue, and no attornment by the tenant is necessary.</p>

<p>1. Probate Court—Power to Release Sureties.—The Probate Court has authority to release from further liability a surety upon an administrator’s bond, under proper proceedings upon the application of the administrator.</p> <p>2. Same—Power Over Orders, at Subsequent Terms.—When the Probate Court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties to a proceeding on the part of the administrator for the purpose of releasing a surety from further liability and giving a new bond, and makes an order to that effect, such order, it seems, can not be set aside after the lapse of the term at which it was made.</p>

<p>1. Cities and Villages—Power to License Second-Hand Stores.— A city, organized under the general law, has power to license secondhand stores, but it can not require a separate license for each article in which such store deals.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

Trespass oil the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Phillip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

<p>Assumpsit, upon a check, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook-County; the Hon. Charles GK Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March terra, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Decrees—Suspended by Appeals.—When an appeal from a decree dissolving a corporation and appointing a receiver, is perfected, such appeal becomes in effect a supersedeas and operates as a stay of all proceedings to enforce the execution of such decree, leaving the matters in the condition in which they were when the appeal was perfected, and such is the case without reference to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the appeal bond.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for lost baggage. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.

<p>Bill by Creditors of a Corporation against Stockholders, etc.— Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Oliver H. Horton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>Bill for an Accounting.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Patne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Practice—Affirmance on Second Appeal.—Where a case is reversed and remanded to the court below and again tried upon the principles laid down in the opinion, and is again appealed, it will be affirmed.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a promissory note. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1894.</p>

<p>1. Guaranty.—Acceptance of Offer of.—An offer to guarantee the debt of another, about to be created, must be accepted within a reasonable time, and no contract exists until the offer is accepted and notice of such acceptance given to the proposed guarantor.</p>

<p>Voluntary Ass’gnments.—Appeal from the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for materials furnished. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1898.</p>

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Parties—Who may Control the Process.—Where the plaintiff has no interest in the subject-matter except as sheriff, under a levy made by him, of an attachment upon the property in dispute, if the plaintiff in the attachment suit consents to an order of the court appointing a receiver the sheriff (plaintiff) has no right to object.</p> <p>3. Same—In Proceedings to try the Rights of Property.—The plaintiff, in a proceeding in the County Court to try the rights of property levied upon and in the custody of the sheriff, is a mere claimant of the property, and the parties having the control of the process by which the sheriff retains possession of the same may consent that it be discharged from such possession without the consent of such claimant.</p> <p>3. Rights of Property—Trial of Appeal.—The trial of the rights of property in the County Court, provided for by the statute, is not a suit • at law or in chancery, but is distinctly a statutory proceeding from which an appeal lies to the Circuit Court.</p> <p>4. Appeals—From Interlocutory Orders.—An order that particular property be surrendered to a receiver is an interlocutory order and not appealable; but it is otherwise with an order imposing penalties for disobedience.</p> <p>5. Interlocutory Orders—What are Appealable.—The only interlocutory o'rders from which appeals lie are those granting injunctions and appointing receivers.</p>

<p>Bill for an Injunction.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1898.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Perry County; the Hon. Benjamin R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.

<p>Forcible Entry and Detainer.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County; the Hon. George W. Wall, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.</p>

Trespass on the Case.—Damages from a nuisance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County; the Hon. Benjamin R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding; heard in this court at the February term, 1896.

<p>/I. Bill of Exceptions—On Motion for New Trials.—Where the overruling of a motion for a new trial, upon which affidavits were read, is assigned for error, the bill of exceptions must show that it contains all the affidavits read, or the court will presume that there were others read sufficient to sustain the action of the trial court.</p> <p>2. Same—Insufficient Statements.—The statement in a bill of exceptions at the close of the evidence that “ the foregoing was all the evidence introduced on the trial,” has no reference or application to affidavits filed afterward in support of a motion for a new trial.</p> <p>3. Practice—Questions Which Can Not he liaised after Verdict.— Where a party litigant has reason to think that his right to an impartial trial has been prejudiced by a speech made in the trial of a previous case, in the hearing of the jurors in attendance upon the court, he may move for a continuance, or he may interrogate the jurors and challenge such of them as are found prejudiced by the speech, but he can not raise the question for the first time after verdict.</p>

<p>Trial of the Rights of Property.—Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. B. H. Canby, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.</p>

Petition, to have certain instruments declared an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Error to the County Court of Massac County; the Hon. George Sawyer, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.

Prosecution, for disturbing the peace, etc., by labor on Sunday. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Richland County; the Hon. Silas Z.' Landes, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1696.

<p>Bill to Redeem, etc.—Appeal from the Circuit Court, St. Clair County; the Hon. Alonzo S. Wilderman, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, 1895.</p>

<p>1. Parties—Corporations and Stockholders—Condition Precedent.— Where complaining shareholders do not sue to redress grievances peculiar to themselves, but proceed in right of the corporation, or what is the same thing, in right of all the shareholders, the failure or refusal of the corporation itself to demand redress is a condition precedent to the right of the shareholders to sue or appear as plaintiffs, unless a state of facts is alleged and proved which makes it apparent that such a demand would be futile.</p> <p>2. Equity—Cancellation of Certificates of Stock—Offers to do Equity.—The rules of equity require that both the corporation and the stockholders, if they seek to cancel a certificate of stock given in exchange for bonds, when the corporation, and therefore the stockholders, have had the full benefit of the bonds in the payment of the corporate indebtedness, must return the bonds even though they may have been declared invalid by the courts.</p> <p>3. Stock—Cancellation of Certificates.—The fact that shares of stock issued by a railroad corporation to a county in- payment for bonds are common shares and are practically of no value, furnishes no reason why such shares should be canceled against the will of the owner.</p>

<p>Actions for Personal Injuries.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. Alonzo S. Wilderman, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—Statements of the Elements of the Plaintiff’s Case, When Unnecessary.—An instruction in an action for personal injuries which relates merely to the measure of damages, is not erroneous because it does not contain a statement of the elements of the plaintiffs case.</p> <p>2. Same—Abstract Propositions of Law.—It is not error to refuse to give an instruction which contains merely an abstract proposition of law.</p> <p>3. Same—When Evidence Conflicting.—Where the evidence is conflicting, special care should be exercised in instructing the jury.</p> <p>4. Appellate Court Practice—What Errors Can Not be Assigned.</p> <p>—Where the error relied upon relates to the giving of instructions by the trial court, it can not be considered by the Appellate Court, unless it is stated as a ground for a new trial in the court below.</p>

<p>Assumpsit.—Attachment in aid. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County; the Hon. Alonzo K. Vickers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Lessor—Liability for Debts of the Lessee—Notice of Conditions.— A person who leases a plant for a year on condition that the business should be conducted without liability or expense to him. the lessor, and afterward, during the term, takes possession of such plant on account of the inability of the lessee to manage the business, can not be held liable for articles furnished to said lessee by persons having notice of the condition.</p>

<p>Debt, on a replevin bond. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County; the Hon. Alonzo K. Vickers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1893.</p>

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. Alonzo S. Wilderman, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Election of Remedies—Replevin, and Suits upon Constables' Official Bonds.—A person whose property is unlawfully taken by a constable under an execution may recover the same in an action of replevin, or he may sue upon the constable’s official bond for damages, as he may elect, but having elected to sue in replevin he can not afterward maintain an action on the bond. .</p>

<p>1. Records—Where They Do Not Purport to Contain all. the Evidence.—-Where the record in a case does not purport to contain all the evidence, the court is precluded from considering issues of fact.</p> <p>2. Abstracts—When Not Sufficient.—The court will not feel itself bound to decide a case upon an abstract from which it can derive no possible benefit.</p>

<p>1. Parties—Insane Persons.—An insane person can not be a complainant in a suit for divorce, where nothing but the status of the parties is involved, for the reason that such person is incapable of electing whether he will remain married or become single, and no person can elect for him.</p> <p>2. Practice—Writ of Error a New Suit.—A writ of error is a new suit.</p> <p>3. Children—Custody of. —The custody of a daughter will, in general, be awarded to the mother in proceedings for divorce, but the court has power at any time to change -such custody, should there be cause for so doing.</p>

Action for Damages, sustained by the falling of a party wall. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>1. Questions of Fact—Weight of Evidence.—When a case involves only questions of fact and there is no such preponderance of evidence in favor of the unsuccessful party as to warrant a reversal of the finding, it must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a check. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Nathaniel C. Sears. Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Voluntary Assignments.—Removal of the Assignee by the County Court.—A County Court can remove an assignee only for statutory causes.</p> <p>2. Appellate Court Practice.—Where a Cause Will Not be Remanded.—Where there is no longer, in the court below, anything to which a remand of a cause can attach, the court will not remand it- in case of a reversal.</p>

Assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered. Appeal from the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. Orrin K Carter. Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>In Equity.—Bill for relief. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Judgments—Must Follow the Verdict.—If, on a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment is entered for the defendant, or vice versa, it is error on the face of the record—unless on the record something appears to justify such judgment.. The justification may be on the pleadings, as when the judgment is arrested, or entered non obstante veredicto.</p> <p>2. Special Findings—Adjuncts of the Verdict. —Special findings are adjuncts of the verdict, and only by considering them as part of the record can a judgment for the defendant, after a verdict for the plaintiff, be held regular.</p> <p>3. Verdict—Where it Will Prevail—Special Findings.—Unless the finding is irreconcilable with the general verdict, looking only at the pleadings, verdict and findings, the general verdict will prevail.</p>

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. James Goggin, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit., on a promissory note. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Henry V. Freeman, Judge, presiding. ' Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Guaranty—Upon Conditions—Failure of.—Where a guarantor becomes such after the delivery of the note upon a condition, and the condition is not complied with, he is discharged.</p>

Transcript, on appeal from a justice of the peace. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Francis Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>1. Abbreviations—Use of, Permissible.—In certifying a record to the Appellate Court, the use of the abbreviations “ Chicago F. G. A. Co.” for the Chicago Fuel Gas Appliance Company, is permissible.</p> <p>2. Amendments—Of Sheriff’s Return Pending a Writ of Error.— Pending a writ of error the court below may allow amendments to the sheriff’s return of service, upon notice to the opposite party.</p>

<p>1. Chancery Practice—The Becord Must Sustain the Decree.—In chancery proceedings the record must sustain the decree, but the facts upon which the final order is based if appearing in the findings of the master need not be reported in the decree.</p> <p>3. Same—Order upon the Master to Beturn the Evidence with his Be-port.—If a party desires the master to return into court the testimony upon which his report is based, he must apply to the court below for an order requiring him to do so, but not having done so it is too late for him to complain for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p> <p>3. Same—Exceptions to the Master's Beport.—If a party, dissatisfied with the master’s report, fails to object and except to the same in the court below, he can not do so for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a contract of guaranty. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Nathaniel C. Sears, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a promissory note. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Injunction—When Improper to Grant Without Notice.—Where a bill for an injunction contains no allegations of facts which tend to show that the defendant could have done anything which would have put the complainant in a worse position if notice of the application for an injunction had been given him, it is error to grant the injunction without notice.</p> <p>2. Practice—Granting Injunctions.—A complainant is not entitled to any consideration in applying for an injunction, unless he first complies with the statute by giving notice, or makes it appear to the court, judge, or master to whom the application is made, by a sworn statement of facts either in the bill or in accompanying affidavits, from which the conclusion can be drawn that he will be unduly prejudiced by giving notice.</p>

<p>Mandamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edwabd F. Dunne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. West Chicago Park Commissioners.—A Municipal Corporation —Inability.—The West Chicago Park Commissioners is a municipal corporation, with limited powers granted to it by the legislature, and as such is not liable for damages resulting from the negligence of its officers in giving an employe a vicious and unsafe horse to use.</p> <p>2. Respondeat Superior— Where the Doctrine Does Not Apply.—If the agents or servants of a municipal corporation are independent of the corporation, as to the tenure of then office and the manner of discharging their duties, the corporation is not impliedly liable for their acts of negligence, and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.</p> <p>3. Same—Foundation of the Doctrine.—The doctrine of respondeat superior is founded upon the maxim Quifacit per alium, facit per se.</p>

<p>1. Malicious Prosecution—Requisites of the Action.—To the maintaining of an action for malicious prosecution two things must concur : First, a want of probable cause, and second, malice.</p> <p>2. Same—Enticing Another into a Foreign Jurisdiction for Service. — A mere enticement into another State, where there is detention of neither person nor property, will not support an action for malicious prosecution. • 3. Same—Civil Suits.—The action of malicious prosecution can not be maintained for the mere bringing of one civil suit.</p> <p>4. Malice—May be Inferred.—Malice may be inferred from a want of probable cause, but a want of probable cause can not be inferred from malice.</p>

Prosecution, for the violation of an ordinance. Appeal from the Criminal Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Bill, for separate maintenance. Appeal from Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbbidge Hanegy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at; the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Foreclosure.—Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Burden of Proof—Verified Pleas.—In an action of assumpsit upon a promissory note, where a plea of non-assumpsit verified is filed, the burden of proving the execution of the note is upon the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Promissory Notes—Position of Signatures.—In many cases the position of a name on a promissory note fixes the character of the liability of the writer, which can not be changed by parol evidence, as an indorsement in blank by the payee is an assignment carrying with it the statutory liability.</p> <p>3. Same,—Signature at the Left Hand Corner.—Where the signature upon a promissory note offered in evidence appears upon the left hand side, a legal presumption arises that the person writing it placed it there in the capacity of a witness, and such presumption will prevail, unless overcome by some evidence outside of the note.</p> <p>4 Ultra Vires—Mutual Benefit Association.—A demurrer to a plea of ultra vires by a mutual benefit association, to an action upon a promissory note, is properly sustained.</p>

Transcript, from a justice of the peace. Appeal from, the Circuit Court of Cook County: the Hon. Edward F. Dunne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>In Equity.—Bill for relief. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Appeal, from a justice of the peace. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Nathaniel C. Sears, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit.—Breach of contract. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles Cf. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1^96.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for broker’s commissions. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. . Voluntary Assignments— Order to Convey to a Third Person upon Discontinuance, Void.—Upon a discontinuance of proceedings under a voluntary assignment, the court has no power to order the assignee to transfer the assigned property to a third person who has bought up a majority in number and amount of the claims of the creditors, and such order is void as to all creditors who do not consent.</p>

<p>Bill, for an injunction. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Checks—Presentment and Notice of Dishonor.—The want of due presentment and notice of dishonor of a check does not discharge the drawer, unless he has suffered some loss or injury thereby.</p> <p>2. Same— Where the Drawer has no Funds.—If the drawer of a cheek has no funds in the bank at the time of drawing the check, or subsequently withdraws them, he commits a fraud upon the payee, and can suffer no loss or damage from the holder’s delay or failure in respect to presentmentand notice; he is liable without presentment or notice of dishonor.</p>

<p>Garnishment Proceedings.—Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jonas Hutchinson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Bill, for an injunction. ' Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Creditor’s Bill—Pendency of, Gan Not be Pleaded in Bar.—The pendency of a creditor’s bill brought by one creditor for the benefit of all the creditors of a common debtor, can not be successfully pleaded in abatement or in bar of a subsequent bill brought by a different creditor in a different right, until after a decree has been rendered in the former suit, under which all may come in and participate.</p> <p>2. Equity Practice—Consolidation of Suits.—Where creditors’ bills by different creditors are pending against the same common debtor, the court may, upon a proper motion, consolidate them.</p>

<p>1. Corporations—Accommodation Indorsements— Ultra Vires.—An accommodation indorsement of a promissory note is not within the scope of corporate business.</p> <p>2. Promissory Notes—Purchasers in Good Faith.-—A purchaser in good faith of a promissory note, indorsed by a corporation, may recover, but not if he has knowledge that such indorsement was made as an accommodation.</p>

Injunction, to restrain the use of a trade name. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>1. Public Policy—Recovery of Rewards.—There is nothing in the position that a person holds with a railroad company to look after crimes and matters connected civilly and criminally with the company, which makes it against public policy for him to recover a reward for the arrest of a criminal.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Offer of Rewards.—Where a circular is issued with the knowledge and approval of a bank for the arrest of a thief, evidence of such facts is sufficient to show a promise by the bank.</p>

<p>Bill for Divorce.—Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Bill for an Injunction.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Decrees—What are Final.—When a decree finally decides and dis poses of the whole merits of the controversy and reserves no questions or requires no further directions for the future judgment of the court as between the parties and over the subject-matter, it is a final decree.</p> <p>2. Same—What are Interlocutory.—A decree in which the party in whose favor it is made can not obtain the benefit thereof without further hearing before the court, is interlocutory.</p> <p>3. Error—Does Not Lie to Reverse an Interlocutory Decree.—A writ of error does not lie to reverse an interlocutory decree.</p>

<p>1. Bastardy—Place of Commitment on Failure to give Bond—Discharge.—Where a defendant in a bastardy case fails to give a bond and is committed to jail, he will not be entitled to be discharged because he is kept in a place with persons charged with or convicted of crimes and misdemeanors.</p>

<p>1. Appeals—Lie Only from Final Judgments.—An appeal cannot be taken unless there has been a final order or judgment entered in the case.</p>

<p>I. Equity Practice—Amendments to Bills.—An amendment to an original bill is but an addition to such bill, and both the amendment and the original bill constitute but one record.</p> <p>3. Courts of Equity—Cancellation of Insurance Policies.—A court of equity has jurisdiction to cancel a policy of life insurance procured by'fraud.</p>

<p>1. Injunctions—To Restrain Noises, etc.—A court of equity can not regulate the noise of a city by injunction. If the owner of premises makes noises which result in an injury to the property of another person, the remedy is at law, and not in chancery by injunction.</p>

<p>1. Evidence—Original Documents— When not a Part of the Record. — When a judgment is entered in term time, the original documents upon which it is entered are not a part of the record. They can only be made so by a bill of exceptions. . •</p> <p>2; Judgment by Concession—Exceptions.—When a judgment is entered by confession, the defendant can only take exception by moving the court to vacate the judgment and preserve the evidence heard upon the motion by a proper bill of exceptions.</p> <p>8. Practice—Error from a Judgment by Confession.—A writ of error cannot be prosecuted to reverse a judgment by confession, to open or vacate which, no motion has been made in the court below.</p>

<p>1. Appeals—From Orders of Discharge fromArrest. —An appeal from an order of the County Court discharging a person from arrest on a co. set. issued by a justice of the peace must be taken to the Appellate Court.</p>

<p>1. Consideration—Foi' Compromises—Doubtful, Claims.—It is not necessary that a claim be certainly maintainable in order to constitute a good consideration for a compromise. It is sufficient if it be asserted in good faith, and acceded to in the way of settlement. A mere misapprehension of the law is no ground for disturbing the settlement of a doubtful claim.</p>

Assumpsit, for taxes under conditions of a lease. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Babton Payne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

Bill, to set aside a trust deed. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Bill, to foreclose a trust deed. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. William G. Ewing, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the 'October term, 1898.</p>

<p>Mandamus, to enforce payment of license fees. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. William G. Ewing, Judge, presiding.' Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on an insurance policy. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. William: G. Ewing, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

Bill, to foreclose trust deed. Error to the Circuit Court for the County of Cook; the Hon. Elbridq-e Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>1. Jurisdiction.—When Court of Chancery Will Retain.—While it is well settled that if a court of equity acquires jurisdiction of a case on any equitable ground it will retain the cause and afford complete relief, although it becomes necessary to enforce purely legal rights, yet the facts which bring the cause within the jurisdiction of equity must be not only pleaded but proved, and if the court in its final determination concludes that the allegations which alone gave it jurisdiction are baseless, its jurisdiction is at an end.</p>

<p>1. Contracts—Minds of the Parties Must Meet.—In a suit against an insurance company where the plaintiff had directed his agent, who was also agent for the insurance company, to keep his property insured, and the agent in pursuance of said instructions had written the policy sued upon, but had not entered it upon his books, or reported it to his company, but had notified the owner of the property, who had thereupon asked the agent to write the insurance company for permission to make a lower rate and if they refused to do so to cancel the policy, and the agent had done nothing in pursuance of this request, it was held that the minds of the parties had not come together and that the plaintiff could not recover for a destruction of his property by fire.</p>

<p>1. Building Associations—By-Laws, When Binding on Members. —By-laws of a building association not repugnant to the laws of the State, are binding upon the members.</p> <p>3. Contracts.—Not Forbidden By Law, Will Be Enforced as Made. —Courts may not deoh re oppressive, terms sanctioned by legislation, and where parties sui juris and compos mentis enter1 into contracts sanctioned by law, they must abide by such contracts.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for failure to properly execute a writ. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Mechanics’ Lien Proceedings.—Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Oliver H. Horton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Pasties—Who Are Not Proper Parties in Replevin.—In a replevin suit against a sheriff to take goods and chattels levied upon by him under an execution, the plaintiff in the suit in which the execution was issued is not a proper party.</p> <p>3. Same—How Affected by New Declaration.—A new declaration works a discontinuance as to all the defendants to the suit not joined in it.</p> <p>3. Pleas—One Plea in Bar Sufficient.—If a defendant plead and prove one plea in bar he is entitled to judgment; and in replevin a general verdict for the defendant where, among others, there is a plea of property in the defendant upon which issue is joined, warrants a judgment for a return of the property.</p> <p>4. Error—Who May Complain.—A privilege which need not be used and which can not possibly harm the person to whom it is granted can not be complained of as error by him.</p> <p>5. Judgment—How Attached.—Whether a note upon which a judgment has been obtained was properly indorsed is not a question of jurisdiction, but of error, and the question can only be raised in a direct attack upon the judgment by the parties against whom it was rendered.</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Inevitable Results Need Not be Pleaded.—If conditions are averred under which, by the laws of nature, a certain result must follow, the court will take judicial notice of the result.</p> <p>2. Damages—When Not Excessive.—Where the evidence showed damage to plaintiff’s property from foul smells emanating from defendant’s property, there being no standard by which the damages could be measured, and nothing in the record to show that the verdict was dictated by passion or prejudice, it was held that a large verdict was not ground for reversal.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G-. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Assmnpslt.—Services rendered. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Nathaniel C. Sears, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Bill op Exceptions—Striking a Plea from the Piles—Where the court improperly strikes a plea from the files the party aggrieved thereby should, by a bill of exceptions, preserve what the court did in this regard.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, upon a contract of sale. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

'Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tdthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

Transcript, from a justice of the peace. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Bill, in aid of an attachment. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>1. Mechanic’s Lien.—A Sufficient Statement—Decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court that a statement in a mechanic’s lien case, alleging that the materials and work were furnished between certain dates, is a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement in regard to time, state the law correctly.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for salary. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. William Or. Ewing, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1893.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

Assumpsit, on the common counts with additional count in debt. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.

<p>Bastardy.—Appeal from the Criminal Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Attachment.—Appeal from the County Court of Cook County, the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>

<p>Motion, to vacate judgment. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. ArthurH. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1896.</p>