Volume 66 — Maryland Reports

The parcel of land sought to he recovered in this action, is described in the declaration as follows: “Beginning for the same at the northeast corner formed by the intersection of two twenty foot alleys, one running parallel with Charles street avenue, and lying between said avenue and Maryland avenue, and the other running at right angles to said Charles street avenue, and intersecting the west side thereof, (being the first alley running east and west, north of Huntingdon…

The Court below (Brooke and Crane, J.,) decreed that there was due from the defendant, Andrew Jackson Smoot, to the complainant Andrew G. Chapman, administrator of Gerard W. Hungerford, deceased, on account of the residue of the mortgage debt in the proceedings mentioned, the sum of $504.6*7, with interest thereon from the 18th day of May, 1880, and that unless the defendants should, on or before the 1st of January, 1885, pay, or bring into Court to be paid, to the…

This was an action of ejectment brought hy the appellee to recover the real estate in controversy. The appellant pleaded not guilty, and the appellee joined issue. The case was tried before the Court on an agreed statement of facts.

<p> Validity of Title. </p> <p>The “ Charles Street Methodist Episcopal Church of Baltimore,” a corporation under the laws of the State of Maryland, acquired title to a leasehold lot in the City of Baltimore, by deed of assignment duly recorded. This deed contained the following clause: “In trust that there shall be erected and built thereon a house or place of worship for the use of the Methodist Episcopal Church, according to the rules and discipline which from time to time, may be agreed upon and adopted by the ministers and preachers of the said Church at the General Conference,” &c. An annual rent was reserved. Subsequently, the Charles Street Methodist Episcopal Church of Baltimore, by deed duly recorded, assigned the said property to “The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore.” This deed of assignment contained no restrictions. Afterwards, “ The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore,” a corporation duly created under the laws of the State, purchased the reversionary interest or estate in the lot of ground, and by such purchase became discharged and released from the payment of the ground rent. B. .contracted to purchase from “ The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore,” the lot in question, but was unwilling to accept the property until the supposed cloud upon the title could be cleared away, it being questioned whether the purchase from the reversioner of the fee, effected a merger of all interests in “The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore,” and perfected its title. It was further suggested that the title was defective in that “ The Charles Street Methodist Church ” never obtained the assent of the Legislature to its holding the leasehold estate, prior to the assignment thereof to “ The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore; ” and further, in that there was a diversion of the property from the use expressed in the assignment to “ The Charles Street Methodist Church.” On a bill filed by B. to have have the title made valid, it was Held :</p> <p>That by the purchase from, and a conveyance by, the reversioner, of the fee, the less estate was merged in the greater, and the title of “ The Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the City and Precincts of Baltimore,” became absolute and indefeasible upon the assent of the Legislature, which was subsequently given.</p>

<p>Practice in the Court of Appeals — Breach of Contract— Breach of Warranty — Contributory Weyliyence.</p> <p>Any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the Court'below, will not be considered by the Appellate Court.</p> <p>Where in a contract to build a steamboat, it was stipulated that the machinery throughout should be of the best material, and the workmanship first-class, and there is a failure in the observance of this stipulation, there is a breach of the contract, but no breach of warranty, as there can be no express warranty of the quality of that which does not exist.</p> <p>In a contract for building a steamboat it was stipulated that the purchaser should have the privilege of placing with the builder, during all the time the boat was being constructed; a suitable and competent person to superintend her construction, and every facility should be given him to inspect the work and materials at all times, with the right to reject anything that did not come up to the requirements of the contract, and also to alter and change the style. In pursuance of this stipulation, a competent person was selected by the purchaser to superintend the construction of the steamboat, who had every facility given him to inspect the work and materials, by being allowed free access to the builder’s shops and premises, and who attended there from day to day for the purpose of the duties thus assigned him, and brought his engineer with him to assist in his inspection of the machinery. After the boat was completed, delivered and accepted, and had been in use for years, the straps of the starboard walking-beam gave way, causing very serious injury to the boat. In an action by the purchaser to recover damages of the builder, it was Held : .</p> <p>That if the damage done to the steamboat was caused by any negligence on the part of the plaintiff’s agent, it was contributory negligence, and there could be no recovery.</p>

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court. The insertion of the prayers is deemed unnecessary. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000 and judgment was entered thereon. The defendant appealed.

This action, was instituted by the appellee against the appellants on an injunction hond, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by Warren C. White & Co., by reason of an injunction sued out against them by John E. Wood, and wife.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court. The reporting of the numerous exceptions — -thirty-two in all- — is deemed unnecessary. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $4000.00, and judgment was entered thereon. The defendant appealed.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the 'Court.</p>

<p>Construction of a will — Legacies—Payment of Debts and Legacies — When Legacies not a Charge on Beal Pstate.</p> <p>The personal estate is the natural and primary fund for the payment of debts and legacies; and even when the real estate is expressly charged, no resort can be made to it until the personalty is exhausted, unless it has been exonerated by the terms of the will. If the testator gives a legacy the law conclusively presumes that it is to be paid only out of the personalty, and if that is insufficient the legacy is lost, unless a contrary intention is shown on the face of the will. If he wishes it paid out of the realty, he must so state either by express words or by fair and reasonable implication.</p> <p>A will contained the following clause: “I will, and direct my executor hereinafter named, to satisfy and pay all my just debts and funeral expenses out of my estate. * * * * I give and bequeath unto my nephew, J. O. K., the sum of $200, and I direct my executor hereinafter named, to pay the same to him as soon as convenient after my decease out of my estate. * * * ’ * I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real,-personal and mixed, whatsoever and wheresoever at the time of my decease, unto my niece, M. J. W., to her own sole and separate use, &c., &c.;” describing this last devise and bequest so as to exclude all right and interest in the same on the part of her present or any future husband. There were several other legacies which were given in words almost identical with those which were used in the case of J. O. K’s legacy; it was stated that they were all to he paid by the executor out of the estate. The personal assets were not sufficient to pay the legacies in full. On a bill filed by the legatees to subject the devised real estate to the payment of the deficiency, it was Held :</p> <p>That the legacies were not a charge on the real estate.</p>

<p>Evidence — Wul tiel Record — Eoclcet entries of Insolvent proceedings — Order of final Discharge in Insolvency.</p> <p>In an action of assumpsit, the defendant irleaded, that previous to the commencement of the action, he was by the same Court adjudged an insolvent debtor, and discharged as such from all debts and contracts made before the filing of his application. To this plea there was a replication of mil tiel record. Upon the trial-of this issue before the Court, the defendant offered in evidence the docket entries in the matter of his application, for the benefit of the insolvent laws entered on the insolvent docket of the Court, together with the original papers in the insolvent proceeding. Held :</p> <p>1st. That the application in insolvency having been made in the same Court in which the issue of mil tiel record was on trial, it was not necessary to produce a formal record of the insolvent proceedings.</p> <p>2nd. That if the docket entries and original papers laid before the Court for its inspection showed the final discharge of the defendant, his plea should be sustained.</p> <p>The docket entry of the discharge was as follows: “June 21, 1879, certif. pub. notice filed, same day petitioner finally discharged; ” and on the original petition there was this indorsement signed by the clerk, “Petitioner discharged June 21, 1879. By order of Court.” Held :</p> <p>That this was sufficient evidence of the discharge of the defendant, and no formal order of discharge written out and signed by the Judge or Judges sitting at the time of the discharge, was essential to its validity.</p>

<p>Mechanics’ Lien — Waiver of Lien.</p> <p>It is provided by section 3 of Article 67, Revised Code, that a mechanics’ lien shall not be considered as waived, “by granting a credit, or receiving notes or other securities, unless the same be received as payment, or the lien be expressly waived; ” but if an express contract under seal be 'entered into inconsistent with the operation of the lien, the lien is expressly waived by the legal effect of such express contract.</p> <p>A material-man'agreed to accept part of his claim in cash, and a mortgage for the balance. The owner of the house made the cash payment as agreed upon, and offered to give a mortgage for the balance, which was refused, and thereupon offered to pay the sum intended to be secured by the mortgage in cash, which was also refused. Held :</p> <p>That the mechanics’ lien of the material-man was waived by his agreement to accept the mortgage security.</p>

<p>Appeal — Receiver—Article 5, section 21, of the Code.</p> <p>No appeal lies from an order refusing to rescind a previous order appointing a receiver.</p> <p>Neither the appointment of a receiver, nor the refusal to discharge him before final decree, involves the determination of any right between the parties.</p> <p>An order refusing to rescind a previous order appointing a receiver, is not within the meaning of that clause of section 21 of Article 5, of the Code, which declares that an appeal shall lie “ from an' order determining a question of right between the parties, and directing an account to be stated on the principle of such determination.”</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alleghany County, in Equity.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Evidence — Eorgery—Comparison of Sand-Writing — Practice in Appellate Court — Bills of Exception — Practice.</p> <p>In an action against the indorser of a note the defence was forgery. After the plaintiff had proved by several witnesses acquainted with defendant’s hand-writing, that in their opinion the disputed signature was genuine,'the defendant testified that it was a forgery. He then proved, by a witness who had frequently seen the defendant write, and was familiar with his signature, that, in his opinion, the indorsement was not in the defendant’s hand-writing. On cross-examination, for the sole purpose of refreshing his memory, the plaintiff’s counsel exhibited to the witness a letter, which the defendant admitted was in his genuine hand-writing, both in the body and signature, written upon a subject foreign to the case, and the contents of which would not have been admissible, and were not admitted upon any issue joined in the action. He then proposed to ask the witness to examine the same, and say whether he was still of the opinion that the indorsement upon the note was in the defendant’s hand-writing. The Court, upon objection by the defendant, refused to allow the witness to examine the letter or the proposed question to be put to him. The plaintiff excepted. On appeal it was Held :</p> <p>1st. That the ruling of the Court was erroneous.</p> <p>2nd. That to have allowed the witness to examine the letter for the purpose of refreshing his memory as to the defendant’s hand-writing, and then say whether he was still of opinion the disputed signature was not genuine, would in nowise have infringed the rule which is well settled, in this State, against proof of hand-writing by comparison of hands.</p> <p>A certificate or statement of facts appended to the record, and signed by one of the two Judges who sat at the trial, cannot be considered by the Appellate Court.</p> <p>On appeal in a civil suit, the facts of the case, and what occurred at the trial, can be legitimately certified to the Appellate Court only through the medium of bills of exception taken to the rulings of the inferior Court, regularly signed and sealed by the Judge; and the duty of the Appellate Court is confined to a review of these rulings.</p> <p>The proper course for the Court to have pursued, — assuming the statements of the certificate to be true, — was this: If the exceptions were tendered to the Judges for signature after'the trial was ended^ they should have embodied, or required to be embodied in them the facts stated in the certificate, before signing them; and if the exceptions were prepared and tendered for signature, and signed immediately after the rulings were made, and before they were reversed, the Judges should, after reversing the rulings, have withdrawn or erased their signatures — as they would have had a perfect right to do — and then required others to be prepared embodying such facts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cecil County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alleghany County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Motion in Arrest of Judgment. </p> <p>A motion in arrest of judgment after final judgment has been entered, is too late.</p>

In this case, a hill was filed on the 2nd of August, 1866, by Morris Sitler, to foreclose a mortgage on lands in Harford County, executed by George M. McComas and wife on the 8th of February, 1862. This mortgage was acknowledged on the day it hears date, before George M. Bain, who is admitted to have been at the time a justice of the peace of the State of Maryland in and for Baltimore City, duly commissioned and sworn.

<p>Insufficient designation of Grantee in a Deed — Obstructing an Alley-way — Injunction—Dstoppel.</p> <p>Where, in a deed, the grant of a right of way is to the “ owner or owners of the brick house, and curtilage adjoining the property hereby conveyed, on the west side thereof,” the description of the grantee is insufficient to enable any one to claim as such.</p> <p>Equity will enjoin a party from erecting and maintaining obstructions in an alley which destroy the complainant’s right of way therein, and completely deprive him of the use and benefit of the alley, and materally decrease the value of his property.</p> <p>The fact that the complainant himself had previously made an encroachment upon the alley will not estop him from seeking relief in equity against the defendant on account of the trespass.</p> <p>The doctrine that where one stands by, and without objection sees another# laying out money on property to which he himself has some claim or title, cannot afterward in equity and good conscience object to what has been done, does not apply to an act of encroachment on land, the title to which is equally well known, or equally open to the notice of both parties; but the principle applies only against one who claims under some trust, lien or other right not equally ojien and apparent to the parties, and in favor of one who would be misled or deceived by such want of notice.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — The plaintiff offered the following prayers:. 1.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore County, in Equity.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The record in this case, is quite voluminous and contains much that has no hearing upon the questions which the present appeal presents for review, and only such of the facts and proceedings as bear upon those questions need he stated.

<p>Construction of Will — Trustee and Executor — Income—Expenditures.</p> <p>A testator devised as follows: “ I will and bequeath to my friend, Dr. John M. Brome, all my property, both real and personal, in trust, for the support and education of my minor and unmarried children, to be so held in trust until the youngest child living shall arrive to the age of sixteen years, at which time I desire and will that my property shall be equally divided among both my married and unmarried children and their heirs.” Dr. Brome was appointed trustee and executor, and was empowered to sell so much of the testator’s property, either real or personal, as might be necessary to pay his just debts. The trustee and executor sold the whole estate, real and personal, and accounted therefor in the Orphans’ Court, but claimed allowances for expenditures for the support and education of the unmarried and minor children largely in excess of the income of the estate. Held :</p> <p>1st. That no authority was given to the trustee to sell any part of the testator’s estate, except in so far as it was necessary for the payment of his debts.</p> <p>2nd. That the trustee was limited in his expenditures for the support and education of the minor and unmarried children of the testator, during the continuance of the trust, to the income arising from the estate.</p>

<p>Action of Slander — Sec. 4, of Art. 89, of the Code — Husband and Wife — Misjoinder of Parties — Arrest of Judgment.</p> <p>Section 4, of Article 89, of the Code, confers upon the husband the exclusive right, of action for words maliciously spoken of his wife, subsequent to the marriage, touching her character or reputation for chastity previous to her marriage; and the joining of the wife as co-plaintiff with the husband in such action is a misjoinder, and furnishes a sufficient cause for arrest of judgment.</p> <p>Where the action is brought for several slanders spoken at different times, and are laid in several counts, and the action will not lie for the words set out in one of the counts, but will lie for the words declared on in the other counts, and there is a general verdict without distinction of counts, assessing entire damages, the judgment will be arrested.</p>

<p>Indictment charging Rape and cm Assault with Intent to commit Rape — Verdict on one Count only — Writ of Error— Braetice.</p> <p>Where an indictment contains two counts, the first charging the commission of rape, and the second charging an assault with intent to commit rape, and the jury finds the traverser “ guilty of the charge in the first count,” without passing upon the second count, the verdict is sufficient, the minor offence being merged in the greater.</p> <p>A writ of error cannot properly be allowed before final judgment.</p> <p>Where a petition to have the record removed as upon writ of error, is allowed, the Court may proceed to pronounce sentence upon the prisoner without waiting for a determination by the Appellate Court of the questions sought to be presented by the writ of error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

• Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in Equity. This appeal was taken from an order of the Court below, overruling and dismissing the exceptions to the sale, made by the trustee, and finally ratifying and confirming said sale. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Appeal as upon Writ of Error,'from the Criminal Court of Baltimore.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for $5,133.33, and the defendant appealed.

The appellant filed a bill in equity, in which he alleged that John P. Hubbard and wife, William I. Brown and wife, Russell Sturgis and Wife, Henry Upham and wife, J. S. P. Greene and wife, John S. McCulloh, James W. McCulloh, Richard S. McCulloh and William J. McCulloh, were seised in fee simple, as tenants in common of certain lands in Garrett County and that while so seised they became indebted to the complainant in the sum of five hundred and fifteen dollars for…

<p>Guardian and Ward — Guardianes account — Lapse of Time— Intendments.</p> <p>An application by a ward for a revision of his guardian’s account, some seventeen years after its approval and passage by the Orphans’ Court, and nearly nine years after he attained his majority, should not be granted, unless it be very clearly shown that the account was erroneous. After the lapse of so long a time, all reasonable intendments should bo made in support of the action of the Orphans’ Court.</p>

The cáse was submitted to the Court below for trial, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed. The case is further stated in the opinion of this Court.

The Court below decreed “that the parties account with each other of and concerning the matters in these pro-' ceedings mentioned,” and overruled the defence of the Statute of Limitations. From this decree the defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants, on a general demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration. The case is further stated in the opinion of the Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception. — This exception was taken to the permission given hy the Court to the plaintiff to withdraw the sum of $79.50, which he had paid into Court, upon the defendant’s refusal to accept the same as payment for freight. Second Exception. — The defendant offered the following prayers: 1.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the appellant a married woman, suing by next friend, against the appellee to recover a sum of money claimed to be due her by the defendants’ testatrix in her life-time. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Case tried before the Court without a Jury — Appeal—Practice.</p> <p>When the Court hears a case as a jury, its conclusion, like that of a jury, is not subject to appeal.</p> <p>When cases are tried before the Court without a jury, the Court may, and ought to be asked, to decide any legal proposition which either party may think essential to his case, and if he desires to appeal, he should make the Court’s ruling thereon the basis of his exception.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of this Court. The Circuit Court (Fowler, J.) before whom the case was tried without the intervention of a jury, found that the traverser was not guilty on the first count, hut guilty on the second count in the indictment.

The appeal .in this case was taken from a decree dismissing the hill of the complainants, which sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in Equity.</p> <p>This appeal is taken from a decree overruling exceptions to a sale. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This appeal was taken from an order of the Court below, passed on the petition of Marie E. Hatch, and her supplemental petition filed after her intermarriage with George H. Gamble, revoking the letters of administration on the personal estate of William H. Dalrymple, in this State, which had been granted to Augustine J. Dalrymple, and directing letters of administration cum testamento annexo, on said estate, to he issued to J. Southgate Lemmon and Augustine J. Dalrymple.

This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court, overruling the motion to quash the proceedings in insolvency. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court.

This case arises upon a bill filed by the appellants for an injunction to restrain the appellees, the one from maintaining and the other from using certain railway tracks, laid partly on the sidewalk and partly on the carriage way in the bed of the street in front of the complainants’ property. The hill was dismissed by the Court below, (Brown, C. J.,) and the complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Death occasioned by Negligence — Action for Damages — Infant Dquitable plaintiff — Prochein ami — Removal of cause— Affdavit for Removal made by an Infant — Bill of Dxceptions — Appeal—Ownership of Wharf — Liability of Owner of Wharf for Injury resulting from its Defective condition.</p> <p>Where an action is brought in the name of the State for the use of a minor for damages sustained by him by the death of his parents, it is too late after verdict, to object that the name of a prochein cmi should have been inserted.</p> <p>It is not however improper to insert the name of a prochein ami to the infant. In many cases it would be very desirable to do so, especially in those cases where the infant was too young to make an affidavit for removal.</p> <p>An infant upwards of fifteen years of age, will be presumed to have intelligence and discretion sufficient to understand w'hat a removal of Ms case means, and to make the suggestion and affidavit required.</p> <p>A suggestion that “he believed that he could not have a fair and impartial trial,” is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision:</p> <p>A bill of exceptions must be signed and sealed by the Court below before it can be reviewed on appeal.</p> <p>Special exceptions to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an instruction, signed by counsel, but not embodied in an exception signed and sealed by the Court below, cannot be considered on appeal.</p> <p>If such exceptions have ever been considered by this Court, it was always where no objection was urged against them.</p> <p>The proprietor of a farm bordering on navigable water, is not necessarily the owner of a wharf attached to it.</p> <p>Where the owner of a wharf leases or rents it out, and at the time of such renting the wharf is in an' unsafe condition for the use to which it is to be put, and the owner knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of its condition, and one who is lawfully upon the wharf is injured in consequence of its condition, the owner is liable for the injury.</p>

The case was tried before the Court without the intervention of a jury, and is stated in the opinion of this Court.

Appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The first and second appeal in this case were taken from the final decree of the Court helow, of the 2nd of January, 1886, dismissing the original and amended bills as against The Postal Telegraph Company of Baltimore City, •and directing the receivers in the proceedings mentioned, to surrender the possession of the property of said company, consisting of telegraph lines, wires and poles within the State of Maryland, to said…

This was au action on a policy of marine insurance, brought by the appellees against the appellant. The •case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Legislative powers — Municipal Corporations — 'Municipal Elections — Qualification of Voters — Article 1, section 5, of the Constitution — Equity Pleadings — Preamble of a Statute — Effect of its Recital as Evidence.</p> <p>The Legislature may authorize a municipal corporation to fund its floating debt by issuing bonds therefor; and if such debt was contracted without due authority, such legislative approval will give it validity.</p> <p>No municipal elections except those held in the City of Baltimore, are within the terms or meaning of section five of Article I, of the Constitution, providing for a uniform registration of the names of voters.</p> <p>Under section 97 of the Public Local Law of Carroll County, giving the right to vote at municipal elections in the City of Westminster to the inhabitants who are qualified to vote for delegates to the General Assembly, the right of an inhabitant of Westminster to vote for Mayor and Councilmen must depend on the requirements of the Constitution relating to the qualification of voters, without reference to the registration list.</p> <p>A bill in equity was filed by an individual complainant, against S. and others, alleging that S. unlawfully assumed to be Mayor, and the other defendants unlawfully assumed to be members of the Common Council of the City of Westminster, and that they in conjunction were unlawfully exercising the powers conferred by the charter of the city on the corporation, and were about to issue certain bonds to fund a pretended debt which did not exist, and the bill prayed an injunction to restrain the defendants and each of them from selling and disposing of the bonds. Held:</p> <p>1st. That the averments of the bill did not show that the defendants were unlawfully exercising the powers of Mayor and Councilmen; and consequently the proceeding could not be maintained against them.</p> <p>2nd. That they were impleaded in their individual capacities for acts done in the ordinary exercise of their corporate powers, and could not be held to responsibility in such a suit.</p> <p>3rd. That it belonged to the municipal corporation itself to defend the legality of these acts.</p> <p>4th. That on a bill in equity filed against it, if the averment that the City of Westminster was not in debt could be established, it would follow that the issue of the bonds must be enjoined.</p> <p>The preamble to a statute authorizing the City.of Westminster to fund the floating debt of the corporation and to issue bonds, not exceeding a specified sum, for its payment, is not evidence of the indebtedness in a Court of justice.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the appellees against the appellants on a bill of exchange for $500, drawn by McGree & Hunt on the latter, payable at sight, to the order of J. Van Evary, and by him endorsed. The case is further stated in the opinion of the Court. It was submitted to the determination of the Court below without the aid of a jury.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Twenty-two exceptions were taken. Exceptions from one to twenty-one inclusive, other than the fourth, sixth, eighth, ttoelfih, fifteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth, which were abandoned, are sufficiently stated in the opionion of the Court. Twenty-second Exception.

Frederick Rice and John Henry Knell, Jr., trustees of Frederick Lewis, obtained a judgment by default against George Warner in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The judgment was extended by the Court for the plain tiff for §2162.40. An attachment was issued on said judgment, directed to the sheriff of Baltimore City, and laid in the hands of Caleb Warfield and others as garnishees of George Warner.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception — Stated in the opinion of the Court. Second Exception — At the trial the plaintiff offered the four following prayers: 1. That if the jury find that the plaintiff sold to the defendant one hundred and sixty tons and twelve hundred pounds of acid phosphate, upon the terms expressed in the two papers, dated June 15th, 1885, in evidence; that one of the said papers, purporting to he signed Thos.

<p>Appellate jurisdiction — Trial by the Court without a Jury— Bills of Exception — Case stated — Reservation of the Right of Appeal — Judgment on a Case stated.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals has no power to decide any point or question which does not appear by the record of the case to have, been raised, or made in and decided by the Court below.</p> <p>Where a case is tried before the Court without the aid of a jury, the rulings of the Court should be brought before the appellate tri- . bunal for review by means of bills of exception, or by a case stated.</p> <p>In a case stated the Court is confined to the precise facts embraced in the statement, and has no power to draw inferences from them, unless there is an express agreement that the Court may make such deductions of fact as a jury ought to make; and it is necessary to state upon what conclusions of law the Court is authorized to render judgment; and usually both sides reserve the right of appeal.</p> <p>The Court has no power to render judgment on a case stated unless' it is so expressly agreed..</p>

This appeal was taken from an order of the Circuit Court, rejecting the claim of The Third National Bank of Baltimore, and sustaining the exceptions thereto of Thomas M. Lanahan, trustee, and the Rasin Fertilizer Company of Baltimore, and directing the Bank to pay all costs incurred in relation to such exceptions. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Copy of a Deed of assignment executed in Ohio — Evidence— Name of Corporation — Condemnation of the Practice of introducing Original papers in the Argument of a Cause in the Appellate Court.</p> <p>A paper purporting to be a copy of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, executed in the State of Ohio, without seal, without attesting witness, and not purporting to have been executed before any officer of the law, certified by a person purporting to be Clerk of the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County in said State, and under the seal of the Court as a copy "of a deed of assignment” filed in that Court, is not admissible in evidence in the absence of some-proof that by the law of Ohio such a paper was operative and effective as a deed, and was required to be recorded or filed in that Court, and that a copy was made evidence of its execution, and did away with the necessity for any further proof of execution and delivery.</p> <p>A paper purporting to be a copy of the same assignment, from the records of the same Court in Ohio, with an order of the Court thereon to the trustee to give bond, &c., certified under the seal of the Court by the person professing to be clerk of the Court, and the person professing to be Judge of the Court certifying to the official character of the clerk, and that his attestation was in due form, such instrument not being so executed as to entitle it to record, and a copy of such record to be evidence in this State, is-not admissible as evidence of title, without proof of the law of Ohio giving the Probate Court jurisdiction of the subject.</p> <p>The omission of the word “The” in signing the name of the corporation to the deed of assignment, is not fatal to the subscription.</p> <p>The practice of introducing into the Court of Appeals the original papers offered in evidence in the lower Court, instead of having them embodied in the record, condemned.</p>

This suit was brought to enforce the specific performance of a written contract entered into between Albert 17. Horner and J. Hall Pleasants for the sale to the latter by the former of all of his interest and estate in and to a warehouse and lot in the City of Baltimore, together with a wharf fronting twenty-five feet thereon. A pro forma decree was passed by agreement of counsel dismissing the bill of complaint without prejudice. From this decree the complainant appealed.

<p>Corporation — Liability of Assignor and Assignee of Stoeh— Assessment — Code of Virginia of 1860.</p> <p>Although stock may be purchased for a customer by brokers, yet if they choose to treat it as their own, and to make it so appear on the books of the corporation, they assume the liability of stockholders, as between themselves and the corporation, or those claiming through it, and they will not be heard to deny the liability attaching to such relation.</p> <p>All persons becoming stockholders in a corporation must be conclusively presumed to have contracted with reference to, and assumed all the liability prescribed by, the law of the domicil of the corporation.</p> <p>While under the Code of Virginia of 1860, an assignment of the stock of a corporation, may operate a complete transfer of title as between assignor and assignee, it does not release the assignor from his liability, as stockholder, to the company to pay for the stock; but he remains liable not only for past assessments, but for any future assessments upon the stock, though the assignee of the stock becomes liable also.</p>

This action was brought against Eva Seldner and Lippman Seldner, copartners, trading as L. Seldner & Son. Eva Seldner only appeared and made defence. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception. — This exception related to the admissibility of evidence. Second Exception. — The plaintiff submitted the following prayers: 1.

Christian Ohlendorf, by his- last will appointed the appellant, his son, and the appellee, his son-in-law-, his executors. The appellee renounced his right to letters testamentary in due form, and the same were granted to the appellant alone, who gave bond, with the appellee and William Weikel as sureties.

This was au action brought under the statute, in the name of the State, to recover damages for the death of' the minor son of the equitable plaintiff, Harman Gunther, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the appellants. The calamity happened at-the crossing of the Philadelphia turnpike by the Union Railroad, at grade.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The jury gave a verdict for the defendant under the instruction of the Court, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The plaintiff appealed.

The case is stated in the opinion of the .Court. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiffs offered the five following prayers: 1.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in Equity.</p> <p>This appeal was taken from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception. — This exception was taken to the ruling of the Court in refusing to strike out so much of the testimony offered by the defendants as related to the purpose for which they purchased the kainit from the plaintiff, and the time at which they proposed and expected to make use of the same, the objection by the plaintiff to such testimony being that it was not pertinent or material to any issue in the case, and that…

This appeal was taken from a decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill of complaint. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court.

The Ccase is stated in the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff, to maintain the issues joined on his part, further proved by John T. Benson, that in September, 1884, the plaintiff drove Elias Brothers, defendants’ testator, •down to see witness at his home; that witness was owing Brothers a small note which Brothers wanted renewed; that a new note was written by witness’ wife and signed by witness; that plaintiff was about to attest the signature of witness to the note by…

Robertson, trustee, for the purpose of ascertaining the true construction of the sixth clause of the second codicil of the will of the late Ella Y. Davis, which contains the following provision: “ If my brother Joseph, should desire to move upon my farm, my trustee is to give to him all the stock, implements, &c., necessary to carry on the farm, which he, Joseph may select, otherwise, my trustee may sell all the farming implements, horned cattle, horses, mules and other…

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The Court below passed a decree requiring the defendant to-pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $5000, being the purchase money for the lot of ground in the proceedings mentioned, and the plaintiffs upon the payment of said sum of money and their costs, to convey by a deed, duly executed and acknowledged by them as executors of Louisa A. Hoffman, deceased, the lot as aforesaid to the defendant and his heirs; and further requiring…

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Howard County. A petition was filed by Samuel Gaither, addressed to the Judges of the Circuit Court for Howard County, showing that the County Commissioners of said county, had instituted proceedings for the opening of a public road through the lands of the petitioner, and were about to proceed further in the matter, without authority of law •and against- the provisions of the Acts of Assembly in such case made and provided.

The case is stated in the opinion of this Court. The appeal is taken from so much of the decree of the Circuit Court as appointed receivers to take charge of the real estate of Thomas J. McKaig, deceased, and to collect the rents thereof j &c.

<p>Proceeding under Act of 1868, ch. 273, to obtain a Decree for the Sale of an Infant’s Real estate — Irregularity in Proceeding — Jurisdiction of Parties concerned and of the Subject-matter of Suit — Appeal from Order overruling Exceptions by Purchaser to Sale — Decree not open for Review by Appellate Court — Sale advantageous to all parties — Purchaser in Good faith under a Decree or Judgment of a Court of competent Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In proceeding under the Act of 1868, ch. 273, on behalf of a minor, to obtain a decree for the sale or lease of certain real estate in which he is interested as devisee, the bill should be filed in the name of the infant devisee, as complainant, by his next friend, and not by the guardian in his own name, in his character of guardian.</p> <p>"Where, however, the bill is filed by the guardian in his own name, such irregularity in the proceeding does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction, the bill having been in fact filed for and on behalf of the infant, and having expressly charged that it would be for the benefit and advantage not only of the infant, but of all the other parties concerned, that the property should be sold or leased; and the infant, together with all the other parties concerned, then in being, having been made a party defendant to the bill, and he having answered the same by guardian ad litem, duly appointed by the Court.</p> <p>And the Court having thus acquired jurisdiction of the parties concerned, and of the subject-matter of the suit, may rightly pass a decree, if satisfied that it would be 'advantageous to all parties concerned, as well those in being as those after-born, that the property should be sold or leased; and the decree is binding upon all the parties interested, those not in esse as well as those in being, notwithstanding the irregularity of the proceeding, until such decree be reversed or annulled, upon review in regular proceeding for that purpose.</p> <p>But on appeal from an order overruling exceptions by the purchaser to the sale, and ratifying the sale as reported, the original decree authorizing the sale or lease of the property, is not open for review by the Appellate Court.</p> <p>On appeal from such order, it is immaterial whether there was sufficient evidence produced to the Court below to establish the fact that it would be advantageous to all parties concerned, that the property should he sold.</p> <p>Even if the decree could be reversed for errors or irregularities, whether in respect to the evidence, or otherwise, provided the Court had acquired jurisdiction to pass the decree, a purchaser in good faith under the decree, while it was subsisting and binding the parties thereto, will not be affected by such reversal.</p> <p>A purchaser under a judgment or decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction has a right to presume that the Court has taken all the necessary steps to investigate the rights of the parties, and that on such investigation, the decree or judgment, under which he purchased, was properly passed; but.he is bound, at his peril, to see that all proper parties to be bound, were before the Court, and that he does not take a title, supposed to be covered by the decree, that may be impeached aliunde.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Talbot County, in. Equity.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This suit was instituted in the .Circuit Court for Washington County, and upon the suggestion of the plaintiff it was removed to Carroll County, where it was tried. The case is stated in the opinion of this Court. The following is the letter marked “Exhibit No. 1,” and referred to in the second prayer of the defendant: Office of Hoopes Stone, Cement and Paint Co., Hollins and Payson Streets, Baltimore, Md. Baltimore, June 15th, 1882.