66 Md. App. 603 - Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) Items Taken to Jury Room. — Jurors may take notes regarding the evidence and may keep the notes with them when they retire for their deliberation. Unless the court for good cause orders otherwise, the jury may also take exhibits that have been admitted in evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the jury room without the agreement of all parties and consent of the court. Written or electronically recorded instructions may be taken into the jury room only with the permission of the court. (b) Jury Request to Review Evidence. — The court, after notice to the parties, may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested by it. In order that undue prominence not be given to the evidence requested, the court may also make available additional evidence relating to the same factual issue. (c) Communications with Jury. — The court shall notify the parties of the receipt of any communication from the jury pertaining to the action before responding to the communication. All such communications between the court and the jury shall be on the record in open court or shall be in writing and filed in the action.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 89 Md. App. 326 - Standiford v. Standiford · 160 Md. App. 531 - Wagner v. State

2. “The trial judge’s role is that of an impartial arbitrator and that appearance is not generally compatible with an inquisitorial role. It is the better practice for a trial judge to inject himself as little as possible in a jury case, United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C.Cir.1970), because of the inordinate influence that may emanate from his position if jurors interpret his questions as indicative of his opinion. See, also, Patterson [v. State], 275 Md. 563, 578-80 [ 342 A.2d 660 ] (1975). The appearance that a judge may have abandoned his role as an impartial arbitrator, is especially hazardous when cross-questioning a defendant. Yet, if counsel have faltered in their advocacies, it is not improper for a trial judge to be “meticulously careful to make sure that the full facts [are] brought out,” Jeffries v. State, 5 Md.App. 630, 632 [ 248 A.2d 807 ] (1969), or to seek to discover the truth when counsel have not elicited some material fact, or indeed when a witness has not testified with entire frankness. Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1172 , 1193 (1933). Such questioning may even bear upon the credibility of a defendant in a proper circumstance. Madison v. State, 200 Md. 1, 12 [ 87 A.2d 593 ] (1952); King v. State, 14 Md.App. 385, 393-94 [ 287 A.2d 52 ] cert. denied, 265 Md. 740 (1972). This should be achieved expeditiously, however, if at all, for a protracted examination has a tendency to convey to a jury a judge’s opinion as to facts or the credibility of witnesses.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 73 Md. App. 200 - Cardin v. State · 84 Md. App. 353 - Leak v. State

3. ““[wjhile the rule expressly requires notice to the parties of any communication from the jury, its very spirit is to provide an opportunity for input in designing an appropriate response to each question in order to assure fairness and avoid error.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Graham v. State · Stewart v. State