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66 Mo. 391

Dyer v. Brannock

Supreme Court of Missouri

Decided October 15, 1877

Supreme Court of Missouri · decided 1877-10-15

Frror to St. Louis Court of Appeals. The case is reported in 2 Mo. App., 432. Ejectment to recover several lots in the city of St. Louis. The opinion states the case. 1. There was a marriage between Wilson and Sarah Ann Adams in 1824, unless the evidence proves a marriage between Wilson and Jane Collins in 1819. If the latter marriage is proved, then the former is “ deemed null in law,” but under the statute the issue is nevertheless legitimate.

Relies on Valle v. Obenhause

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1877-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently November 2017 · most notably Hames v. Hames (1972), Teter v. Teter (1885)

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 48 state decisions — followed in 17 states

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Hough, J.,

¶1Concurring. — I concur in reversing the judgment and remanding the cause. I adhere to the views expressed by me in the case of Valle v. Obenhouse, 62 Mo. 81; so that if there, was an uninterrupted adverse occupancy of the land in question, beginning after the birth of issue, and continuing for the period of twenty-four years, neither Mrs Dyer nor her heirs would have been barred thereby. Whatever may have been Mrs. Dyer’s rights prior to the birth of issue, most certainly, after the birth of issue, she was not entitled to possession, and therefore as there was no merger of the husband’s estate, neither she, nor her heirs could have any right of action until the husband’s estate was determined by his death. As Mrs. *424Dyer died before her husband, and as no right of entry could accrue to her by reason of an adverse possession begun after the birth of issue, her children are not limited to three years after her death, as provided by Sec. 6, Art. 2, Chap. 89, Wag. Stat., but are entitled if sui juris, to ten years after their right of action accrued, which was on the death of their father, and not before.

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