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66 N.C. App. 358

State v. Snyder

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Decided February 7, 1984

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1984-02-07

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently February 1993

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“One connotes a positive concept of express hatred, ill-will or spite, sometimes called actual, express, or particular malice. Another kind of malice arises when an act which is inherently dangerous to human life is done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief. Both these kinds of malice would support a conviction of murder in the second degree. There is, however, a third kind of malice which is defined as nothing more than “that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justification.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 109 N.C. App. 64 - State v. McBride

Relies on State v. Foust · State v. Duboise

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-02-07

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

ARNOLD, Judge.

¶1Defendant was convicted of three counts of second degree murder. Second degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E. 2d 393 (1971). Although the issue has not been raised by the parties, we find that the conviction of defendant for second degree murder constituted “plain error” as there is no evidence of malice on the part of defendant.

¶2Malice as an element of the crime of second degree murder may be either express or implied. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E. 2d 889 (1963). Furthermore, malice is not only hatred, ill-will, or spite, as it is ordinarily defined, but it also includes the “condition of the mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justification.” Id. at 458, 128 S.E. 2d at 893.

¶3In the case at bar, there is no question that defendant’s act of running a red light and striking the car of the decedents resulted in their deaths. There is no evidence, however, express or implied, that these deaths were the result of any malice. Without this essential element there can be no crime of second degree murder.

¶4The disposition of this case in no way prevents the State from prosecuting defendant for the offenses of involuntary manslaughter or death by vehicle (see C. Whitebread, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, § 23.6 Appeal, Retrial, and Implied Acquittal (1978), but the conviction on the three counts of second degree murder is

¶5Reversed.

Judges WhichARD and Becton concur.
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