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66 Tenn. 64

Starks v. State

Tennessee Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1872

Tennessee Supreme Court · decided 1872-12-15

<p>'CbimiNAXí Law. Malicious stabbing. In an indictment for malicious stab-hing under sec. 4608 of the Code, the words “cut, penetrate and wound,” describe the offense with quite as much accuracy and certainty as if the word stab had been used.</p> <p>, Cases cited: Peck v. The State, 2 Hum., 85; Jarnagin v. The State, 10 Ter., 531.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 4608.</p>

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Decided 1872-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently April 1997

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Nicholson, C. J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2Starks was indicted and convicted in the Criminal Court of Davidson for unlawfully, and' of his malice aforethought, cutting, penetrating and wounding Jack Bowers, with a certain knife, then and there held in his hand.

¶3A motion was made to arrest the judgment, upon the ground that the defendant was indicted under sec. 4608 of the Code for malicious stabbing, whereas the offense charged is that of malicious cutting.

¶4The indictment is in these words: “Jo. Starks unlawfully and of his malice aforethought, then and there did cut, penetrate and wound,” Jack Bowers, with a certain knife, etc.

¶5It was held in Peck v. The State, 2 Hum., 85, that “it is better to pursue strictly the words of the statute, as it precludes all questions about the meaning of the expressions used. But when a word not in the statute is substituted in the indictment for one that is, and the word thus substituted is equivalent to the word used in the statute, or is of more extensive signification than it, and includes it, the indictment will be sufficient.”

¶6The question, then, arises, are the words “cut, penetrate and wound,” as used in the indictment, equivalent to the word “stab” used in the statute?

¶7In the case of Jarnagan v. The State, 10 Yer., 531, the indictment contained the word “stab,” and that the wound was inflicted with a knife; It was *66objected that it was insufficient, because that word did not describe the injury inflicted by the term “cut” or “wound,” so as to show that the skin was broken or penetrated by the weapon. But the court said: The word “stab,” by its own proper force and meaning, imports a breaking and penetration of the skin as distinctly as would the word “ cut.” This case recognizes the word cut as equivalent to the word “stab” in such a case. But, in the present indictment, the words “cut and penetrate” are used, and as the wound is charged to have been with a knife, they describe the offense with quite as much accuracy and certainty as if the word “stab” had been used.

¶8We are therefore of opinion that there is no error, and affirm the judgment.

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