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66 Tex. 265

Gallagher v. Bowie

Texas Supreme Court

Decided May 18, 1886

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1886-05-18

Tried below before the Hon. R. E. Beckham. This was an action by appellee, Bowie, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by his wife. Mrs. Bowie, with her child, was a passenger for hire in the two-horsestage run by appellant, Gallagher, between Weatherford and Graham. At a stopping place on the road the driver left the stage, without fastening the horses, or leaving anyone to hold them.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1886-05-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently January 1971

7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Robertson, Associate Justice.

¶1It was held by this court in Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex., 331., that for personal injuries done to the wife the damages would be community property, and, generally, properly recoverable only at the suit of the husband. The elements of damage in such cases have been repeatedly stated in former decisions, and mental suffering has never been excluded from the list. The charge of the court on this branch of the case was entirely unexceptionable

¶2Mrs. Bowie was a passenger in appellant’s stage for hire, and appellant owed her the degree of care due by a common carrier of passengers. The court instructed the jury that it was the duty of the carrier to employ a competent driver, and of the driver to use the “utmost care” for the safety of the passengers. The jury was not instructed that the negligence of the driver was that of his master. This omission could only have prejudiced appellee. The charge properly stated the degree of care exacted by the law of carriers of passengers. Thompson on Carriers, 200; Hutchins on Carriers, sec. 501; Shear. & Redf. on Neg., sec. 266. That degree is generally described by the authorities as “the utmost,” and the use of this expression in the charge was not objectionable. If it needed explanation or qualification, appellant should have requested a special charge.

¶3There was no lack of evidence to sustain the verdict. The horses were left practically free to run away, if they had that disposition. Any reasonable caution would have prevented the injury.

¶4The judgment must be affirmed.

¶5Affirmed.

¶6[Opinion delivered May 18, 1886.]

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