Mull v. Wienbarg’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““An Act to provide for the survival of causes of action for personal injuries upon the death of the person injured or of the person liable for such injuries, or of both, specifying the measure of damages in such action.”' “Sec. 1. Causes of action, whether suit has been brought upon the same or not, in favor of the injured party for personal injuries other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the reputation or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death nor by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued; but in the case of the death of either or both, such cause of action shall survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives of such injured party and against the person, receiver, or corporation liable for such injuries, and his or its legal representatives; and so surviving such cause of action may be hereafter prosecuted in like manner and with like legal effect as would a cause of action for injuries to or destruction of personal property. The court or jury in every such action may give such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as it shall deem fair and just. “Sec. 2. Where the wrongdoer is himself killed by the act causing the injury, the cause of action, if any, shall be deemed to have accrued against deceased during his lifetime.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estes Ex Rel. Estes v. Riggins

2. ““It is said in 25 C.J.S., Death, Section 42, page 1135, speaking of the statute here in question (Lord Campbell’s Act) that: ‘In the absence of a statute expressly so providing, the right of action for death by wrongful act does not survive the death of the wrongdoer.’ In Kranz v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40 , 143 N.W. 1049, 1050 , Ann. Cas. 1915C 1050, it was said: ‘And in this connection it should be observed that there is a vital difference between the survival of a cause of action upon the death of the injured party and a survival of liability upon the death of the wrongdoer. A statute may provide for the one and not for the other.’ In Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N.Y. 258 , 1 N.E. 787, 793 , 52 Am. Rep. 25 , the court, speaking of a statute above in question, stated: ‘It will be observed, also, that the statute, although creating a new cause of action, and passed for the express purpose of changing the rule of the common law in respect to the survivability of actions, and conferring a right upon representatives which they did not before possess, does not undertake, either expressly or impliedly, to impair the equally stringent rule which precluded the maintenance of such actions against the representatives of the offending party.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Estes Ex Rel. Estes v. Riggins

3. ““In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or for injuries to the person, or for an injury to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also survive; and the action may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, provided that in actions for personal injury damages, if the person otherwise entitled thereto, dies, recovering [sic] shall be limited to damages for wrongful death." (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. DeHerrera v. Herrera