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← 661 F. Supp. 1053 - United States v. Stringfellow

661 F. Supp. 1053 - United States v. Stringfellow’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
3
states following
May 2018
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 12 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently May 2018 · most notably United States v. Kramer (1991), Bell Petroleum Services Inc v. Sequa Corporation (1993)

2 federal appellate · 12 district · 3 state decisions

4201987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (§ 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980)

Relies on Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo · Porter v. Warner Holding Co. · New York v. Shore Realty Corp. · Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States · United States v. First National Bank of Circle

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “There are two distinct contexts in which the issue of “apportionment” arises. It is critical that these two different contexts are not confused. In the first context, the question is whether the harm resulting from two or more causes is indivisible, or whether the harm is capable of division or apportionment among separate causes. If there is a single harm that is theoretically or practically indivisible, each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury. However, if there are distinct harms that are capable of division, then liability should be apportioned according to the contribution of each defendant. The second context in which the issue of “apportionment” arises occurs after the first inquiry regarding the indivisibility of the harm. If the defendants are found to be jointly and severally liable, any defendant may seek to limit the amount of damages it would ultimately have to pay by seeking an order of contribution apportioning the damages among the defendants.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “discretion to use equitable factors in apportioning damages in order to mitigate the hardships of imposing joint and several liability upon defendants who have only contributed a small amount to a potentially large indivisible harm.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Collapsing the distinction between section 107 [ 42 U.S.C. § 9607 ] and section 113 [ 42 U.S.C. § 9613 ] ignores the clear language and structure of the statute. Section 107 imposes liability “Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to” the defenses set forth in section 107(b). Congress enacted section 113 as a separate section to address contribution. [I]t would be “anomalous” to permit apportionment of clean-up costs among PRPs in a section 113 action and not to permit apportionment in a section 107 action, but only if defendants in a section 107 action could not seek contribution in a section 113 action. But the structure of CERCLA does not preclude consideration of equitable factors, including the liability of a PRP who was (or is) plaintiff in a section 107 action. Rather, CERCLA separates those equitable factors from section 107 and considers them in a section 113 contribution action---- ... CERCLA was enacted to facilitate cleanup of the tens of thousands of hazardous waste sites in this country. Section 107 permits the Government or a private party to go in, clean up the mess, pay the bill, then collect all its costs not inconsis tent with the NCP from other responsible parties — even if plaintiff was also responsible for the contamination. Any PRP is entitled under section 113 to bring a contribution action against other PRPs — including the PRP who previously cleaned up the mess and was paid for its trouble through a section 107 proceedin”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.