Roger Scott v. E. P. Perini, Superintendent’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The constitutional standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence was established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Justice Stewart held that the “relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 . The standard is not whether the evidence is sufficient to convince the habeas court of the petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor does that standard require the prosecution to rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 Id. [443 U.S.] at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2793 . The Jackson standard is to be applied “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 n. 16. This also includes reference to state evidentiary law. Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 , 99 S.Ct. 3088 , 61 L.Ed.2d 865 (1979). Thus we have held in Goldman v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1980), that it is proper for the federal habeas court to take cognizance of state evidentiary law in determining whether an element of the particular criminal offense has been proved.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. York v. Tate · Delk v. Atkinson

2. “Scott and Speigner formed a decision to kill Bell and either or both of them carried out the plan by shooting Bell ....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spalla v. Foltz · Delk v. Atkinson

3. “7 Much has been written concerning the relative weight of circumstantial and direct evidence. Generalized opinion ranges from that which tends to place lesser credence in circumstantial evidence to that which assigns it greater reliability on the premise that the witness giving direct testimony may lie, but circumstances do not. See 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 26 (3rd ed. 1940). In a civil case, Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 , 330, 81 S.Ct. 6 , 10, 5 L.Ed.2d 20 (1960), the Supreme Court stated: “But direct evidence of a fact is not required. Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” The modern view is that the law generally makes no distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence nor requires particular instruction to the jury, allowing jurors to give evidence the weight which they believe it is entitled.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. York v. Tate