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← 662 F.2d 946 - United States v. Mastrangelo

United States v. Mastrangelo’s Empirical Analysis

662 F.2d 946 · 1981

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
3
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

20 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably United States v. Ruggiero (1991), United States v. Mastrangelo (1982)

20 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

1801981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1503 · 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 952

Relies on Bruton v. United States · United States v. Jorn · Lego v. Twomey · Arizona v. Washington · Wade v. Hunter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... [T]he test must be simply whether at the time the trial judge is faced with the question he reasonably concludes that there is a distinct possibility that the defendant participated in making the witness unavailable, at least where, as here, the Government is totally without fault and the case cannot proceed and the ends of justice be served by the evidence already introduced or otherwise available to the Government.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “I was under the distinct impression, and I believe that by a preponderance of the evidence, based on what I then had before me, I was warranted in finding that this defendant Mastrangelo, either directly arranged for the killing of the witness or was advised of the possible killing of the witness and acquiesced. He was the only person that could gain from it. ... The tape was clear that he had threatened another witness. Mastrangelo was out on bail. The Court observed him during this emergency. Everybody in the courtroom was shocked. Mr. Coiro was very upset. The defendant, Mastrangelo, took it like a soldier. He didn’t smile, as I recall, but he certainly wasn’t upset by it. At best, he was neutral on the issue. It just is inconceivable . . . that this radical step to aid Mastrangelo, who is the only person that could have been helped by killing this witness, would have been taken without his knowledge, acquiescence, or orders. And that, it seems to me, is the clearest situation of a finding of manifest necessity that you can get.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[w]e must not only give due deference to the trial judge’s determination, see Arizona v. Washington; United States v. Grasso, 600 F.2d at 347 , but that determination in favor of the declaration of a mistrial in a case like this — “along the spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial and which vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny”— “is entitled to special respect.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 510 [ 98 S.Ct. at 833 ].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.