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662 S.W.2d 344

Williams v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided December 21, 1983

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1983-12-21

Relies on Rubio v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-12-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 143 later decisions — most recently March 2018 · most notably Montgomery v. State (1991), McKay v. State (1985)

143 state decisions

9401983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

CLINTON, Judge,

¶1concurring.

¶2I am in accord with the majority’s analytical process and resulting conclusion that the extraneous transaction involving appellant Williams was admissible under the novel facts comprising this very close issue. Being aware of the tendency of both lawyers and judges to apply the law concerning the admission of extraneous conduct evidence in a rote fashion, however, my motive in writing is to caution against future misapplication of this case.

¶3There are two crucial factual features presented which, in my view, render the evidence admissible.

¶4First, there is evidence placing Williams in the company of the robbers before the offense and evidence of conduct on the part of Williams (albeit ambiguous) which indicates his knowing assistance in the offense.1 This evidence created a material issue in the case as to whether Williams acted as a party. Obviously, without some independent indication that he was acting in concert with the robbers, the extraneous offense would have no relevance to any material issue in the case.

¶5*348Second, the remarkable similarity of the instant transaction to the extraneous offense is what ultimately, though barely, tips the balance in favor of the latter’s admission: the same modus operandi, giving the same false name to the same cashier in the same Pizza Inn when taken together render evidence of the extraneous offense slightly more probative on the issue of Williams’ participation in the primary offense, than prejudicial.2 Had the transactions been less similar, I would be inclined to view the probative value of the extraneous offense evidence as negligible, at best.

¶6With emphasis on the above aspects of the case which Judge McCormick has already explicated well, I join in both the opinion and judgment of the Court.

TEAGUE, J., joins.

¶7. Having arrived with the robber and the “wheel man,” Williams entered the Pizza Inn five minutes before the “large heavy set man” then ordered a pizza, giving a false name. Shortly thereafter, the heavy set man pulled a shotgun on the manager.

¶8. This balance is basically a question of whether the evidence has greater potential for assisting the jury in resolving a material issue or for confusing the jury and diverting their attention from the material issue. Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion con-currmg). Of course, the fact that the State was constrained to prove appellant’s participation by inferences from circumstances is another crucial feature of the evidence which rendered the contested testimony more probative than prejudicial.

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