Marks ex rel. Hall v. Catlow’s Empirical Analysis
663 F.2d 960 · 1981
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently October 2015 · most notably Aleta Beaupied v. Amy Chang (1998), Goss v. Goss (1983)
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green · Wetmore v. Markoe · Pauley v. Spong · Nunnally v. Nunnally · Jones v. Tyson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Arizona treats a post-divorce child custody proceeding as a continuation of the original divorce action. See Beard v. Greer, 116 Ariz. 536, 539 , 570 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz.App.1977). The factors and bases delimiting a court’s power to award attorney’s fees in the original action are therefore identical in the later ancillary proceeding. See Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 34 Ariz. at 346-47, 271 P. at 719. As Arizona law considers attorney’s fees to be spousal support if awarded in the original divorce action, this characterization must therefore also apply to fees awarded in post-divorce child custody proceedings. “As Catlow’s debt for legal services is founded upon his state-created obligation to support his former wife, the debt is nondischargeable under section 17(a)(7) of the former Bankruptcy Act. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 76-77 , 25 S.Ct. 172, 175 , 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904); Jones v. Tyson (In re Jones), 518 F.2d at 680.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The court from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the costs and expenses of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter [Chapter 3, Dissolution of Marriage] or under chapter 4, article 1 of this Title [Child Custody].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. In Re Jarski“as much for ... support as payments made directly to [the former spouse or child].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.