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664 F.2d 1049

Docket No. 81-1274.

Blackwell v. Anderson

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Oct. 9, 1981.

Decided Nov. 23, 1981.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 22, 1982.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1981-11-23

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently November 1981

1 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1981-11-23

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¶1See 102 S.Ct. 1446.

¶2*1050Carl Ziemba, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner-appellant.

¶3Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for respondent-appellee.

¶4Before EDWARDS, Chief Circuit Judge, KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶5PER CURIAM.

¶6Petitioner in this case appeals from a judgment denying his habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Petitioner had been convicted of first degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He seems to contend that at best the proofs presented by the government at his trial would serve to sustain a conviction for second degree murder.

¶7Our review of this record, however, shows that there is more than ample evidence for the jury to find the following facts. On the date in question defendant went to the apartment of one Charles Thompson at 3 a. m. with three other men. Defendant kicked the door in. One of the other men, Pippin, shot Thompson three times. Defendant then told Pippin, the man who had shot Thompson, to make sure that Thompson was dead. Thereupon Pippin went back and shot Thompson three more times.

¶8We believe that the jury could appropriately have found the necessary intent and participation in this murder to support the first degree murder conviction. Further, we find in this record no prosecutorial abuse, ineffective assistance of counsel, or erroneous ruling by the trial judge which served to deprive appellant of any federal constitutional right.

¶9The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.

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