Blue v. Thaler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Blue nonetheless contends that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in his case interpreted the new special issues as prohibiting them from giving full consideration and effect to all of the mitigating evidence that he presented during his punishment-phase trial. Blue acknowledges that “the language in the Texas mitigation issue itself,” i.e., § 2(e)(1), is constitutionally adequate. But he argues that § 2(f)(4)’s definition of mitigating evidence as evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness is unconstitutionally narrow and “effectively nullifies the word ‘background’ in the special issue itself.” According to Blue, many reasonable, law-abiding jurors “will assume that the phrase ‘moral blameworthiness’ relates only to those factors that are directly related to the commission of the crime, but not to the perhaps more remote socio-economic and psychological reasons why the defendant may have been predisposed to commit it.” Thus, he concludes, the evidence he presented of his “poor mental health, low IQ, and good conduct while incarcerated” were effectively put beyond the reach of the jury. This Court considered and rejected this very line of argument in Beazley v. Johnson, where it held that the capital sentencing scheme presently codified in article 37.071 “does not unconstitutionally ‘preclude the jury from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances o”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rhoades v. Davis · 73 F. Supp. 3d 693 - Garcia v. Director, TDCJ-CID

2. “[T]his court interprets the 'about 70’ language of the AAMR's definition of mental retardation to represent a rough ceiling, above which a finding of mental retardation in the capital context is precluded.” (citations omitted)); Ex parte Sosa, 364 S.W.3d 889 , 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Busby v. Davis, 677 Fed.Appx. 884 , 887, 2017 WL 396549 , at (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cathey v. Davis · In Re: Eric Cathey

3. “Whereas § 2254(d)(2) sets out a general standard by which the district court evaluates a state court’s specific findings of fact, § 2254(e)(1) states what an applicant will have to show for the district court to reject a state court’s determination of factual issues. For example, a district court may find by clear and convincing evidence that the state court erred with respect to a particular finding of fact, thus rebutting the presumption of correctness with respect to that fact. See § 2254(e)(1). It is then a separate question whether the state court’s determination of facts was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See § 2254(d)(2). Thus, it is possible that, while the state court erred with respect to one factual finding under § 2254(e)(1), its determination of facts resulting in its decision in the case was reasonable under § 2254(d)(2).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Batchelor v. Cain