Prosise v. Haring’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “among the most critical guarantees of fairness in applying collateral estoppel is the guarantee that the party sought to be estopped had ... an adequate incentive to litigate 'to the hilt' the issues in question.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Clark v. Clark · Clark v. Clark

2. “According to the court, this technical rule does little work in light of the statement several lines later that 16 [a] defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil litigation from contesting facts representing the elements of the offense. However, under the terms of this Restatement such an estoppel is not a matter of issue preclusion, because the issue has not actually been litigated, but is a matter of the law of evidence beyond the scope of this Restatement. 17 Unable to find any cases utilizing the American Law Institute's notion of”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Fullerton · State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Fullerton

3. “These decisions have recently been collected in Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 Iowa L.Rev. 281 & nn. 122-25 (1980); Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 464, 478-83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Modest Dissent] in the course of that respected commentator’s challenge to the Second Restatement’s general position that an essential predicate for collateral estoppel is that the issues shall have been “actually litigated.” The existence of these decisions is of course recognized in the Second Restatement, but their results, though conceded to be possibly “correct,” are there ascribed to estoppel principles derived from the law of evidence rather than from traditional res judicata doctrine. Id. § 133, Comment b; Reporter’s Note, Comments b and c. Many of the cases, however, clearly reveal an assumption that res judicata/collateral estoppel doctrine is being applied. Freed of any “mutuality” and “actually litigated” requirements, collateral estoppel doctrine would of course clearly apply, and Professor Vestal so explains the cases. See Vestal, Modest Dissent, supra at 478-83. For our immediate purposes we have to assume that these decisions constitute elements in the body of “conventional” collateral estoppel doctrine ... notwithstanding the indications of a lack of scholarly consensus on the exact shape of that doctrine.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winker