Strutton v. Meade’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[ The Youngberg court] did not address the question of whether an individual “committed for care and treatment under state law ... has a state substantive right to habilitation, which is entitled to substantive ... protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 316 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2452 . Since Youngberg , some circuits have adopted a rule that “the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir.1980)). We have not adopted such an approach. Instead we have held that although “the Supreme Court has recognized a substantive due process right to reasonably safe custodial conditions, [it has not recognized] a broader due process right to appropriate or effective or reasonable treatment of the illness or disability that triggered the patient’s involuntary confinement.” See Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 788 (8th Cir.2006); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that person who was civilly committed for purposes of safekeeping did not have a constitutional right to psychiatric treatment for pedophilia), see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (“[W]e have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civil”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 336 F. Supp. 3d 974 - Karsjens v. Piper · 175 F. Supp. 3d 1081 - Willis v. Palmer

2. “(1) ‘an injury in fact,’ meaning ‘the actual or imminent invasion of a concrete and particularized legal interest’; (2) a causal connection between the alleged injury and the challenged action of the defendants’ and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 915 F. Supp. 2d 1064 - Jackson County v. MERSCORP, Inc.

3. “civilly committed individuals 'enjoy constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these interests.’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Karsjens v. Jesson