67 Cal. 2d 9 - People v. Doherty’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 179 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 198 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We cannot apply a truncated version of the Constitution to the forthcoming proceeding merely because it is a second trial. We cannot rationally forbid the use of statements violative of Miranda for defendants first tried after June 13, 1966, and sanction such use for those tried at that time after an earlier nullified proceeding. . . . This defendant on retrial is surely entitled to no less protection of the Constitution than one simultaneously brought to trial for the first time.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chapman v. State · Dell v. State

2. ““Since the language employed in the statement of the Johnson rule is inconclusive, in our opinion the intention of the court may best be found by examining the reasons for the rule. The court listed three factors which entered into its decision: the purpose for announcing new standards in Miranda , the reliance placed upon the pr e-Miranda rules, and the seriously disruptive effect on the administration of justice of a decision that Miranda apply retroactively. Finding that the integrity of the fact-finding process is not as substantially improved by Miranda as it has been by others of its decisions, that the pr e-Miranda rules had been relied on by law enforcement officers to obtain confessions which are inadmissible in post-Miranda cases, and that making Miranda retroactive would seriously disrupt administration of our criminal laws, the court, decided against applying Miranda retroactively. While the disruptive effect upon our criminal laws would not be as great if we follow Gibson as it would have been if the Supreme Court had held that Miranda applied retroactively, because retrials are not required in all pr e-Miranda decisions in which confessions are involved, the presence of a disrupting effect similar to that with which the court was concerned in Johnson , as well as a consistent thrust from each of the other two criteria, leads us to conclude that the Supreme Court did not intend that Miranda apply to retrials in cases such as the instant one.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 1 N.C. App. 279 - State v. Branch

3. “We held in Dorado that the principles established by Escobedo could not logically be limited to statements which had been obtained after the suspect's request for counsel had been denied. A number of state and federal courts, however, had not fully `perceived the implications of Escobedo. ' [Citation.] `Defendants can no more be charged with anticipating [those implications] than can the States' [citation].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 253 Cal. App. 2d 443 - People v. Pineda