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67 Ill. 204

Villars v. Palmer

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1873

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1873-01-15

James Steele, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery, by William Villars, against Levin T. Palmer, administrator of the estate of Guy Merrill, deceased, and John G. Leverich, to enjoin proceedings at law by Palmer as administrator of the estate of Merrill, for the use of Lexrerich, upon a promissory note,'given by one George W. Taylor as principal, and signed by the complainant as surety, and payable to said Guy Merrill as master in chancery. .

Relies on People v. White

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently June 1929

10 state decisions

40187318801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Justice Sheldon

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court:

¶2The claim on the part of the surety in this case is, that, as by the neglect of the creditor to present his claim against the estate of Taylor, the principal, all remedy in respect to the debt has been lost against the estate of the principal, that should operate to discharge the surety.

¶3The complaint is of mere delay, not of any affirmative act on the part of the creditor, whereby the surety has been affected. But it is the well established principle, that mere delay on the part of the creditor to proceed against the principal does not discharge the responsibility of the surety.

¶4In cases of this sort, there is not any duty of active diligence incumbent on the creditor. All that the surety has the right to require of the creditor, in the absence of any statute provision, is, that no affirmative act shall be done that will operate to his prejudice. It is his business to see that the principal pays.

¶5The law furnished the surety here with ample remedies for his protection. He might have paid the debt according to his undertaking, and have sued the principal himself; or he might have gone into a court of equity after the debt became due, and obtained a decree that the principal should pay it; or he might, under the statute, have given to the creditor written notice to put the note in suit, and thus have compelled him to sue the principal.

¶6If he has seen fit to lie by, and the neglect to proceed against the principal in his life time, or against his estate after his decease, has been the means of depriving the surety of his indemnity, he must abide by the loss, and can not throw it upon the creditor.

¶7Without more, we need but to refer to the cases of The People v. White et al. 11 Ill. 342, and Taylor v. Beck, 13 id. 376, where the subject is fully considered and the authorities cited. In the former case, the very point made by the surety here is decided adversely to him.

¶8Under the statute of March 4, 1869, Sess. Laws 1869, p. 305, where the principal maker of a joint note has départed this life, it is made the duty of the holder of the note to present the same against the estate of the decedent for allowance, to the proper court, within two years after the granting of the letters of administration. But that statute is too late to affect the present case.

¶9The decree of the court below dismissing the bill is affirmed.

¶10Decree affirmed.

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