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67 Miss. 136

Duncan v. Moore

Mississippi Supreme Court

Decided October 15, 1889

Mississippi Supreme Court · decided 1889-10-15

Feom the chancery court of the first district of Chickasaw county. Hon. Baxter McFarland, Chancellor. From the agreed statement it appears that Richard Duncan owned a homestead upon which he resided with his family, and gave trust deeds on the same to secure debts to C. C. Moore and others.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“There is much force in the argument of defendant’s counsel that the statute does not require a joint deed of husband and wife for the conveyance of the husband’s homestead, but only that the wife should “sign” the husband’s deed to signify her consent to the disposition made by the husband of his property; that the substantial thing is the written evidence of such consent; and that this may be as certainly shown by a separate instrument as by signing the deed of the husband. The present controversy does not call for a decision of what would be the effect of such separate deed made by the wife under the direction or consent of the husband, and we express no opinion on the subject. We are, however, of opinion that whatever be the form, it is, at least, essential to show the contemporaneous assent of both husband and wife to the conveyance.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Avakian v. Citibank, N.A.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently December 2014

1 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

2018891890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Cooper, J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2We yield to the urgent solicitation of counsel to pass upon both questions presented by this appeal, though the decree might be affirmed upon the single point on which we are advised the bill was dismissed in the court below, viz., that, conceding the invalidity of the conveyance sought to be annulled, the complainant is not of right entitled to the intervention of a court of equity, except upon condition of himself doing equity.

¶3It appears from the record that the complainant being indebted to the defendant Moore executed a deed of trust upon his homestead as security for the debt due, but his wife, who was at the time living with him on said land, did not sign the deed. Afterwards, at the instance of the creditor, and, so far as appears, without the consent of her husband, she executed a separate conveyance to the creditor of her interest in the homestead. The question presented is whether this subsequent deed of the wife is sufficient to give validity to the former invalid encumbrance by the husband.

¶4By the code (§ 1258) it is declared that, “no conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other encumbrance upon the homestead, exempted from execution, shall be valid or binding, unless signed by the wife of the owner, if he is married and living with his wife.”

¶5There is much force in the argument of defendant’s counsel that the statute does not require a joint deed of husband and wife for the conveyance of the husband’s homestead, but only that the wife should “sign” the husband’s deed to signify her consent to the disposition made by the husband of his property; that the substantial thing is the written evidence of such consent, and that this may be as ceilainly shown by a separate instrument as by signing the deed of the husband.

¶6The present controversy does not call for a decision of what would be the effect of such separate deed made by the wife under the direction or consent of the husband, and we express no opinion on the subject. We are, however, of opinion that whatever be the form, it is at least essential to show the contemporaneous assent of both husband and wife to the conveyance. To permit the wife, without the knowledge or consent of the husband, to give validity *139to an invalid encumbrance or conveyance would be in effect to give her the power of disposal rather than the veto power provided by the law.

¶7Decree affirmed.

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