State v. Collins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 46 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Throughout R.C. Title 29, minor misdemeanors are distinguished from other misdemeanors. In R.C. 2901.02 (classification of offenses), the General Assembly has delineated various categories of crimes. Misdemeanors are further subdivided into four degrees. Minor misdemeanors have their own category. This same classification is found in R.C. 2929.21, which establishes separate penalties for misdemeanors, up to six months in jail, and for minor misdemeanors, a fine of up to $100 only. In addition, there is no right to a jury trial for a misdemeanor offense. R.C. 2945.17. Moreover, a prosecution for a minor misdemeanor must be brought within six months (as opposed to two years for a misdemeanor and six years for a felony). R.C. 2901.13(A). Also, a trial for a minor misdemeanor must be held within thirty days after arrest or the service of summons (once again, different time constraints than those for misdemeanors and felonies). R.C. 2945.71. “The rule of statutory construction is that penal laws ‘shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.’ R.C. 2901.04(A). Having classified misdemeanors and minor misdemeanors separately, and having provided for several distinctions in various code provisions, the General Assembly cannot be presumed to have intended that they merge into one classification, that of ‘misdemeanors,’ for purposes of the involuntary manslaughter statute. Any uncertainty must be resolved against the state.” Collins, s”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 124 Ohio Misc. 2d 37 - City of Medina v. Hannan

2. ““ ‘ * * * There is no logical reason for inflicting manslaughter punishment on one who unintentionally kills another simply because he is committing a traffic violation, unless it makes sense to punish the one-in-a-thousand traffic violation, which by bad luck produces an unexpected death, far more severely than the nine hundred and ninety-nine violations which happily do not produce any such devastating result. * * * It is true that, in the case of crimes defined in terms of bad results, it is often something of an accident whether the specified result occurs or not. Where one seriously wounds another by shooting at him with intent to kill, or severely but unintentionally injures him by reckless driving, chance often takes a hand in deciding whether the victim dies or recovers, and thus whether the defendant receives a greater or lesser punishment. If the bad result which happens is actually intended, or if it is recklessly produced (especially by one conscious of the risk), it does not seem too harsh to make the severity of his punishment depend somewhat on the actual result, however accidental. Where, however, the result is both unintended and produced without any consciousness of the risk of producing it, it seems too harsh and illogical.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 117 Ohio App. 3d 762 - State v. Campbell

3. ““Chippendale dealt with whether involuntary manslaughter and aggravated vehicular homicide could both be charged from the same conduct. The case did not consider the sufficiency of the underlying violation to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Indeed, we did not need to do so as the defendant’s involuntary manslaughter charge was predicated upon the first degree misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence. R.C. 4511.19(A).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 98 Ohio App. 3d 262 - State v. Milliner