Hinkle v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Hinkle contends that because the jury could infer Hinkle’s intent to murder Caneshua from Hinkle’s use of a deadly weapon in effectuating the murder, the State could not present evidence of a collateral offense in order to prove intent. The Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant’s use of a deadly weapon to kill a victim is sufficient to give rise to an inference that the defendant intended to kill the victim. See, Ex parte Burgess, 827 So.2d 193, 199 (Ala.2000) (‘intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s act of using a deadly weapon.’). Thus, by demonstrating that Hinkle used a handgun to shoot and kill Caneshua, the State produced sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Hinkle acted with the requisite intent to murder Caneshua Henry. However, this Court has held that once the inference has been created, the State may not present evidence of collateral offenses to support a showing of intent. See Hunter v. State, 802 So.2d 265, 269 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), quoting Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155, 1159 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (‘ “When the element the State bears the burden of proof on can ‘be inferred from the act itself,’ the State may not use extraneous offenses as circumstantial evidence of that element in its case in chief.” ’) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing the State to present testimony regarding the prior altercation between Hinkle and Canesh-ua as evidence of intent to commit the charged offense, p”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hudson v. State · 217 So. 3d 27 - Horton v. State

2. “" '[t]he admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.' Taylor v. State , 808 So.2d 1148 , 1191 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte Loggins , 771 So.2d 1093 , 1103 (Ala. 2000). This is equally true with regard to the admission of collateral-acts evidence. See Davis v. State , 740 So.2d 1115 , 1130 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 265 So. 3d 387 - Gaston v. State