Volume 67 — Tennessee Reports

<p>PROM LOUDON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. O. P. Temple, Chancellor.</p>

<p>1. Husband and Wife. Tenant by courtesy. Under see. 2481 of the Code,. the husband now has no power to sell the wife’s land, but his right to remain thereon and enjoy its use and occupation during the continuance of coverture, and if he survives his wife, during his own life, the right still remains.</p> <p>Case cited: Guión v. Anderson, 8 Hum., 325.</p> <p>2. Same. Wife’s equity. Where the wife is forced to separate from her husband by reason of cruel and inhuman treatment from him, she may, by bill in equity, have a suitable provision made for her support out of the rents and profits of her land.</p> <p>Case cited: Prater v. Hoover, 1 Col., 544.</p>

<p>Elections. Omtested. Jurisdiction. The validity of the election of a person to the office of sheriff, cannot he contested under title 11, ch. 8-of the Code. The jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the circuit court, under Code, sec. 889.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 889, 3409-3423.</p>

<p>EROM HAWKINS.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. H. C. Smith, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM M’MINN.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. Hoyl, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Trusts. Deeds of trust. A being largely indebted to various persons, conveyed certain lands to B, their attorney, the deed being absolute on its face. But the intention was that B was to hold it in trust for his clients. Held, that he held the lands in trust for them.</p> <p>2. Pleading and Practice. Demwrrer. Des adfudieata. A decree sustaining or overruling a demurrer, affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, is final as to the points adjudged in that particular case, and may be relied on as res adjudieata.</p> <p>Cases cited: Jameson v. McCoy, 5 Heis., 109; McNairy v. Mayor, etc., 2 Baxter, 251.</p>

<p>PROM HAMILTON.</p> <p>Appeal irom the Chancery Court. D. M. Key, Chancellor.</p>

<p>1. Sale of Land. Chancery Practice. Mistake. Bid on land at execution sale* The jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside the satisfaction of an execution on the ground of mistake of fact as to the state of defendant’s title to the land levied upon is original and inherent, and is not affected by the act of 1847, Code sec. 2990.</p> <p>2. Statutory Remedy. Res adjudícala: A failure to obtain relief under the statutory remedy cannot be relied upon as res adjudícala to a bill brought for that purpose.</p> <p>3. Pleading- and Practice. Mode of procedure. If the statutory remedy be resorted to, the terms of the statute must be strictly complied with. But where a bill is filed the proceeding must be conducted according to the course of a court of equity.</p>

<p>Exemption. One half interest in a horse. Under the exemption law an ascertained one half interest in a horse is as much exempt from execution as a whole horse.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 2288.</p>

<p>FROM HAMBLIN.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Jas. H. Randolph, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Bills and Notes. Due comae of trade. A note taken in payment of a pre-existing debt, is not received in the due course of trade, and is subject, in the hands of the person so receiving it, to all the equities against it.</p> <p>2. Same. Fraudulent transfer. A note fraudulently passed by an agent or trustee to another, to secure such other person against liability assumed for the party who transfers the note, is not received in due course of trade, and the real owner is entitled to it as against the party who receives it.</p> <p>Cases cited: Kimbro v. Lytle, 10 Yer., 423; Nichol v. Bate, 10 Yer.,432..</p>

<p>1. County Court. Majority note necessary. When. Appropriation of money. A majority of the justices of the county voting in the affirmative is required to make an appropriation of money over fifty dollars.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 4190.</p> <p>Act cited: 1835, ch. 6.</p> <p>2. Same. Parol proof. Not admissible to contradict the record. When. Parol testimony is not admissible to contradict the minute records of the proceedings had at a meeting of the court.</p> <p>3. Same. Organisation and business of county court. Sec. 4195 of the Code requiring the ayes and noes to be taken and entered upon the minutes ■when appropriations of money are being voted is not imperative, but directory merely. The court say it, however, is an important one, and should never be omitted by the clerk.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs 4195, 4180.</p>

<p>FROM BLEDSOE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. Hoyle, Judge.</p>

<p>EROM HAMILTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. D. M. Key,. Chancellor.</p>

<p>1. Pleading and Evidence. In action upon an open accownt which has been assigned. It is a rule of the common law, recognized in this State, that by the purchase of an open account, the purchaser acquires merely an equitable interest, and»the promise of the debtor, to the purchaser, is necessary to enable mm to maintain an action at liwtf-in his own name. Therefore, if the purchaser of such account brings suit thereon in his own name, both the assignment and the promise to pay the account to the assignee must be averred in the declaration, otherwise no material or traversable issue is tendered thereby.</p> <p>Case cited: Mount Olivet Cemetery Co. v. Shubart, 2 Head, 120.</p> <p>'2. Same. In case of duress. Matter in avoidance. The assignee of a debt or chose in action may avail himself of the fact of duress, operating on the assignor just as the assignor might have done in a suit by or against himself; but a replication to a plea of payment, denying the payment, does not authorize proof that the payment was accepted under duress. The duress, in such cases, is matter in avoidance, which must be specifically pleaded.</p>

<p>Mortgage. Lien. Registration. Notice. Where the title and possession, both have passed to the purchaser of personal property, a lien only being retained, with power in the assignee of the notes given for the-purchase money to sell, upon their non-payment at maturity, constitutes a mortgage only, and if not registered, will be void as to subsequent btma fide purchasers without notice, and a discovery of the incumbrance by such purchaser before registration of his conveyance works no injury to his superior title. *</p> <p>Cases cited: Gambling v. Read, Meig’s B., 281; Woods v. Burroughs,. 2 Head, 207; Brisan v. Dougherty, 11 Hum., 51.</p> <p>Code cited: Section 2078.</p>

<p>PiiBADmG and Pbactice. Pauper Oath. Must be taken how and where. A pauper oath taken in another State by one of its citizens before a notary public, is insufficient, and will not sustain the prosecution of a suit in this State.</p> <p>Cases cited: Davis v. Dyer, 5 Sneed, 679; 2 Heis., 641.</p> <p>Code cited: Section 3192.</p> <p>Acts cited: Act of 1821, ch. 22; 1829, ch. 88. ■</p>

<p>FROM BRADLEY.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. Hoyl, Judge.</p>

<p>Cototty Liabilities. How enforced against a fraction of the indebted county, taken to form part of a new county. An act providing for the organization of a new county out of fractions to be taken from several existing counties, provided that the fractions so taken to form the new county should continue liable for their pro rata of all debts contracted by their respective counties prior to the separation, and be entitled to their proportion of any stock or credits belonging to such old counties. Held, that for the purpose of enforcing the liabilities of said respective fractions for their pro rata of debts created prior to the separation, th'e parént counties have the same jurisdiction as they ■ had before the separation. That as regards this purpose, the old counties are kept intact and subject to the assessment and collection of taxes as if no new county had been formed.</p>

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. A. Caldwell, Special Chancellor.</p>

<p>PROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. O. P. Temple, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM GREENE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. E. Gillen-ivaters, Judge.</p>

<p>CORPORATIONS. Municipal. Charters of. Jurisdiction of Chancery Court to amend charter of incorporated town. The only jurisdiction which the chancery court lias to alter or amend the charter of incorporation of a town or village, is conferred by the act of January 30, 1871, ch. 54, sec. 7. This act authorizes such alteration or amendment only on application hv the authorities of such incorporated town.</p>

<p>FROM K5TOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Criminal Court. M. L. Hall, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. T. Hall, Judge.</p>

<p>1. "Private Corporations. Amendment of charter. A charter being a contract, where the original charter provided that no amendment should be made except on the unanimous petition of the president and directors, and any amendment so recommended to be unanimously accepted by the president and directors, an amendment accepted and adopted by the president and directors unanimously will be valid as a substantial compliance with the condition, although not recommended by the unanimous petition of the president and directors, that provision being merely directory.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. Where an unauthorized amendment was adopted by the directory of a corporation, on the faith of which a consolidation was made, under legislative sanction, with another corporation, by which a new corporation was created, with all the powers assumed by the first, stockholders consenting to the consolidation are estopped to question the amendment.</p> <p>3. Same. Same. Directors. Authority of. Directors are not technical parties, but only trustees in a general sense, as are agents and bailees entrusted with the care and management of property. They may purchase stock from stockholders without being subject to the stringent rule governing dealings between trustee and cestui que trust.</p> <p>Cases cited: Overend v. Gibb, 3 Eng. Rep., 7-17; Liquidators v. Coleman, 6 Eng. R., 26-33; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall., 229-30; Commissioners v. Reynolds, Amer. L. Reg-., 376; Spering’s Appeal, 71 Pa. Amer. Rep., vol. 10, p. 689; Post v. Russell, 36 Ind., 60; Smith v. Hurd, 12 Ind., 371; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yer., 490; Brig-htwell v. Mallory, 10 Yer., 197; Koeler v. Black River Palls Co., 2 Bl., 716-17-18.</p> <p>4. Same. Same. Stockholders.. Stockholders have the right to inspect the books of the corporation at all reasonable times. (Aug. & Ames on Corp., 607.)</p> <p>5. Same. Same. Railroads. Under the ordinary powers granted to a railroad having its termini in this State, the directory has no power to purchase other railroads without the sanction of the stockholders. (5 Amer. R., 420, 739.)</p> <p>Cases cited: Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, Eng. R., vol. 1, pp. Ill, 116, 116; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wh., 518, 716; R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 5 Amer. L. R., 739-40; Gabriskie v. R. R. Co., 6 Amer. L. R., 426; Nichol v. Mayor, 7 Hum., 261.</p> <p>6. Chanceey Pbactioe. Multifariousness. Code, sec. 4325, allows one or several parties having a joint or common interest to join several unconnected matters against the same party or parties in one bill, but does not allow others who have no joint or common interest to join in the suit.</p> <p>7. Same. Same. Under Code, sec. 4326, the discretion ought to be exercised in favor of retaining the Bill with amendments allowed; but where, after the elimination of the multifarious matter, only a mere skeleton remains, it is proper to dismiss the bill without prejudice.</p> <p>8. Suits. Sow brought. Pleading and practice. As a general rule, for injuries to the corporate property, the suit must be in the name of the corporation. But if the directors refuse to prosecute, or they are to be made defendants, the stockholders injured may sue, in equity, in. their own name, making the corporation one of the defendants. (7 Amer. R., 282.)</p>

<p>EROM COCKE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. H. C. Smith,, Chancellor.</p>

<p>Judgments and Decbees. Sale of land under execution issued upon a judgment that has been satisfied. Void. Evidence. An execution issued upon a judgment which has been satisfied, has no basis on which to rest, and a sale under such execution is void; the rule caveat emptor applies to the purchaser. And if the fact of the judgment having been satisfied does not appear on the record, extraneous testimony may be introduced to show that fact. This is not a collateral attack on the judgment, nor an attack to show by extraneous evidence that ij¡ is void, but is simply stowing that the judgment has, subsequently to its rendition, been paid.</p> <p>Cases cited: Henderson v. Starritt, 4 Sneed, 470; Hughes ¶. Bryan’s Lessee, 6 Yerg., 471; Ingle v. McCurry, 1 Heis., 26; Sherrell v. Good-rum, 3 Hum., 428.</p>

<p>FROM BLEDSOE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. Hoyle, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Pieading and Practice. Charge to jury. Exception to. No exception is required to be taken to the charge of the court below, further than to embody it in the record, and present it for revision in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Case cited: Weakley v. Pearce, 5 Heis., 424.</p> <p>2. Prato. Contracts. Representations. Warranty. Representations made to influence the vendee in buying from the vendor, which were effective in accomplishing that object, are equivalent to a warranty, and the vendor is bound to answer for the breach; and this, whether innocently or fraudulently made.</p> <p>Case cited: Hogg & Belcher v. Cardwell, 4 Sneed, 157.</p> <p>3. Same. Same. Memm'andum of sale. Representations. Representations are in effect proposals to the contract, and the person who makes them is liable in damages, if they turn out to be untrue, although they may not be embodied in the written memorandum of sale.</p> <p>See Hogg & Belcher v. Cardwell, 4 Sneed, 157.</p>

<p>PROM LOUDON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. O. P. Temple, Chancellor.</p>

<p>EROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Paupeb Oath. Motion to depauperize. Discretion of the court. It is impossible to lay down a rule which will govern in every case, in determining whether a party should be depauperized or not. Much must he left to the sound discretion oí the judge who tries the question, but on such trials the uniform language of the court has been, that the laws passed to enable poor persons to litigate their rights in court should be construed and administered with great liberality.</p>

<p>Cohtbact. Consideration. Forbearance to sue. .An agreement to forbear-for a time, proceedings at law or in equity, to enforce a well founded claim is a valid consideration for a promise. Nor need the agreement to a delay be for a time certain, for it may be a reasonable time only, and yet be a sufficient consideration for a promise. But in declaring on a promise made on .such a consideration, the plaintiff must allege and prove the actual time of forbearance, and if this be judged by the court to be reasonable, the action will be sustained; but where the stay of action is wholly uncertain, or such as can be of no benefit to the debtor, or detriment to the creditor, it is not enough.</p>

<p>1. Respiting Tbust. Joint purchasers. A resulting trust in land is not raised in favor of the payor of the purchase money, where he, and another, jointly purchased land, upon the agreement and understanding that each was to pay a certain proportion of the money, and took a deed therefor, but the other party failed to pay his proportion. In such case, they are joint tenants, each holding, the legal title to an undivided interest, and the payor has a lien for the projJorlion which was to be paid by his co-tenant on the interest of such co-tenant.</p> <p>2. Lien. Attachment. But the lien of the payor is inferior to the lien of an attaching creditor of the co-tenant.</p>

<p>PROM JEFFERSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court: J. H. Randolph, Judge.</p>

<p>Pleading and Practice. Scire facias as against defaulting witnesses. Judgment nisi was promptly taken by the complainant against a defaulting witness, and a scire facias was ordered to issue returnable to the next term of the court. The clerk and master failed to issue the sci. fa. as ordered. At the next term the complainant had the order for the issuance of the sci. fa. revived, and the sci. fa. was accordingly issued, and was made known. The defaulting witness demurred to the sci. fa. because it was not issued and tested at the term at which the judgment nisi was entered. Held, that the neglect to issue the soi. fa. was the neglect of the clerk and master, and not the neglect of the complainant, and that it did not operate to release the witness from liability. The demurrer was overruled. Case of Kincaid v. Mogers, 3 Sneed, 4, commented upon.</p>

<p>FROM SEVIER.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court.</p>

<p>1. Kraudulent Coutbyance. W. made a fraudulent conveyance of certain lands to M., who afterward, by direction of W., conveyed the same by absolute deed to P., hut, in reality, to secure a debt due from W. to P. The deed from M. to P. recited a false consideration, hut P. was not present, and knew nothing of the execution of the deed until it was afterward sent to him. Held, that P. had a right, as against the other creditors of W. as well as against W. himself, to retain the legal title to the lands to secure the payment of the debt to W., he having had no knowledge of nor participation in the fraudulent design of W. in having the legal title conveyed to him.</p> <p>2. Judgment. Setting aside. Satisfaction of. A judgment creditor of W. had execution issued and levied on the lands which had been conveyed to P., and purchased the same at the execution sale by bidding the amount of his judgment thereon. Held, that as said judgment creditor might well believe that P. had participated with W. in the attempt to hinder and delay his creditors, he had a right in equity to have the satisfaction of his judgment set aside.</p>

<p>EROM GREENE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. E. Gillen-WATERS, Judge.</p>

<p>WmL. Legacy. Attachment. A died leaving a mil, in -which he leaves to his wife and executrix the whole of his property, to be used by her for the support and education of his children, but allowing her at any time, in her discretion, to advance a portion of the estate among the children, and to assist any one of them who, from loss or misfortune, might be in want. There were seven children, and a creditor of one of them filed a bill seeking to attach and subject his interest under the will to the payment of the debt. Held, that the interest was so uncertain, contingent, and indefinite, that it was not susceptible of attachment.</p> <p>Case cited: Lockwood & Co. v. Nye et al., 2 Swan, 515.</p>

<p>Title Bond. Vendor’s lien. Waiver. Where a vendor of land simply executes to his vendee a bond for title, he remains clothed with the legal title, which the law will intend to have been retained as an absolute security for the purchase money, and the burden of proof is on the vendee to show a waiver.</p> <p>Cases cited: Campbell v. Baldwin, 2 Hum., 248; Anthony v. Smith, 9 Hum., 508.</p>

<p>FROM SULLIVAN.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. E. Gillen-waters, Judge.</p>

<p>Husband and Wide. Conveyance of property by wife before marriage in fraud of marital rights of the husband. A conveyance by a woman before marriage, and pending negotiations of marriage, of her property, made secretly and upon inadequate consideration, will be set aside by a court of equity, upon the application of the husband, as a fraud upon his marital rights. The settled rule in this State is, that every such transaction by a woman pending a treaty of marriage is not necessarily fraudulent and void, because the intended husband was not a party or privy thereto, but that each case must be judged by its own circumstances.</p> <p>Case cited: Lawden v. Harris, 1 Head, 203.</p>

<p>County Coubt. Removal of Guardian. The County Court has exclusive-jurisdiction in the matter oE appointing and removing guardians, and when, by its action, a guardian has been removed, and upon appeal to the Circuit Court said action is approved, this court will presume that the action oí the County Court was lawful and right, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.</p>

<p>Evidence. In an action brought by tbe plaintiff in error to recover damages from defendant in error for the killing of his intestate, the court allowed a statement of the facts connected with the accident, made by one of the defendant’s witnesses soon after its occurrence, and printed in a newspaper, to be read to the jury, and commented on by counsel as a part of the witness’s testimony, and as a contradiction of his testimony on trial of the cause going to his credit. In his charge to the jury the court withdrew from before the jury the statement so far as it had been admitted as evidence of the witness ' and binding on the company, but said to the jury that they might look to the printed statement as evidence so far as the same may be admitted by the witness to be correct, as part of his testimony. Held, that the admission of the printed statement as a part of the witness’s testimony in any view, was error, for which judgment should be reversed.</p>

<p>MvNICIPAl. Cobpobation. Police powers. Unreasonable exercise of. An ordinance of a municipal corporation forbidding licensed retailers of spirituous liquors to sell between tbe hours of 6 p. h. and 6 A. m. is invalid, because an unreasonable exercise of the police powers of the municipal corporation.</p>

<p>FROM WASHINGTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court.-,. Chancellor.</p>

<p>1. CHANCERY Pieading and Practice. Bill of review. A bill of review ■will not lie for error apparent, where a decree was pronounced dismissing the bill, when some of the defendants to it had not answered-</p> <p>Case cited: Eaton v. Dickinson, 3 Sneed, 401.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. A hill of review for new matter, or newly discovered evidence, can only he filed by leave of court, and such leave cannot he granted except in open court.</p> <p>Cases cited: Colville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 525; Frazer v. Sypert, 5-Sneed, 104.</p>

<p>Chancery Pleading and Pratice. Power to appoint administrator. Location of property to authorize. Where a bill, seeking to have an administrator appointed, alleges that the deceased’s “estate, goods, chattels and effects” were in a certain district at the time of his death,, allegation will be sufficient, under the statute, to give the chancery court of that district jurisdiction, as well as if the residence of the party at that time had been averred to be there.</p> <p>Code cited: see. 2209, art. 2, ch. 2.</p>

<p>FROM HAMILTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. D. M. Key,. Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM WASHINGTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court.</p>

<p>EROM ANDERSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Correction oe Deed. Mistake. Statute of Frauds. In a case where the vendor by mistake conveys to the purchaser a lot of a different number from the one actually sold to him, the jurisdiction of a court of equity to reform the deed so as to make it embrace the lot actually sold, is clear and undisputed. Nor does the statute of frauds, in such a case, intervene to bar the relief sought.</p> <p>Case cited: Bailey r. Bailey, 8 Hum., 233.</p>

<p>Costs. Amended bill. The surety for costs on the original bill is liable to the extent of the penalty of his bond for costs which accrue on an amended bill filed in the same cause, and such surety is not released by the fact that the court, upon motion, ordered the complainant to execute a new bond with other sureties, which he failed to do, and he afterwards took the pauper oath.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 3196a.</p>

<p>1. Mobtcag-e. SubstiMMon. A loaned B a sum of money, which B used in paying off a debt due to C, which was a balance for purchase money due on a lot of ground, the payment of which was secured by mortgage on the land. A, after B’s death, filed a bill against her heirs and administrator, alleging that there was an agreement between him and B to the effect that he should be substituted to 0, the mortgagee’s lien, and seeking to have the mortgage foreclosed for his benefit: Held, that if the facts were as alleged, though this was denied, it was not entitled to be substituted to the lien of the mortgagee, there being no priority, either, as creditor or security, between them.</p> <p>'2. Married Woman. Contract. A married woman cannot bind herself personally, or-her property by contract.</p>

<p>Constructive Delivery. Common carriers. R., Q-. & Co. shipped a certain number of bales of cotton to a consignor at Louisville over the lines of the W. & A. R. R. Co. and the 3ST. & C. R. R. Co. The cottoa ivas insured by the complainant, and was destroyed by lire at Chattanooga while in the possession of one or other of the railroads. The Insurance Company paid the loss, and seeks a recovery against them by way of subrogation to the rights of the owner. The right of the Insurance Company to a recovery being clear as to one or the other, the question was, which should bear the loss. The facts are, that the cotton was delivered to the W. & A. R. R., which brought it to Chattanooga on open cars, and there placed it on a side track known as the Y, which was the property of the ÍT. & C. Railroad, but which was used by all the railroads running into Chattanooga. While on the Y it was burned. The W. & A. R. R. insisted that the placing the cotton on the Y was a delivery, and adduced proof tending to show that in practice this was a delivery; whereas, the N. & C. R. R. claimed that it was not a delivery, and furnished prqof tending to show that among the roads using the Y delivery was not regarded as made until the car containing the freight was hauled to the transfer platform of the receiving road, and the freight examined and checked off by the bill of lading, and received by the clerk of the receiving company: Held, that the proof preponderated in favor of the latter view, and that there had, in fact,'been no delivery to the N. & C. R. R., and that the W. & A. R. R. was liable.</p>

<p>f Writ 03? Ebbob. Pleading and Practice. Married women. Statute o Limitations. Where a decree has been rendered against husband and wife jointly, and the husband's right to prosecute a writ of error is barred, the wife cannot, by next friend, file a record for writ of error, making her husband a defendant, while covert, for the reason that the suit must be jointly prosecuted.</p> <p>Cases cited: Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 483; Patterson v. Butterworth, 4 Yerg., 158; Barrow’s Lessee v. Nave, 2 Yerg., 227; Parker v. Elder, 11 Hum., 546.</p> <p>■ Code cited: Secs. 3180-81-82.</p>

<p>'CrrtntCH Trustees. Separation of Methodist Episcopal Ohurch. In 1811 certain land was conveyed to certain named persons, and their successors, as trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Ohurch, to he used for the purpose of worship, according to the discipline and government of that church. It was so used and held until the church separated into the two organizations, viz: The Methodist Episcopal Ohurch, South, and the Methodist Episcopal Ohurch, Horth. Under the articles of separation adopted at the time the separation took place, it was provided, among other things, that the church property in conference districts uniting with either organization should become the property of the particular organization (North or South) united with. Under the articles of separation, the Holston Conference, in whose district this property lay, united with the Southern branch. The property remained thus until 1865, when the Ohurch, North, took possession of the property, and held it as its property. This was done by the secession of a number of the members of this particular church, and three of its trustees from the Church, South, and uniting with the Northern branch. In a contest between the trustees who claimed it as the property of the Church, South, and the trustees who claimed as the property of the Church, North: Meld, that the trustees of the Ohurch, South, had the better right, because the separation of the Methodist Episcopal Ohurch being valid, the property in question became the property of the Ohurch, South, by the union of the Holstein Conference with that organization; and the secession of three of the trustees and other members did not carry with them the title.</p>

<p>Mechanic's Lien. Complainants sold lumber to the A. & C. R. R. Co., of which S. was the agent and superintendent. S. used a part of the lumber thus sold in building houses on his land: Held, that the Railroad Company failing to pay for the lumber, complainant had no mechanic’s lien on S.’s land to secure the payment for the same.</p> <p>'Code cited: Secs. 1981 and 1981a.</p>

<p>1. Married Woman. Privy examination. Registration for twenty years. After registration of a deed for twenty years, acknowledged by a married woman, under Code, sec. 2084, the presumption in favor of its validity is conclusive, and all enquiry upon the subject of ac-knowledgement, etc., is cut off.</p> <p>Cases cited: Mathewson v. Spencer, 4 Sneed, 384; same case, 3 Sneed, 520.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 2084.</p> <p>2. Statement under oath. Estoppel. In a bill filed by a woman after coverture, who made a statement under oath in direct conflict with the statement in the bill in this case: Held, that her first statement operated as an estoppel on her to allege a different state of facts.</p> <p>Cases cited: Cooley v. The State, 2 Head, 608; Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 5 Sneed, 39 to 48.</p>

<p>EROM BRADLEY.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. D. M. Key, Chancellor.</p>

<p>PROM HAWKINS.</p> <p>Appeal from tlie Chancery Court. S. J. "W-Luokey, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court.</p>

<p>Injunction Bond. Liability of sureties. Several bonds. The security-given on the injunction bond being proved insufficient, the court ordered that the complainant execute another bond, which was done, said bond having as securities thereon the security on the original bond and several other names. Afterwards, another bond was executed with the same persons as sureties, and one other. In a contest between* the sureties on these several bonds, as to the order of their liability, held, that they were equally liable, and that the securities other than the original security are not to be taken as successive and additional securities, increasing the amount of money secured to he paid, but only as additional names to the original bond, because as all the parties on the first and second bonds are on the third bond with tlie addition of two others, that the last bond was intended to he equivalent to the addition of the other names to the first hond and nothing more.</p>

<p>Statute oe Limitations. In 1823 K., the owner in lee of a tract of land, intermarried with F. In 1826 F. sold the land to C., and gave him bond for title; 0. held the land under actual enclosure until 1831, when he died. It came through a regular chain of conveyances to the defendants. K., the original owner, died in 1866, and F. survived until 1869. The plaintiffs, daughters of K., brought this action to recover in January, 1871. The adverse holding of the land by the various parties in possession commenced in 1826. ' Held, that plaintiffs were barred by twenty years adverse possession, and were not entitled to recover.</p> <p>[¿Cases cited: Guión v. Anderson, 8 Hum., 298; Wersign v. Murphy, 2 Head, 674.</p>

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>erom hawkins.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. H. C. Smith, Chancellor.</p>

<p>PROM ROANE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Elijah T. Hall, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM BLEDSOE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. IIoyl, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM SULLIVAN.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. C. J. St. John, Special Judge.</p>

<p>EROM GREENE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. E. Gillen-waters, Judge.</p>

<p>Banks and Banking. Bills and notes. Usury. Meeovery of. Pleading and practice. The act of Congress prescribing a penalty as a punishment for violating the law by national banks with regard to usury, will not preclude the State courts from compelling the restoration of the usury, according to its local laws, to the party from whom it was received, or his creditor, especially where it does not appear that the penalty has been enforced prescribed by the act of congress, or is now subject to be enforced.</p>

<p>from sbquatchie.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>Appeal from the Criminal Court. M. L. Hall, Judge.</p>

<p>PROM CARTER.</p> <p>Appeal from' the Chancery Court. E. E. Gillen-waters, Chancellor.</p>

<p>Chauceby Pbacticu. Belief granted different from that specially prayed for. When. Relief may be granted under tbe general prayer of a bill in chancery different from that specially prayed for when it is consistent with the facts alleged and proven, if it does not take the defendant by surprise.</p> <p>Case cited: Rose v. Mynatt, 7 Yer., 37.</p>

<p>1. Beal Pb.opeb.ty. Tenancy by the curtesy. Estates in remainder. Gondi-iional fees. Wills. A husband may be tenant by the curtesy 'where the estate of the wife was a conditional or determinable fee, although, the condition has happened upon which the limitation oyer in favor of other parties takes effect.</p> <p>Facts: A devised land to three children, the general words of the will vesting them with a fee simple title, the following clause being added: If either of the three should die without heirs, the estate shall fall to the two; if two should die, to the one; and if the one should die without heirs, the property should be divided between the heirs of C. and J. Two died without issue, the survivor, a girl, married and had one child born alive, which soon thereafter died, being followed by the mother: Held, that the husband was entitled to an estate by the curtesy in the land so descended.</p> <p>•Case cited: Love v'. Ingram, MS. . 2. Same. Insolvent proceedings. Sale of land to pay debts. Wills. Specific devise. Wliere tlie testator die'd leaving land undisposed of by will, and some specifically divised, tlie former only being specially charged with the payment of debts: Held, that the lands not devised should be sold first, in exoneration of that which was, from the payment of debts.</p>

<p>Ohaitceby PRACTICE. Administrators and executors. Constitutional Law. Comity of States. Descent and distribution. A bill may be filed in the courts of this State by creditors, who are also heirs, living in Georgia, against the executor or administrator of the estate under which they claim, “ for an account of the funds, etc., and upon the exhaustion of the personalty that the lands be sold to satisfy their recovery, etc.1’ And this may be done notwithstanding enough property unencumbered and subject to complainants’ demand, though they have not exhausted such remedy first, belonging to the estate is located in their own State. That the property in this State was disposed of by will, and the testator died intestate as to that in Georgia, will not change the result.</p>

<p>1. CnrMTSTAi, Law. Change of venue. Affidavit for upon grounds of undue excitement. Where a prisoner offers his own affidavit for change of venue upon the grounds of undue excitement against him, etc., if it appears from the record that the excitement was manifested at the time of the arrest, and was confined to the immediate friends of the deceased, and there being no satisfactory evidence that it was existing at the trial term so as to prejudice the defendant, it will not he error to refuse the change of venue under such circumstances.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 5195.</p> <p>2. Same. Charge of cov/rt as to commuting punishment, etc. It is not error under the facts of this case for the court to neglect to charge that the jury have the power to commute the death penalty, for murder in the first degree, to.imprisonment for life, etc., when not requested to do so.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 5257.</p> <p>S. Same. Confessions. Admissibility of. Such feaifof the ultimate con sequences of his crime, as perhaps every criminal feels when arrested and confronted with his accusers, will not render a confession inadmissible. The prisoner was arrested for murder, and brought over one hundred miles to the neighborhood where deceased had lived, and was being handcuffed at a blacksmith shop where a number of the relatives and friends of the deceased gathered about, and some excitement was manifested ; a brother-in-law of deceased wanted to take off the prisoner’s shirt, which he said was bought with deceased’s money, and a son of deceased used some abusive language to the prisoner, but no attempt at violence was offered, the officers having him in charge assuring him that he'should be protected. After he was handcuffed he was taken to a house three hundred yards away, where he made a partial confession; and afterward, on his way to Tazewell, when every thing was quiet, no threats were being made and not a word had been spoken for half an hour, he made a full confession to his guards. Held, that such a confession made under the facts of this case is ad- ■ missible as evidence, and testimony to the effect that the prisoner told another person that his confessions so made afterwad were all false and made through fear, cannot be admitted in evidence, and will not alter the case.</p> <p>Cases cited: Wilson v. The State, 3 Heis., 244^5.</p> <p>4. Same. Omission of court to gire a full charge upon self-defense wider an indictment for mwrder. Under the facts of this case, and the verdict being for murder in the first degree, it is clearly shown that an omission of a full charge upon the question of self-defense, worked no injury to the defendant, and is therefore not a reversible error.</p> <p>Cases cited: Williams i>. The State, 3 Heis., 379, and the case of Bay v. The State, there cited.</p>

<p>EROM BLEDSOE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. John B. Hoyl, Judge.</p>

<p>PROM KNOX.</p> <p>No record found.</p>

<p>EROM 'WASHIU©TOW.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. E. E. Gillen-WATERS, Judge.</p>

<p>PROM GREENE.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. H. C. Smith, Chancellor.</p>

<p>PROM -LOUDON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>EBOM HAMILTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. D. M. Key, Chancellor.</p>

<p>PROM VAN BUREN.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. McConnell, Judge.</p>

<p>PROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from Circuit Court. Nathaniel Banted, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery and Circuit Courts. W. E. Cooper, Chancellor, and Nathaniel Baxter, Judge»</p>

<p>FROM WILLIAMSON.</p> <p>■ Appeal from the Chancery Court. W. S. Fleming, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM HUMPHREYS.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Bice, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Law Court. Jo. C.' Guild, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM SMITH.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. Wm. G. Craw-XjEY, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Law of Nashville. J. C. Guild, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Executors and Admdubtratobs. Sureties on bond of, liable for what. Duties of executor. Defendants due from executor to testator before death. Sureties liable for. Where a creditor dies leaving a will, by which he appoints his debtor his executor, the sureties on the bond of the executor are liable for the debt due from the debtor to his testator, at the suit of the legatees, who are entitled to the fund, if with due and proper diligence the same could have been collected, had it been due from a third party, and the executor required to collect the same.</p> <p>Case cited: Hughlett v. Hughlett, 5 Hum., 467-473.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 2223-2252.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. Where a suit is pending for the recovery of a claim, without evidence of fraud or such gross negligence, as might imperil the debt, ordinarily the executor should not be charged with the same.</p>

<p>1. Evidence. Incompetency of representatives in action by or against. The act of 1869-70, oh. 78, sec. 2 (Code, sec. 3813d), provides that in an action by or against an executor, administrator, or guardian, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by the testator, intestate, or ward, unless called by the opposite party or required to testify by the court, the purpose of the law being to prevent the surviving party from having the benefit of his own testimony, when by the death of his adversary his representative was deprived of the deceased’s version of the transaction or statement.</p> <p>2. Case in Judgment. Therefore where the deposition of the testator was taken and filed before his death, giving his statement of the transaction, and the surviving parties were competent to give, and have given their version of the transaction, upon the suit being revived by his executor, the reason for the exclusion of the testimony does not exist.</p> <p>3. Counterfeit Money. Payment in. The payment of a counterfeit bill upon a debt is a nullity, and does not extinguish the debt. The bill should be returned within a reasonable time after it is discovered to be worthless, otherwise the party so receiving the bill must bear the loss.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 3813a, b, e, d.</p>

<p>FROM JACKSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. McConnell, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Chancery Practice. Decrees. Appeal from. New parties. Where a hill is filed at one term of the court against specific parties, and a decree is had in favor of complainants, a new defendant, who has heen made such by order of the court at a subsequent term, may appeal from a decree rendered at that time, reviving the former judgment of the court against him, which will reopen the entire case with all its former decrees, so far as he is concerned, for review by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 3157.</p> <p>2. Deeds of Trust. 77. S. Revenue stamps. Instruments not mid for want of. When. It will he error to declare a deed of trust void solely for the want of a revenue stamp.</p>

<p>Attachment. Replevin bond. Sureties on liable for what. Ghancery practice. Glerh and master. Where personal property has been attached by bill in chancery, the defandant may replevy the same by giving the proper bond in such cases, and if the court decrees the return and sale of the property pending the suit, after use by defendant under the bond because of its perishability, the sureties on the bond are not . liable for any difference between what was actually realized by the sale and the valuation of the property fixed in the bond.</p> <p>Case cited: Muhling v. Craneman, 4 Baxter, 88.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 3509, 3514 and 3535.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Nathaniel Baxter, Judge.</p>

<p>EROM BEDFORD.</p> <p>Appeal from tbe Circuit Court. W. H. William-soN, Judge.</p>

<p>Real Pbopebty. Administrator. Redemption of land by. Rights of creditors. Where the son is a judgmennt creditor of, and administrator upon his father’s estate, he may redeem land belonging to the estate, which has been, sold for'the payment of debts, and hold the same as any other redeeming creditor, and his fiduciary relation as administrator will not alter the case.</p> <p>Case cited: Dulles et al. v. Head et al., 6 Yer., 53, 65, 68.</p> <p>The court say: “As a judgment creditor of said Giles T. said Robert G. had the undoubted right to redeem, or to purchase the claims of creditors who had liens. That right was exercised upon the last day upon which he could claim it, no one else who had such right having at any time theretofore offered to redeem, and we cannot see that he, as administrator, sustained any such fiduciary relation to the land as that he should forego the exercise of an undoubted legal right. Nor that because he was heir at law, as well as judgment creditor, he might not for himself and the widow and heirs of his father, purchase the rights and claims of creditors having liens upon the land; or as such judgment creditor redeem from them, holding the land as any other redeeming creditor would hold it.”</p>

<p>1. Venditioni Exponas. Error in teste. Practice in Supreme Court. An error merely clerical in the teste of process will not vitiate, as where a venditioni exponas issued from this court bearing- teste first Monday of December, 1875, instead of first Monday of January, 1876, especially after a sale has been made. Such errors upon application will be remedied.</p> <p>2. Judicial Notice. Change of term time. This court will take judicial notice of the death of one of its clerks and appointment of another, as well as a change in the time of meeting by the Legislature.</p>

<p>FROM BEDFORD.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. Jno. R. Steele, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Nathaniel Baxter,. Judge.</p>

<p>1. SUSPENSION op Statute op Limitations. Covertwe. Where the right of action had accrued, and afterward the statute is suspended, and during the suspension plaintiff is married, the coverture existing at the end of the suspension cannot he relied on to defeat the bar.</p> <p>Case cited: Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs, 6 Yei%, 160-68.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 2775.</p> <p>2. Same. Guardian and ward. Trustee. A ward is not barred because the statute has run as to the guardian. The doctrine that when the trustee is barred the cestv/i que trust is also barred, does not apply to guardian and ward.</p> <p>Case cited: Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 67.</p> <p>3. SURETIES. Several bonds. Sureties upon several bonds may be sued at the same time. It is not necessary to exhaust the property of the guardian and sureties on the last bond, before bringing suit against sureties on the first.</p> <p>Case cited: Jamison v. Cosby, 11 Hum., 273.</p>

<p>Municipal CORPORATION. Sights of eminent domain. And general power over corporate property. Streets, etc. Sale of land. Forcible entry and de-tainer. Case in point: The plaintiff was put in possession by the corporate authorities of Pulaski of a piece of property forming an angle between two streets, which he had, under these circumstances, occupied for nearly thirty years, when the city sold the same to the defendant as “ a lot or parcel of ground,” giving him a deed, etc., and in order to put the purchaser in possession, after giving plaintiff ten days’ notice to vacate, the town constable, by order of the city council, destroyed plaintiff’s enclosure, and placed defendant in occupation of the property, whereupon plaintiff sues in an action of forcible entry and detainer. Upon the trial the court below excluded the deed from evidence given by the city to defendant. Verdict was in favor of defendant. Held:</p> <p>1. A municipal corporation, under the facts of this case, has no authority, by virtue of its general and charter powers, to remove nuisances from the streets, its right of eminent domain and general power over the corporate grounds to eject in the manner stated the occupant of a lot claimed by the city, in view of all the circumstances, to place its ven-dee of the same in possession.</p> <p>2. Since the corporation might be estopped from treating the property thus sold as a street, thereby giving some technical advantages, it was improper to exclude the deed in evidence, though it could not be used as a muniment of title.</p> <p>Question of estoppel and statute of limitations in their applicability to ■ municipal corporations discussed.</p>

<p>EEOM GILES.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. W. P. Maktin, Judge.</p>

<p>FROM MARRY.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Martin, Judge.</p>

<p>CanvmsrAX Law. Officer who has charge of jury. Instructions to by Judge. The record shows that alter the jury were elected, empanneled, tried, and sworn, they were respited until the meeting oí the court on the next day, and were placed in charge of W. H. T. Morgan, an officer of the court, “ who was duly sworn according to law to keep the jury together, separate and apart from all other citizens whatsoever, until their return into open court to resume consideration Of the cause now on trial.</p> <p>The court say: We are asked to presume that the judge below administered the oath as required by law; this we cannot do, as the record shows affirmatively that no such oath was administered.</p>

<p>PARTNERSHIP. Rills and notes. Right to recover on note signed hy name different from firm name, eta. Ordinarily, a firm must bind itself by its proper firm name, but to this there are exceptions. If the firm had, by-use, adopted a name somewhat differing from that stipulated in the articles of partnership, and if under that different name it borrow money for the benefit of the firm, the money may be recovered of the firm by the name under which they may have executed the security sued on.</p>

<p>Cbihinai. Law. Admissibility of confessions. Evidence. The prisoner was arrested on the charge of murder on Sunday. It appearing to the magistrate trying the cause that the testimony was insufficient to hind the prisoner over on, he suggested to Dr. Logue that he had better take the prisoner out and talk to him, and tell him about turning State’s evidence, which he did, but the prisoner denied all knowledge of the crime, and was thereupon released. On Monday he was rearrested, and before trial was again approached by one Merritt, who held out to him, also, the benefits of a confession. He was also told of the consequences of not making a statement, and that he was strongly suspected. These persons were neither an officer, prosecutor, or any one in authority. There was some excitement against the prisoner. Upon the last trial before the committing magistrates, which took jilace on Tuesday, perhaps, the prisoner voluntarily, after being told that it could be taken against him, but not for him, without persuasion or threats, made a confession admitting his complicity, but charging the real crime upon others, which was taken down in writing by one of the magistrates. He made several conflicting statements, but finally said that the written one was true, and the others were false: Held, that under all the circumstances it was proper to admit the statement as taken down by the magistrate as evidence on the prisoner’s trial in the criminal court for murder.</p>

<p>FROM SUMNER.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. Jo. C. Guild, Judge.</p>

<p>EROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. W. F. Cooper, Chancellor.</p>

<p>FROM SHELBY.</p> <p>Appeal from the Chancery Court. L. P. Walker, Chancellor.</p>

<p>Oeiminaij Law. Date of the offense omitted in indictment cured by verdict. No day is specified in the indictment on which the offense is alleged to have been committed, hut simply that the defendant “ did felon-iously take, steal and carry away,” etc. Meld, this defect is cured by a verdict of the jury.</p> <p>Case cited and commented upon: King v. The State, 3 Heis., 151.</p>

<p>Illegitimacy. Descent. When an illegitimate woman dies seized of real estate, leaving no child, mother or brother, but leaving a husband and illegitimate sister; held, that the sister is not entitled to the estate as against the husband.</p> <p>Cases cited: Webb v. Webb, 3 Head, 69; Woodward n. Duncan, 1 Col., 563.</p> <p>Code cited: Secs. 2423, 2423a.</p>

<p>1. INSURANCE. Insurable interest of plaintiff put in issue. Evirdem, of proof on him. Evidence. Pleading and practice. Upon an action seeking to recover against an insurance company the amount of a policy issued upon a building destroyed by fire, if the insurable interest of the plaintiff be put in issue by plea, the burden of proof is upon him, though he had possession at the time of the loss.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. lease. Forfeiture. The happening of the condition must be taken advantage of by landlord. In case of a lease providing for forfeiture on failure to pay taxes, if payment is made before the for- , feitare is taken advantage of by re-entry on the part of the landlord, the forfeiture will be saved.</p>

<p>CKDsnNAlj Law. Discharge of jury without verdict. Special Judge. Entry o record. The prisoner had been tried previously for the same offense. Upon that trial the evidence was heard and jury charged, when the judge was taken suddenly sick, and a special judge elected according to law in such cases. It was agreed that the jury might retain a verdict as though the regular judge presided; they had to be discharged without agreeing, all of which appeared of record, being entered with other business transacted by the regular court before leaving the bench, who failed to sign the minutes for several terms thereafter. .5ield, that this did not entitle the defendant to be discharged.</p> <p>Case cited: Moore v. State, 3 Heis., 493.</p>

<p>PROM TIPTON.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court. T. J. Flippin, Judge.</p>

<p>Ckiminax. Law. Lewdness. Two persons jointly indicted for. One may be convicted, though the other was acquitted. A conviction of one party, charged with lewdness, may follow the acquittal of the other, jointly charged.</p>

<p>Bills AND Notes. Principal <md surety. Application of payment. Election. A principal in several endorsed notes paid to his creditor a sum of money, which was applied as partial payment on one of the notes by the creditor, who received no directions as to its application. Held, That it was error for the holder of the note to erase the credit and place it upon another one of the notes,-some time afterward, at the principal’s request, as it violated the rights of the endorsers upon the first note, which received the payment.</p>

<p>Action on Replevin. Comity of States. Receiver. Attachment. Where tie court of a sister State, laving jurisdiction of tie parties and subject matter, and laving tie property -within its actual control, appoints a receiver to take possession of and sell the property, and this order is executed by the property being actually taken into possession by the receiver, this -will give to him against the parties to the litigation, and those claiming through them, a special property and right of possession that -will enable him to maintain an action of replevin, and that right -will not be lost by sending the property to this State ■ for sale; to this extent, this court will respect the order and judgments of the courts of sister States. The receiver can, in such case, maintain the action in his individual capacity to recover the property from an attaching creditor in this State, notwithstanding he may have failed until afterward to qualify and give the bond as such.</p>

<p>FROM SHELBY.</p> <p>]STo record found.</p>

<p>CBUmsTAlj Law. Jury. Swearing of officer in charge of. Omission of record. Where the record fails to show that the officer in charge of the jury was duly sworn, the omission will be cured by the presumption that such was the case, which will relieve it from being a reversible error. It appeared of record in this case simply, that D. W. Rivers, deputy sheriff, had the jury placed in his charge, and was instructed to attend them. The court refused to reverse.</p> <p>Cases cited: Duncan v. The State and Johnson r. The State, this volume.</p> <p>Code cited: Sec. 758.</p>