67 Wash. 2d 111 - State v. Alter’s Empirical Analysis
1965
Citation profile
24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently October 2009
24 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Pollard v. United States · Williams v. United States · United States v. Provoo · United States of America Ex Rel. Louis Von Cseh v. Edward M. Fay, Warden of Greenhaven State Prison, Stormville, New York · State v. Dehler
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“`the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Const, art. 1, § 22 (amendment 10) provides that, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public trial . . . .” This constitutional requirement for a speedy trial for an accused is implemented by RCW 10.46.010, the “60-day” statute requiring trial of defendant within 60 days after indictment is found or the information filed unless good cause is shown for a delay. . . . Our statute was enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although our statute sets a limitation of 60 days as an arbitrary measure to determine a speedy trial, yet whether a “trial has been ‘speedy’ is a matter which depends upon relative values and the circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether the constitutional right has been protected.” 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1912 note 2, (Supp. 1964). It has been suggested that “Four factors are relevant to a consideration of whether denial of a speedy trial assumes due process proportions: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant.” United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963). . . . . “The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive.” Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 , 1 L. Ed. 2d 393 , 77 Sup. Ct. 481 (1957). There must not be “arbitrary, oppressive or vexatious delay which . . . [is] prejudicial” Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1955). (Footnote omitted.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“`in the light of the circumstances of each particular case,'”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Iniguez
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.