Jackson v. Foti’s Empirical Analysis
670 F.2d 516 · 1982
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently October 2000
7 federal appellate · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Washington v. Glucksberg · Jackson v. Indiana · Specht v. Patterson · Humphrey v. Cady · Baxstrom v. Herold
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'Mental institutions exist for the benefit of those who can be helped by care and treatment or who require custodial attention. They are not substitutes for prisons.' Nor can they be permitted to become such.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"Jackson contends that his post-acquittal detention is unlawful because it has never been determined judicially that he is both mentally ill and dangerous. The principal evidence of Jackson's insanity or incompetency refers to his mental state at the time of the offense in 1974 and immediately thereafter. Jackson was declared to be insane at that time for purposes of Louisiana's criminal code.8 All other specific findings, indeed the bulk of the evidence adduced at the subsequent hearings, involve the issue of Jackson's potential dangerousness if he were released. Each time the court remanded Jackson to the mental institution, the order was based on a finding that he was considered a menace to himself and society. The record does not contain a determination that Jackson is mentally ill, although there is evidence which may be taken as inferentially reflecting such illness. However, the record contains medical reports suggesting that Jackson is not mentally ill and a conclusionary finding by the trial judge of current sanity. As defined in the civil commitment statute, to be mentally ill one must be afflicted "with a psychiatric disorder which has substantial adverse effects on... [one's] ability to function and ... requires care and treatment." La.R.S. 28:2(14). Jackson maintains that this fundamental basis for civil commitments should control the institutionalization of insanity acquittees. Subject to certain variances and limitations, appropriately applicable to criminal co”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Perez“"Under Powell, dangerousness is a determination that does not lie solely within the province of medical opinion; "a state may reasonably allow the judge to play a greater role in making this determination... than he plays in other civil commitment cases." 579 F.2d at 333. In view of Jackson's anti-social act of homicide, the state trial judge was entitled, on this record, to find Jackson to be dangerous. As we observed in Powell : This past conduct justifies a greater role for the trial judge in determining whether an insanity acquitee remains dangerous to society in order to protect society from similar behavior in the future. Id. (citing United States v. Ecker, 177 U.S. App.D.C. 31, 543 F.2d 178 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 , 97 S.Ct. 788 , 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977))."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Perez
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.