Shcolnik v. Rapid Settlements Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The district court held that Appellants could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to willfulness, because they did not actually pay Shcolnik [the Debtor] the million dollars he demanded. The court interpreted the Supreme Court to require that a debtor intend “the alleged injury itself’ in order to fulfill the willfulness component of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(6). Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 , 118 S.Ct. 974 , 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). Kawaauhau held that a willful injury, in this context, is a “deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” 523 U.S. at 61 , 118 S.Ct. at 977 . Appellants have neither alleged nor offered evidence that Shcolnik intended to inflict litigation costs on them, which is the debt for which they urge nondischargeability. Unfortunately, the district court failed to consult this court’s opinions interpreting Kawaauhau . First, we have held that an injury is “ “willful and malicious’ where there is either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.” In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.1998); In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 508-09 (5th Cir.2003). Second, we noted that “it would seem peculiar to deem an action causing injury not ‘willful’ when the tort-feasor’s action was in fact motivated by a desire to cause injury.” Miller, 156 F.3d at 604 . In an opinion nearly contemporaneous with Miller , this court stated that “ ‘the debtor must have intended the act”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp. v. Swasey (In re Swasey)

2. “When client property is entrusted to an attorney the attorney-client relationship, which would otherwise be a fiduciary relationship based upon special knowledge, skills, and expectations, becomes, in addition to that, a technical trust relationship. With the entrustment of property an attorney automatically takes on the duties (i.e., “fiduciary capacity”) of a trustee. These trust duties are in addition to the ordinary fiduciary duties attendant upon a purely service based (e.g., litigation) attorney-client relationship. It is the entrustment of property which superimposes a technical trust upon the attorney-client relationship and it is the existence of a technical trust which places the lawyer in a fiduciary capacity. Consequently, the exception to discharge under § 523(a)(4) “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” will not apply to a lawyer unless he or she has been entrusted with funds or property. When, as here, the underlying debt is a judgment for professional negligence or fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to legal services like litigation, the § 523(a)(4) exception will not apply.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. MacPherson v. Marano (In re Marano)

3. “[Shcolnik] absconded with various documents from [the companies’] offices. Shcolnik then began threatening to disclose alleged criminal and regulatory violations by [the companies] if they did not “buy-out” his “ownership interests.” In emails, he referred to a “doomsday plan” which would be launched if Stewart Feldman, the primary owner of [the companies], did not “properly compensate” him for his “ownership interests ... which appear to be worth in excess of $1,000,000.” He threatened a “massive series of legal attacks ... which will likely leave you disbarred, broke, professionally disgraced, and rotting in a prison cell,” and expressed his hope that Feldman would be the victim of prison rape.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Purser v. Scarbrough (In re Scarbrough)