Waring v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

54 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] defendant has standing to assert the violation of a co-defendant’s fourth amendment rights if he or she can show (1) that a police officer obtained the evidence as a result of gross or shocking misconduct, or (2) that the officer deliberately violated a co-defendant’s rights.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Samson v. State · Christianson v. State

2. “[W]e will employ an objective standard to determine whether or not a seizure has occurred, i.e., whether or not a reasonable person would believe that he or she was free to go. We recognize that upon being confronted by a police officer, the average person would feel an obligation to respond to the officer’s questions and not to walk away. Such a confrontation, therefore, will amount to a seizure “only if the officer added to those inherent pressures by engaging in” “conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive even if coming from another private citizen.” 3 W. LaPave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2, at 53, 54 (1978) (footnote omitted). “[T]he critical inquiry would be whether the policeman, although perhaps making inquiries which a private citizen would not be expected to make, has otherwise conducted himself in a manner consistent with what would be viewed as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two ordinary citizens.” Id.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Castle v. State · Lindsay v. State

3. “[W]e believe that law enforcement officers generally conduct searches and seizures of an individual’s person or property for the purpose of prosecuting that individual, rather than for the purpose of prosecuting a co-defendant. If a search or seizure were unlawful, any resulting evidence would be excluded at the trial of the defendant whose rights were violated. To apply the exclusionary rule a second time in a co-defendant's trial would not serve any additional deterrent purpose. Id. at 361-62 (footnote omitted). Although no evidence was suppressed in the instant case, there was certainly a threat of suppression if the police violated Fisher’s rights and Fisher was involved. On the facts of this case, any holding that Fisher’s rights were violated would turn on a determination by this court that the police did not have reasonable suspicion that "imminent public danger existed] or [that] serious harm to persons or property [had] recently occurred_’’ Whether the facts of this case would fit within that phrase would involve a difficult case of first impression for this court. We conclude that allowing Christianson to have standing to assert Fisher’s rights would "not serve any additional deterrent purpose.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Christianson v. State · State v. Batts