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671 F.2d 367

Docket No. 80-5459.

Cordner v. United States

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 1982.

Decided March 15, 1982.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1982-03-15

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Section 1001(b) is clearly intended to permit a realistic assessment of the economic gain or loss attending a sale or exchange. That purpose would be frustrated by an interpretation that compelled gold coins to be treated at a fraction of their true value. We therefore conclude that money in § 1001(b) refers to the currently circulating medium of exchange, while property includes coins that have, by reason of their value to collectors or the intrinsic worth of their contents, a fair market value in excess of their face value. Because the key element is the excess of market over face value, it is immaterial that such coins may be legal tender at their face value.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Kahre

“We have no difficulty in holding that the gold coins here, though legal tender and hence money for some purposes, are also property to be taxed at fair market value because they have been withdrawn from circulation and have numismatic worth. When legal tender, by reason of its value to collectors or the intrinsic worth of its contents, has a fair market value in excess of its face value or tender, then it should be deemed property other than money ...”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Kahre

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 1001 · 26 U.S.C. § 301

Relies on Joslin v. United States · 264 F. Supp. 193 - In Re Midas Coin Company · Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently December 2013

12 federal appellate ·

1101982199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*368Thomas R. Sheppard, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for plaintiffs-appellants; Michael D. Fernhoff, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.

¶2John A. Dudeck, Washington, D. C., argued, for defendant-appellee; M. Carr Ferguson, Michael L. Paup, Richard Farber, Richard D. Buik, Washington, D. C., on brief.

¶3Before CHAMBERS, KENNEDY, and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.

¶4KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:

¶5Appellants own substantially all the outstanding shares of stock of First Thrift Investors, a California corporation, and they received 275 $20 Double Eagle gold coins as a corporate dividend distribution. The coins had been purchased by a First Thrift wholly-owned subsidiary at their fair market value and had been distributed to First Thrift Investors as a dividend. Appellants reported the dividend at the face value of the coins, $5,500, but, upon audit, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue charged appellants with a taxable dividend in an amount equal to the fair market value of the coins, which was $70,936. In the refund action brought by appellants below, after they had paid the deficiency under protest, the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.

¶6Under section 301 of the Internal Revenue Code, the amount of any corporate distribution to non-corporate distributees, for dividend purposes, is “the amount of money received, plus the fair market value of the other property received.” I.R.C. § 301(b)(1)(A). We have no difficulty in holding that the gold coins here, though legal tender and hence “money” for some purposes, are also “property” to be taxed at fair market value because they have been withdrawn from circulation and have numismatic worth. California Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 107, 111 (1981) (gold coins, though legal tender, are property and not money for purposes of similarly worded I.R.C. § 1001(b), defining amounts realized from sale).

¶7When legal tender, by reason of its value to collectors or the intrinsic worth of its contents, has a fair market value in excess of its face value or tender, then it should be deemed property other than money for purposes of section 301(b)(1)(A). See California Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, supra; cf. Joslin v. United States, 666 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), aff’g 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 9643 (D.Utah March 23,1981) (silver coins received for legal services are taxed at fair market value). See also In re Midas Coin Co., Inc., 264 F.Supp. 193 (E.D.Mo. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968) (treating coins having appreciated numismatic value as “goods” under Uniform Commercial Code).

¶8AFFIRMED.

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