671 So. 2d 1101 - Millet v. Cormier’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This duty is the same under the strict liability theory of La.C.C. art. 2317 as under the negligent liability theory of La.C.C. art. 2315. The difference in proof between these theories of liability is that, under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315, it must be shown that the owner, or person in custody, either knew or should have known of the risk, whereas under La.C.C. art. 2317, a claimant is relieved of proving the defendants' scienter. Under either theory of liability, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that: (1). the property which caused the damage was in the custody of the defendant; (2) the property was defective because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises. (breach of duty); (3) the defect in the property was a cause in fact of the resulting injury. In both negligence and strict liability cases, the reasonableness of the risk is determined by balancing the probability and magnitude of the risk against the utility of the thing. Under either theory of liability, the court must decide if the risk which causes the injury is within the ambit of protection of the duty. Farr, 430 So.2d at 1143 . (Citations omitted). Moreover, in Koppie v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 478 So.2d 179 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), writ denied, 479 So.2d 922 (La. 1985), we further defined what type of defect gives rise to strict liability and said that: [Under a theory of strict liability] not every minor imperfection or irregularity will give rise to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 707 So. 2d 475 - Creel v. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc.

2. “Although the Louisiana Supreme Court abolished assumption of the risk, it has maintained its well established policy that "the duty which a landowner owes to persons entering his property is governed by a standard of reasonableness, and that a potentially dangerous condition that should be obvious to all comers is not, in all instances, unreasonably dangerous." Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931 (La.1991); Murray, 521 So.2d at 1136 (citing Shelton, 334 So.2d at 410). "Therefore, under a duty/risk analysis, if the facts of a particular case warrant, there could be a finding that a defendant owed no duty under circumstances, or on the other hand, that a plaintiff was 100% at fault." Socorro, 579 So.2d at 941 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 732 So. 2d 597 - Penton v. Schuster

3. “[A] pedestrian is not required to look for hidden dangers, but is bound to observe his course to see if his pathway is clear. The pedestrian is held to have seen those obstructions in his pathway which would have been discovered by a reasonably prudent person exercising ordinary care under the circumstances. Davidson v. Shreveport Yacht Club, Inc., 535 So.2d 1192 (La. App. 2 Cir.1988), writ denied, 537 So.2d 1162 (La.1989).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 707 So. 2d 475 - Creel v. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc.